[R-P] "No me vengan a hablar de democracia " , Putin

[Nestor Gorojovsky]

Respuesta a:"[R-P] "No   me   vengan  a   hablar"
Enviado por:silvio ansaldi
Con fecha:24 Oct 2006, a las 16:19

> ¡En segunda vuelta, esta lista vota Lula!
> 
> CITANDO LA FUENTE,EL MATERIAL DE ESTA LISTA ES DE LIBRE REPRODUCCIÓN 
> 
> Parece que el Kremlin se enojo con los representantes
> del imperialismo actual ( globalizacion-neoliberal)
> que le cuestionaban  su autoritarismo en Chechenia y
> Georgia ( con ingerencia extranjera e imperialista)y
> su poca predisposicion a defender los derechos
> -humanos
> Pero este le recordo lo ocurrido en la ex-Yugoslavia .
> 
> Silvio Ansaldi

Así es, Silvio.  Mirá la perlita que sigue:

Gentileza de la lista A-List

[No traduzco en su totalidad.  Pero el artículo que sigue, cuyo 
título se pregunta "Quién mató a Ana Politkovskaya", revela ante todo 
la unanimidad sin matices con que operó la prensa occidental ante 
este hecho (idéntica, dicho sea de paso, a la que presidió la 
cobertura del escándalo en San Vicente).  Todos condenaron a Putin y 
plantearon que la periodista asesinada era una valiente e influyente 
trabajadora de prensa casada, solamente, con la verdad.

En todo caso, el matrimonio le daba pocos hijos porque era una 
periodista bastante poco conocida.  En cambio, la prensa occidental 
no dijo una palabra en otros dos casos, lo que es muy revelador:

"Todos los diarios dieron a entender que la Sra. Politkovskaya fue 
asesinada por aliados del presidente de Rusia debido a que informó la 
verdad sobre la guerra en Chechenia.  Según ellos, Rusia es una 
cuasidictadura donde el gobierno no tolera el disenso, y lo 
ilustraron refiriéndose -aunque en términos extrañamente difusos- a 
la cantidad de periodistas que ya fueron víctimas de similares 
asesinatos por encargo.
 
Y es precisamente aquí donde hay que plantar el índice sobre la 
página y gritar "¡Mentirosos!".  Algunos de esos artículos contenían 
referencias oblicuas al último periodista asesinado en Moscú, Paul 
Klebnikov, el editor estadounidense de la revista Forbes.  Pero 
ninguno se tomó la molestia de agregar que nadie ha siquiera llegado 
a sugerir que su muerte pueda atribuirse al gobierno ruso.  Por el 
contrario: mientras que Politkovskaya era una militante anti-Putin, 
Klebnikov militaba contra los oligarcas.  Escribió un libro brillante 
sobre Boris Berezovsky: uno de los libros que mejor informan sobre la 
"transición" rusa de la década del 90.  Allí, acusaba a Berezovsky de 
asesinato y de haber sido como la mano en el guante de los señores de 
la droga y gángsters de Chechenia; publicó una serie de entrevistas 
con uno de los líderes separatistas chechenos, a la que puso el poco 
diplomático título de "Conversando con un bárbaro". Sus esfuerzos le 
valieron una bala en la cabeza.  Nadie celebró su valentía en la 
prensa occidental al momento de morir. Y téngase en cuenta que era un 
estadounidense.  Lo que pasa es que había dedicado su vida a mostrar 
que la política de Occidente en Rusia se basaba en una alianza con 
criminales muy peligrosos, y que los "empresarios" que Occidente 
celebra como luchadores por la libertad -Berezovsky disfruta de asilo 
político en Inglaterra - son en realidad una banda de asesinos 
despiadados. 

El único periodista ruso asesinado que, a diferencia de Klebnikov y 
Politkovskaya, todos los rusos conocían se llamaba Vlad Listyev; su 
nombre es prácticamente desconocido en Occidente. 

Cayó bajo las balas de los asesinoe el 1 de marzo de 1995.  Entonces, 
Listyev era el presentador del programa de periodismo televisivo más 
popular del país, y una de las personas que más confianza inspiraban: 
una verdadera superestrella de la TV.  Acababan de nombrarlo director 
del principal canal de TV de Rusia, el ORT (ahora Primer Canal).  
Pese a su inmensa fama, los medios occidentales jamás citaron su 
asesinato como un ejemplo de intolerancia o falta de apego a la ley 
por parte del que entonces era presidente, Boris Yeltsin.  No, al 
menos, como lo hacen ahora con Putin.

