[R-P] Spam detectado por Arnet - Asunto original: "Can Musharraf Survive?"

[Abulafia]

Ay! don Julio:

Estos políticos de oficio y tiranuelos de profesión, me hacen admirar 
cada vez más a Esopo, Apuleyo, y a los nuestros, don Arturo o al negro 
Fontanarrosa.

Leyendo boludeces.


Outa


Julio Fernández Baraibar escribió:
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> 
> Asunto:
> [R-P] "Can Musharraf Survive?"
> De:
> Julio Fernández Baraibar <fernandezbaraibar en gmail.com>
> Fecha:
> Wed, 1 Aug 2007 16:53:07 -0300
> A:
> abulafia en arnet.com.ar
> 
> A:
> abulafia en arnet.com.ar
> CC:
> Lucha de masas para recuperar la Argentina 
> <reconquista-popular en lists.econ.utah.edu>
> 
> 
> [Ayúdenos a financiar la lista, escriba a recpopmod en gmail.com.]
> 
> CITANDO LA FUENTE,EL MATERIAL DE ESTA LISTA ES DE LIBRE REPRODUCCIÓN
> 
> 
> Está en inglés y no lo voy a traducir. Su autor es Immanuel Wallerstein, un 
> muy buen observador de la política internacional y una interesante cabeza en 
> el páramo intelectual yanqui.
> Básicamente sostiene que Musharraf, el presidente militar pakistaní, 
> atraviesa un momento verdaderamente crucial. Los norteamericanos lo 
> consideran blando con los "jihadistas", estos lo consideran un títere yanqui 
> y la clase media urbana quiere la vuelta a un régimen civil.
> El New York Times publica hoy una declaraciones del senador Barack Obama, 
> precandidato a la presidencia por los demócratas, donde se pone el traje de 
> halcón en relación a Afganistán y a Musharraf. Todo ello como respuesta a la 
> dulce Hillary Clinton quien acuso de tener una política internacional 
> "ingenua" a Obama, debido a unas declaraciones de éste donde afirmó que él 
> se reuniría con los dirigentes de Irán, Cuba, Siria, Norcorea y Venezuela 
> sin ningún tipo de precondiciones durante el primer año de su mandato.
> La noticia es de mucha utilidad para aquellos que piensan que con los 
> demócratas cambiará la política internacional yanqui.
> Para quien lea inglés aquí está el artículo
> 
> Julio Fernández Baraibar
> fernandezbaraibar en yahoo.com.ar
> fernandezbaraibar en gmail.com
> Skype: julio.fernandez.baraibar
> Visite mis blogs: http://fernandezbaraibar.blogspot.com
> http://jfernandezbaraibar.blogspot.com
> 
> emailStripper es un programa gratis para la limpieza de
> los ">" y otros caracteres de sus emails y facilitar su lectura.
> http://www.papercut.biz/emailStripper.htm
> 
> Commentary No. 214, August 1, 2007
> 
> "Can Musharraf Survive?"
> 
> 
> Poor Pervez Musharraf! He is not very popular, and is under pressure from 
> just
> about everybody. Yet he labors on, seeking to maintain his equilibrium, and 
> his
> power, while sitting on top of a seething volcano. He has in fact done 
> better
> than one might have thought possible.
> 
> To start the story at the beginning, we have to remember the origins of the
> state of Pakistan. The principal nationalist movement in colonial India was 
> the
> Indian National Congress, led by Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. 
> Mohammed
> Ali Jinnah, a secular lawyer of Muslim origin, was an active member. But he
> increasingly came to feel that Muslims as a group (one might say as an 
> ethnic
> group) were relegated to a second-class citizenship. He joined the Muslim
> League, a movement seeking autonomy/independence for a "Muslim" region. In
> 1934, Jinnah became its president, and in the final negotiations with the
> British for the independence of India, he succeeded in obtaining an 
> independent
> and separate status for Pakistan.
> 
> On August 14, 1947, when Pakistan became an independent state, it consisted 
> of
> several provinces in the northwest of colonial India and a Bengali province 
> in
> the northeast, quite distant from the western sector. On August 11 of that
> year, Jinnah made an inaugural speech before the about-to-be legislative 
> body
> of Pakistan, calling for an "inclusive and pluralist democracy," which would
> guarantee equal rights for all its citizens of whatever religion or ethnic
> group. Not only was the Muslim League essentially a modernist secular
> nationalist movement, but the armed forces that would be established drew 
> its
> personnel from the old British military forces in India, and its officer 
> corps
> was equally secular for the most part.
> 
> As we know, independence for India and Pakistan resulted immediately in
> terrible inter-group violence and, among other things, a struggle for the
> control of Kashmir. The net outcome of that initial struggle was not only a 
> de
> facto (and to this day contested) partition of Kashmir but also a transfer 
> of
> populations, such that Pakistan became overwhelmingly Muslim. In 2007, its
> population numbers 165 million, which makes Pakistan the sixth most populous
> state in the world, and one whose birthrate is among the highest. This
> population is today 97% Muslim, of which 20% are Shi'a.
> 
> The political history of Pakistan has been tumultuous. Its relations with 
> its
> principal neighbor, India, have always been tenuous and conflictual. The
> eastern part of Pakistan seceded in 1971, with Indian encouragement, to 
> become
