[R-P] Spam detectado por Arnet - Asunto original: "Can Musharraf Survive?"
Víctor Morón
vicmoron en prodigy.net.mx
Jue Ago 2 08:55:05 MDT 2007
¿Qué Apuleyo? ¿Plinio Apuleyo Mendoza?
Víctor Morón
vicmoron en prodigy.net.mx
vicmoron en gmail.com
MSN: vicmoron en hotmail.com
Skype: vicmoron
Tel.: (+ 52 833 215.49.66)
Móvil: (+ 52 833 158.68.93)
-----Mensaje original-----
De: reconquista-popular-bounces+vicmoron=prodigy.net.mx en lists.econ.utah.edu
[mailto:reconquista-popular-bounces+vicmoron=prodigy.net.mx en lists.econ.utah.
edu] En nombre de Abulafia
Enviado el: jueves, 02 de agosto de 2007 9:25
Para: Víctor Morón
CC: Lucha de masas para recuperar la Argentina
Asunto: Re: [R-P] Spam detectado por Arnet - Asunto original: "Can Musharraf
Survive?"
[Ayúdenos a financiar la lista, escriba a recpopmod en gmail.com.]
CITANDO LA FUENTE,EL MATERIAL DE ESTA LISTA ES DE LIBRE REPRODUCCIÓN
Ay! don Julio:
Estos políticos de oficio y tiranuelos de profesión, me hacen admirar
cada vez más a Esopo, Apuleyo, y a los nuestros, don Arturo o al negro
Fontanarrosa.
Leyendo boludeces.
Outa
Julio Fernández Baraibar escribió:
> Este mail es considerado SPAM. El mensaje original lo vas a encontrar
> adjunto a este mail. Abajo se encuentra un detalle de porque la
> herramienta antispam considero a este mail como correo basura.
>
>
> Detalles del anásis: (10.9 puntos, 5.0 requeridos)
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>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Asunto:
> [R-P] "Can Musharraf Survive?"
> De:
> Julio Fernández Baraibar <fernandezbaraibar en gmail.com>
> Fecha:
> Wed, 1 Aug 2007 16:53:07 -0300
> A:
> abulafia en arnet.com.ar
>
> A:
> abulafia en arnet.com.ar
> CC:
> Lucha de masas para recuperar la Argentina
> <reconquista-popular en lists.econ.utah.edu>
>
>
> [Ayúdenos a financiar la lista, escriba a recpopmod en gmail.com.]
>
> CITANDO LA FUENTE,EL MATERIAL DE ESTA LISTA ES DE LIBRE REPRODUCCIÓN
>
>
> Está en inglés y no lo voy a traducir. Su autor es Immanuel Wallerstein,
un
> muy buen observador de la política internacional y una interesante cabeza
en
> el páramo intelectual yanqui.
> Básicamente sostiene que Musharraf, el presidente militar pakistaní,
> atraviesa un momento verdaderamente crucial. Los norteamericanos lo
> consideran blando con los "jihadistas", estos lo consideran un títere
yanqui
> y la clase media urbana quiere la vuelta a un régimen civil.
> El New York Times publica hoy una declaraciones del senador Barack Obama,
> precandidato a la presidencia por los demócratas, donde se pone el traje
de
> halcón en relación a Afganistán y a Musharraf. Todo ello como respuesta a
la
> dulce Hillary Clinton quien acuso de tener una política internacional
> "ingenua" a Obama, debido a unas declaraciones de éste donde afirmó que él
> se reuniría con los dirigentes de Irán, Cuba, Siria, Norcorea y Venezuela
> sin ningún tipo de precondiciones durante el primer año de su mandato.
> La noticia es de mucha utilidad para aquellos que piensan que con los
> demócratas cambiará la política internacional yanqui.
> Para quien lea inglés aquí está el artículo
>
> Julio Fernández Baraibar
> fernandezbaraibar en yahoo.com.ar
> fernandezbaraibar en gmail.com
> Skype: julio.fernandez.baraibar
> Visite mis blogs: http://fernandezbaraibar.blogspot.com
> http://jfernandezbaraibar.blogspot.com
>
> emailStripper es un programa gratis para la limpieza de
> los ">" y otros caracteres de sus emails y facilitar su lectura.
> http://www.papercut.biz/emailStripper.htm
>
> Commentary No. 214, August 1, 2007
>
> "Can Musharraf Survive?"
>
>
> Poor Pervez Musharraf! He is not very popular, and is under pressure from
> just
> about everybody. Yet he labors on, seeking to maintain his equilibrium,
and
> his
> power, while sitting on top of a seething volcano. He has in fact done
> better
> than one might have thought possible.
>
> To start the story at the beginning, we have to remember the origins of
the
> state of Pakistan. The principal nationalist movement in colonial India
was
> the
> Indian National Congress, led by Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru.
> Mohammed
> Ali Jinnah, a secular lawyer of Muslim origin, was an active member. But
he
> increasingly came to feel that Muslims as a group (one might say as an
> ethnic
> group) were relegated to a second-class citizenship. He joined the Muslim
> League, a movement seeking autonomy/independence for a "Muslim" region. In
> 1934, Jinnah became its president, and in the final negotiations with the
> British for the independence of India, he succeeded in obtaining an
> independent
> and separate status for Pakistan.
