[R-P] More about Serbia

[Edgar Schmid]

Realmente no sé si el nacionalismo serbio es burgués o
no.

Tampoco me importa mucho. Lo que sí:

a. hay un bloque de nacionalistas moderados (si estos
son los moderados, ¡que serán los exaltados!),
social-nacionalistas, ultra-derechistas, nacionalistas
"democráticos", nacionalistas de Nueva Serbia,
nacionalistas de Milosevic (y como dijo el taxista de
Belgrado: nacionalistas somos todos)

b. El caso es que derrotarían a los "modernizadores"
pro-europeos (pro-European modernizers backed by
Western European leaders)

c. Si ganan los nacion alistas, para la Unión Europea
se pudre todo.

d. Los nacionalistas serbios tienen la puta costumbre
de ir a contramano del resto de Europa.

e. Son como los clavos, más lo martillás, más se
hunden en la madera.

Hay que aguantarlos porque, "el enemigo de mi enemigo
es mi amigo"

''Intelligence Brief: Serbian Nationalists Consolidate
Influence''

The Serbian parliament elected the far right
nationalist Tomislav Nikolic to the post of president
on May 8. Moderate nationalists, led by Prime Minister
Vojislav Kostunica, backed Nikolic and paved the way
for the emergence of a social-nationalist bloc
composed of the far right, the democratic
nationalists, the New Serbia group, and the Socialists
(political heirs of Slobodan Milosevic).

Due to Serbia's constitutional rules, fresh elections
will be called for in July if the parliament is unable
to agree on a new government by next Monday. If
Serbians cast ballots in July, the social-nationalist
parties will likely gain the upper hand against
pro-European modernizers backed by Western European
leaders.

If nationalist, anti-E.U. parties prevail by
parliamentary or electoral means, the European Union's
efforts to quickly integrate Serbia into the Union
will suffer a critical setback. Such an outcome will
increase geopolitical instability in the western
Balkans, as Kosovo strives for independence from
Belgrade. Moreover, the Serbian economy will likely
suffer from higher political risk, at least in the
short term.

Serbian nationalism is a deeply rooted sociological
and political phenomenon and emanates from Serbian
history. Notwithstanding the weakening of classical
nationalism all over Europe in the 20th century,
Serbian society and its political scene have their own
specificity that cannot be read through the lenses of
Western European pro-globalization ideology.

The Balkan wars in the 1990s and the deep frustration
in Serbia that ensued from Yugoslavia's disintegration
provided the social and ideological basis for the
persistence of nationalism. The 1999 N.A.T.O. war
against Belgrade aggravated Serbians further, even
though many of them sincerely opposed Slobodan
Milosevic's socialist rule.

Elites and citizens have never accepted Western
support for Kosovo's ethnic Albanians and are unhappy
with N.A.T.O.'s, the European Union's, and the United
Nations' "soft treatment" of anti-Serbian movements
and actions by Albanian nationalists. Moreover,
Belgrade was unhappy with Montenegro's independence
last year, both for domestic and geopolitical reasons.
[See: "Intelligence Brief: Montenegro Votes for
Independence"]

Serbian democratic institutions after the pivotal
years of 1999-2000 and the end of Milosevic's rule
have remained weak. Political instability has been
dominant in the country, while the European Union has
often proved overly optimistic in its expectations
about its capability to normalize Serbia and to
quickly integrate it into its political structures.

The Kosovo question remains unsettled, since Kosovo's
ethnic Albanians keep pushing for national
independence while Belgrade opposes it. The European
Union does not look particularly happy to watch the
birth of yet another country (Kosovo) and would prefer
a federation, but it also seems unwilling to impose
the latter on Kosovo's nationalists.

With Serbian nationalists again on the rise in
Belgrade, the Kosovo question will probably become
thornier, and the European Union will need to monitor
the situation closely in order to anticipate possible
outbursts of violence.

Moreover, Serbia's southern region of Sandzak, where a
significant Muslim minority resides, has been the
theater of intra-Muslim disputes recently as Wahhabi
influence is growing.

Serbia's political instability will, therefore,
augment geopolitical instability in the western
Balkans, as Brussels strives to progressively
integrate Bosnia, Croatia, Albania, the Former
Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia,
and possibly Kosovo.

Possible implications for decision-makers are
significant both politically and economically.

First, political uncertainty in Serbia will increase
political risk since hardliners in Belgrade may opt
for stronger ties with Russia and strongly oppose
liberal openings to the European Union's free market
rules. Hence, foreign investment will likely be
discouraged in the short run, which will slow Serbia's
economic growth, complicating the European Union's
plans.

Second, Russia's political influence will be enhanced,
which will add to Moscow's leverage when it comes to
ambitious energy transport projects to convey Black
Sea and Caspian resources toward Austria and Italy
through Serbia.

Belgrade also recently agreed to form joint ventures
with Russian energy giant Gazprom in order to use
Serbian territory as a hub for natural gas. Gas would
be stocked in large quantities in special deposits in
order to guarantee delivery continuity during winter
or crises. Obviously, having anti-European leaders in
Belgrade is not the best prospect for Western
Europeans who seek to enhance energy security.

Serbia's nationalist turn and instability also
complicates N.A.T.O.'s plans to resolve the Kosovo
question quickly and to forge a stable security
environment between the Adriatic and the so-called
wider Black Sea region.

Anti-European nationalism will remain a fundamental
political force in Serbia in the coming years. In the
short-term, political uncertainty is likely to
persist, and in the case of early elections in July,
pro-European forces will suffer from citizens' low
confidence in democratic institutions. Therefore, a
strong pro-European course in Belgrade appears
unlikely to take shape in the near future.

However, the economic implications of the
anti-European turn could be negative for a country
like Serbia, which has no strategic resources and lost
its Adriatic outlet when Montenegro became
independent. Weaker economic growth will likely create
discontent in a country full of well-educated workers.
Hence, in the medium term, modernizers could win the
hearts and minds of Serbians since the country needs a
stable and friendly environment to develop.





	
		
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