Sin duda, esto se debe a que -para decirlo con los encantadores 
eufemismos de la Wikipedia- "cuando Listyev sacó del negocio a los 
intermediarios de las agencias de publicidad, quitó a muchos 
empresarios corruptos una fuente de enormes ganancias".  Dicho en 
buen castellano, esto significa que la mayor parte de los rusos creen 
que lo mató Boris Berezovsky -quien tomó control de ORT 
inmediatamente después del asesinato, y en buen medida gracias al 
asesinato- o si no Vladimir Guzinski, un magnate de los medios rival, 
que al igual que Berezovsky es un oligarca de tiempos de Yeltsin 
ahora exilado.  El único periodista occidental que se planteó abierta 
y seriamente si el contrato para asesinar a Listyev lo había firmado 
Berezovsky, Guzinsky, o el factótum de la publicidad Serguei Lisovsky 
(aliado de Berezovsky) fue -qué cosa rara- Paul Klebnikov".

El resto, sigue en la misma onda.  Pero con lo de arriba, creo, 
alcanza.  Versión completa en inglés, a continuación.]

fuente: http://www.sandersresearch.com/

Who killed Anna Politkovskaya?

By John Laughland 
Oct/11/2006

In C. S. Lewis' science fiction dystopia, That Hideous Strength, the 
secretive organization which controls the state has its agents 
writing in newspapers on all sides of the political spectrum, in 
order to disguise its power with the appearance of plurality. In 
today's West, by contrast, even the appearance of plurality seems to 
have been discarded.

The murder on 7th October of the Russian journalist, Anna 
Politkovskaya, was greeted with the monolithic unanimity which has 
now become the hallmark of the so-called free press in the West. The 
right-wing Daily Telegraph devoted a leader to her murder on 9th 
October, the first sentence of which was:

'People sometimes pay with their lives for saying out loud what they 
think,' Anna Politkovskaya said last year of Vladimir Putin's Russia.

The same day, the left-wing Guardian also published a leader about 
her murder. Its first sentence read:

'People sometimes pay with their lives for saying out loud what they 
think,' Anna Politkovskaya told a conference on press freedom last 
December.

The whole of the British, American and West European press extolled 
Politkovskaya as 'one of Russia's bravest and most brilliant 
journalists' (The Guardian), 'one of the few voices that dared 
contradict the party line' (The Daily Telegraph), 'a firebrand for 
freedom' (The Independent), 'the most famous investigative journalist 
in Russia' (The Times), 'one of the bravest journalists in Russia' 
(The New York Times); 'a victim of rare courage' (The Washington 
Post). All these quotes are from the leader articles which each paper 
thought worth devoting to her death. In reality, Politkovskaya was 
virtually unknown in Russia. The reaction of a wealthy Russian 
businessman dining in Brussels on the night of her murder was 
typical:

'Politkovskaya? Never heard of her.'

Politkovskaya in this respect resembles another murdered Russian-
speaking journalist with connections in the Caucasus, Georgiy 
Gongadze, the Ukrainian citizen with a Georgian surname whose murder 
in 2000 was instrumentalized by the United States in an attempt to 
implicate the then Ukrainian president, Leonid Kuchma. Politkvskaya 
was not quite as obscure as Gongadze: he ran a mere web site 
(although this meant that when he traveled to Washington DC he was 
received by the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright) while the 
newspaper where she worked, Novaya Gazeta, had a circulation of 
250,000. Still, that is not much in a country of nearly 150 million 
inhabitants and certainly not enough to merit the exaggerated praise 
heaped posthumously upon her.

The media in Britain and America also competed with one another to 
lay the blame for the murder squarely at President Putin's door. The 
Financial Times announced that,

'In a broad sense, Mr. Putin bears responsibility for creating, 
through the Kremlin's long-standing assault on the independent media, 
an atmosphere in which such killings can happen.'

The Washington Post asserted pompously that,

'It is quite possible, without performing any detective work, to say 
what is ultimately responsible for these deaths: It is the climate of 
brutality that has flourished under Mr. Putin.'

All papers implied that Mrs. Politkovskaya had been killed by allies 
of the Russian President for reporting the truth about the war in 
Chechnya. According to them, Russia is a quasi-dictatorship in which 
the government brooks no dissent, and they illustrated this by 
referring back - albeit in strangely vague terms - to the number of 
other journalists who have been victims of similar contract killings.

It is here that we can put our fingers firmly on the page and shout, 
'Liars!' Some of these articles contained glancing references to the 
last journalist to have been killed in Moscow, the American editor of 
Forbes magazine, Paul Klebnikov, but none of them bothered to add the 
key rider that no one has ever suggested that the Russian government 
had Klebnikov murdered. On the contrary:

whereas Politkovskaya was an anti-Putin militant, Klebnikov was an 
anti-oligarch militant. He wrote a brilliant book about Boris 
Berezovsky - one of the most informative books about Russia's 
'transition' in the 1990s, in which he accused Berezovsky of murder 
and of being hand in glove with Chechen drug lords and gangsters - 
and he published a series of interviews with one of the Chechen 
separatist leaders, which he undiplomatically entitled 'Conversations 
with a barbarian'. He was rewarded for his efforts with a bullet in 
the head. When he died, there were no paeans of praise for his 
bravery or courage in the Western press, even though he was an 
American, for Klebnikov had devoted his life to arguing that the 
West's policy in Russia is based on an alliance with very serious 
criminals, and that the 'businessmen' whom the West champions as 
freedom fighters - Berezovsky has political asylum in Britain - are 
in fact a bunch of ruthless murderers.