>
> On August 14, 1947, when Pakistan became an independent state, it
consisted
> of
> several provinces in the northwest of colonial India and a Bengali
province
> in
> the northeast, quite distant from the western sector. On August 11 of that
> year, Jinnah made an inaugural speech before the about-to-be legislative
> body
> of Pakistan, calling for an "inclusive and pluralist democracy," which
would
> guarantee equal rights for all its citizens of whatever religion or ethnic
> group. Not only was the Muslim League essentially a modernist secular
> nationalist movement, but the armed forces that would be established drew
> its
> personnel from the old British military forces in India, and its officer
> corps
> was equally secular for the most part.
>
> As we know, independence for India and Pakistan resulted immediately in
> terrible inter-group violence and, among other things, a struggle for the
> control of Kashmir. The net outcome of that initial struggle was not only
a
> de
> facto (and to this day contested) partition of Kashmir but also a transfer
> of
> populations, such that Pakistan became overwhelmingly Muslim. In 2007, its
> population numbers 165 million, which makes Pakistan the sixth most
populous
> state in the world, and one whose birthrate is among the highest. This
> population is today 97% Muslim, of which 20% are Shi'a.
>
> The political history of Pakistan has been tumultuous. Its relations with
> its
> principal neighbor, India, have always been tenuous and conflictual. The
> eastern part of Pakistan seceded in 1971, with Indian encouragement, to
> become
> the state of Bangladesh. The first military coup occurred in 1958.
Civilian
> rule, under a largely secular, urban party led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was
> restored in 1972, only to be overthrown again five years later. The coup
was
> led by Gen. Zia ul-Haq who was a quite pious Muslim and installed sharia
as
> the
> law of the land. He also had the country renamed the Islamic Republic of
> Pakistan. Civilian rule was restored years later under the aegis of
Bhutto's
> daughter, Benazir Bhutto, who then ceded place to Nawaz Sharif. In 1999,
> Sharif
> sought to arrest his chief of staff, one Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who
> succeeded
> in having Sharif arrested instead and being himself placed at the head of
> the
> government. He was proclaimed president in 2001, and elected to that post
in
> 2002.
>
> To make sense of this back and forth, we have to identify the principal
> political actors inside Pakistan and its geopolitical alliances. To start
> with
> the latter, Pakistan's biggest concern has always been India, and
therefore
> logically it sought the support of two states whose relations were
reserved
> towards India throughout the Cold War - the United States and China. These
> two
> states considered Indian foreign policy too close to that of the Soviet
> Union.
> The India-Pakistan military strains led both to refuse to sign the nuclear
> non-proliferation treaty and to develop nuclear weapons, much to the
chagrin
> of
> the United States.
>
> Internally, the situation in 2007 is quite different from that in 1947.
> Islamism as a political force has become extremely strong and permeates
> large
> sectors of the armed forces. Islamists are unhappy about Pakistan's links
> with
> the United States, especially during the last five years. The urban,
secular
> forces would like to force out Musharraf (as well as the armed forces)
from
> political power and have recently shown their strength in their successful
> support of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court whom Musharraf had tried
> to
> fire. The armed forces, while Islamist, do not really want to cede their
> role
> to jihadist elements like al-Qaeda, and therefore attempt to play a bridge
> role
> - appeasing but trying to contain the jihadist forces.
>
> When the United States was supporting jihadists in Afghanistan in the
1980s,
> its strongest ally was Pakistan, and in particular the intelligence units
of
> the armed forces, the ISI. In the 1990s, the ISI helped the Taliban come
to
> power in Afghanistan. Hence, the ISI was quite unhappy when the United
> States
> overthrew the Taliban and has not been very cooperative with regard to
> Afghanistan, something about which Afghanistan's current president, Hamid
> Karzai, complains to this day.
>
> It seems quite clear that, when Osama bin Laden launched the attack
against
> the
> United States on September 11, 2001, one of his major objectives, if not
his
> principal one, was to bring down the regimes in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
> Why
> and how so? Bin Laden considered the regimes in both countries too
> accommodating to the United States behind their ambiguous language on
> Islamism.
> He expected the United States to put pressure on the Musharraf regime to
> engage
> his homegrown Islamists totally. Bin Laden's theory was that, if it did
so,
> Musharraf's regime would fall.
>
> Musharraf has resisted this pressure (as has Saudi Arabia), agreeing with
> bin
> Laden that it was politically suicidal to do what the United States wanted
> him
> to do. On the other hand, he had to keep the United States relatively
happy
> lest Pakistan lose the crucial economic and military support of the United
> States. So, every once in a while, he throws a bone to the United States,
as
> in
> the recent assault on the Red Mosque, a stronghold of Islamists. But he is
> careful not to go further.
>
> And this contradiction is what brings us to where we are today. The
> jihadists
> are well installed in the so-called northwest frontier areas (which have
> always
> been de facto autonomous) and Musharraf does not dare to take real action
> against them. The jihadists denounce Musharraf for being too pro-American.
> The
> United States, on the other hand, considers him far too accommodating to
the
> jihadists. The United States keeps mumbling about direct action. But the
> United
> States cannot really turn against Musharraf entirely, lest an even worse
> regime
> succeed his. Meanwhile, the urban secular classes are pressing a weakened
> Musharraf to step down and give way to a truly civilian regime.
>
> Musharraf's key support, indeed sole support, remains the army. But as
long
> as
> the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq continue, Islamist political strength
> continues to grow. And Pakistan has many nuclear weapons. Should the
> Islamists
> come to unrestrained power, this would pose a real geopolitical threat to
> the
> United States, unlike the invented one of Saddam Hussein.
>
> by Immanuel Wallerstein
>
>
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