> the state of Bangladesh. The first military coup occurred in 1958. Civilian
> rule, under a largely secular, urban party led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was
> restored in 1972, only to be overthrown again five years later. The coup was
> led by Gen. Zia ul-Haq who was a quite pious Muslim and installed sharia as 
> the
> law of the land. He also had the country renamed the Islamic Republic of
> Pakistan. Civilian rule was restored years later under the aegis of Bhutto's
> daughter, Benazir Bhutto, who then ceded place to Nawaz Sharif. In 1999, 
> Sharif
> sought to arrest his chief of staff, one Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who 
> succeeded
> in having Sharif arrested instead and being himself placed at the head of 
> the
> government. He was proclaimed president in 2001, and elected to that post in
> 2002.
> 
> To make sense of this back and forth, we have to identify the principal
> political actors inside Pakistan and its geopolitical alliances. To start 
> with
> the latter, Pakistan's biggest concern has always been India, and therefore
> logically it sought the support of two states whose relations were reserved
> towards India throughout the Cold War - the United States and China. These 
> two
> states considered Indian foreign policy too close to that of the Soviet 
> Union.
> The India-Pakistan military strains led both to refuse to sign the nuclear
> non-proliferation treaty and to develop nuclear weapons, much to the chagrin 
> of
> the United States.
> 
> Internally, the situation in 2007 is quite different from that in 1947.
> Islamism as a political force has become extremely strong and permeates 
> large
> sectors of the armed forces. Islamists are unhappy about Pakistan's links 
> with
> the United States, especially during the last five years. The urban, secular
> forces would like to force out Musharraf (as well as the armed forces) from
> political power and have recently shown their strength in their successful
> support of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court whom Musharraf had tried 
> to
> fire. The armed forces, while Islamist, do not really want to cede their 
> role
> to jihadist elements like al-Qaeda, and therefore attempt to play a bridge 
> role
> - appeasing but trying to contain the jihadist forces.
> 
> When the United States was supporting jihadists in Afghanistan in the 1980s,
> its strongest ally was Pakistan, and in particular the intelligence units of
> the armed forces, the ISI. In the 1990s, the ISI helped the Taliban come to
> power in Afghanistan. Hence, the ISI was quite unhappy when the United 
> States
> overthrew the Taliban and has not been very cooperative with regard to
> Afghanistan, something about which Afghanistan's current president, Hamid
> Karzai, complains to this day.
> 
> It seems quite clear that, when Osama bin Laden launched the attack against 
> the
> United States on September 11, 2001, one of his major objectives, if not his
> principal one, was to bring down the regimes in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. 
> Why
> and how so? Bin Laden considered the regimes in both countries too
> accommodating to the United States behind their ambiguous language on 
> Islamism.
> He expected the United States to put pressure on the Musharraf regime to 
> engage
> his homegrown Islamists totally. Bin Laden's theory was that, if it did so,
> Musharraf's regime would fall.
> 
> Musharraf has resisted this pressure (as has Saudi Arabia), agreeing with 
> bin
> Laden that it was politically suicidal to do what the United States wanted 
> him
> to do. On the other hand, he had to keep the United States relatively happy
> lest Pakistan lose the crucial economic and military support of the United
> States. So, every once in a while, he throws a bone to the United States, as 
> in
> the recent assault on the Red Mosque, a stronghold of Islamists. But he is
> careful not to go further.
> 
> And this contradiction is what brings us to where we are today. The 
> jihadists
> are well installed in the so-called northwest frontier areas (which have 
> always
> been de facto autonomous) and Musharraf does not dare to take real action
> against them. The jihadists denounce Musharraf for being too pro-American. 
> The
> United States, on the other hand, considers him far too accommodating to the
> jihadists. The United States keeps mumbling about direct action. But the 
> United
> States cannot really turn against Musharraf entirely, lest an even worse 
> regime
> succeed his. Meanwhile, the urban secular classes are pressing a weakened
> Musharraf to step down and give way to a truly civilian regime.
> 
> Musharraf's key support, indeed sole support, remains the army. But as long 
> as
> the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq continue, Islamist political strength
> continues to grow. And Pakistan has many nuclear weapons. Should the 
> Islamists
> come to unrestrained power, this would pose a real geopolitical threat to 
> the
> United States, unlike the invented one of Saddam Hussein.
> 
> by Immanuel Wallerstein
> 
> 
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