In contrast to both Klebnikov and Politkovskaya, the one murdered 
Russian journalist whom all Russians had heard of when he died - and 
whose name is virtually unknown in the West - was Vlad Listyev.

When he fell under the assassin's bullets on the night of 1st March 
1995, Listyev was Russia's most popular talk show host and one of the 
most trusted people in the country - a genuine TV superstar. He had 
just become director of Russia's main TV channel, ORT (now First 
Channel). In spite of Listyev's immense fame, the Western media never 
cited his murder as an example of the lawlessness or intolerance of 
the then president, Boris Yeltsin, in the way that they now attack 
Putin.

This is doubtless because - to use the charming euphemisms of 
Wikipedia - 'When Listyev put the middlemen advertising agencies out 
of business, he deprived many corrupt businessmen of a source for 
enormous profits.' In plain English, this means that most Russians 
believe that Listyev was murdered either by Boris Berezovsky - who 
took control of ORT immediately after Listyev's murder, and in large 
measure because of it - or by Vladimir Guzinski, a rival TV magnate 
who, like Berezovsky, is a Yeltsin-era oligarch now in exile. The 
only journalist from the West who did discuss openly whether the 
contract to kill Listyev had come from Berezovsky, Guzinsky or 
Berezovsky's ally, the advertising mogul, Sergei Lisovsky, was, oddly 
enough, Paul Klebnikov.

Politkovskaya's colleagues on Novaya Gazeta include notorious pro-
American commentators like the 'independent Moscow-based defense 
analyst,' Pavel Felgenhauer, whose also works as a columnist for the 
Jamestown Foundation: the Director of that body, Glen Howard, is 
Executive Director of the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya, a 
neo-con outfit which campaigns for a 'political settlement' with the 
terrorists in that North Caucasus province of the Russian federation. 
This may explain why you can find only one opinion about 
Politkovskaya in the Western media. At the same time, by contrast, 
there is a huge variety of opinions about her murder in supposedly 
dictatorial Russia itself. The theories now circulating in Moscow 
about Politkovskaya's murder include (apart from the claim that the 
Russian government or the Chechen authorities were responsible):

revenge by corrupt police who found themselves wanted or in prison as 
a result of her sensationalist journalism; a conspiracy by opponents 
of the Russian president and the Chechen Prime Minister, Ramzan 
Kadyrov, to discredit them; revenge by former Chechen militants; a 
murder carried out by Russian nationalist opponents of Putin (her 
name was on the death-lists of various neo-Nazi groups); a political 
provocation designed to discredit the Chechen authorities or trigger 
some movement in that troublesome province; or a conspiracy by 
opponents of Russia from the former Soviet Republic of Georgia with 
which Moscow is currently engaged in a fierce diplomatic row.

Take your pick - but the sheer variety of points of view gives the 
lie to the claim that Politkovskaya was fighting a monolithic media 
machine controlled by the government.

Among the many points of view expressed, few were pithier than this 
one from a commentator for Lentacom.ru,

Politkovskaya's murder spells unambiguous benefits for the West. The 
past month saw massive unofficial clampdown on Russia. Take the 
attempts to pull Ukraine into NATO. Take the alliance's "intensive 
dialogue" with Georgia. Take Saakashvili's behavior the President of 
Georgia, very humiliating for Russia, which has been certainly agreed 
with the West. Theoretically, Politkovskaya's murder diverts 
attention from Georgia and builds up western pressures on Russia, 
something today's Georgia can only benefit from. Yet, I believe that 
those who had ordered the crime are more global. There is no 
immediate evidence somebody in the West issued direct instructions. 
It is beyond doubt, though, that the West is a direct beneficiary.

One does not have to believe this conspiracy theory, or any of the 
others. But at least if one is Russian, the consumer of news has a 
large number of different points of view to consider, all of which 
are easily accessible to the ordinary Russian by buying the newspaper 
or looking at the Internet. In the West, by contrast, even the most 
assiduous conspiracy theorist will have great difficulty finding 
anything other than the party line that Mr. Putin did it. Now, what 
does that tell you about the state of political and media pluralism 
in the West?

Este correo lo ha enviado
Néstor Miguel Gorojovsky
nestorgoro en fibertel.com.ar
[No necesariamente es su autor]
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"La patria tiene que ser la dignidad arriba y el regocijo abajo".
Aparicio Saravia
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