[R-P] EE.UU. negocia su huida de Iraq

[Nestor Gorojovsky]

Va en inglés.  No tengo tiempo para traducir.  Pero el dato es 
interesante:  los EE.UU. comienzan a sentarse para hablar con la 
resistencia iraquí (encabezada, para sorpresa de muchos ignorantes, 
por miembros del Ba'ath de Saddam Hussein).  No pueden sostenerse en 
pie, ésa es la verdad.  Y empiezan a ceder.

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Date sent:      	Sun, 20 Feb 2005 21:00:59 +0100
From:           	Michael Sims <mjsbpmagen-mxmail en yahoo.fr>
Subject:        	[Marxism] Iraqi resistance negotiating with USA ?
To:             	Activists and scholars in Marxist tradition <marxism en lists.econ.utah.edu>
Send reply to:  	Activists and scholars in Marxist tradition
	<marxism en lists.econ.utah.edu>

 From TIME
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1029805,00.html>

Talking with the Enemy
Inside the secret dialogue between the U.S. and insurgents in 
Iraq—and
what the rebels say they want By MICHAEL WARE



Sunday, Feb. 20, 2005
The secret meeting is taking place in the bowels of a facility in
Baghdad, a cavernous, heavily guarded building in the U.S.-controlled
green zone. The Iraqi negotiator, a middle-aged former member of
Saddam Hussein's regime and the senior representative of the
self-described nationalist insurgency, sits on one side of the table.

He is here to talk to two members of the U.S. military. One of them,
an officer, takes notes during the meeting. The other, dressed in
civilian clothes, listens as the Iraqi outlines a list of demands the
U.S. must satisfy before the insurgents stop fighting. The parties
trade boilerplate complaints: the U.S. officer presses the Iraqi for
names of other insurgent leaders; the Iraqi says the newly elected
Shi'a-dominated government is being controlled by Iran. The 
discussion
does not go beyond generalities, but both sides know what's behind 
the
coded language.

The Iraqi's very presence conveys a message: Members of the 
insurgency
are open to negotiating an end to their struggle with the U.S. "We 
are
ready," he says before leaving, "to work with you."


In that guarded pledge may lie the first sign that after nearly two
years of fighting, parts of the insurgency in Iraq are prepared to
talk and move toward putting away their arms—and the U.S. is willing
to listen. An account of the secret meeting between the senior
insurgent negotiator and the U.S. military officials was provided to
TIME by the insurgent negotiator. He says two such meetings have 
taken
place. While U.S. officials would not confirm the details of any
specific meetings, sources in Washington told TIME that for the first
time the U.S. is in direct contact with members of the Sunni
insurgency, including former members of Saddam's Baathist regime.

Pentagon officials say the secret contacts with insurgent leaders are
being conducted mainly by U.S. diplomats and intelligence officers. A
Western observer close to the discussions says that "there is no
authorized dialogue with the insurgents" but that the U.S. has joined
"back-channel" communications with rebels. Says the observer: 
"There's
a lot bubbling under the surface today."

Over the course of the war in Iraq, as the anti-U.S. resistance has
grown in size and intensity, Administration officials have been
steadfast in their refusal to negotiate with enemy fighters. But in
recent months, the persistence of the fighting and signs of division
in the ranks of the insurgency have prompted some U.S. officials to
seek a political solution. And Pentagon and intelligence officials
hope the high voter turnout in last month's election will deflate the
morale of the insurgents and persuade more of them to come in from 
the
cold.

Hard-line islamist fighters like Abu Mousab al-Zarqawi's al-Qaeda
group will not compromise in their campaign to create an Islamic
state. But in interviews with TIME, senior Iraqi insurgent commanders
said several "nationalist" rebel groups—composed predominantly of
ex-military officers and what the Pentagon dubs "former regime
elements"—have moved toward a strategy of "fight and negotiate."
Although they have no immediate plans to halt attacks on U.S. troops,
they say their aim is to establish a political identity that can
represent disenfranchised Sunnis and eventually negotiate an end to
the U.S. military's offensive in the Sunni triangle. Their model is
Sinn Fein, the political wing of the Irish Republican Army, which
ultimately earned the I.R.A. a role in the Northern Ireland peace
process. "That's what we're working for, to have a political face
appear from the battlefield, to unify the groups, to resist the
aggressor and put our views to the people," says a battle commander 
in
the upper tiers of the insurgency who asked to be identified by his
nom de guerre, Abu Marwan. Another negotiator, called Abu Mohammed,
told TIME, "Despite what has happened, the possibility for 
negotiation
is still open."

But can such talks succeed? A senior official in the U.S. embassy in
Baghdad says the nationalist insurgents "want to cut a deal, thinking
we get ours and they get theirs." Any deal with the insurgents would
be up to the new government, but embassy officials say they believe
that reaching an accord should be the new government's top priority.

Behind the scenes, the U.S. is encouraging Sunni leaders and the
insurgents to talk with the government. A tougher job may be to
convince the leaders of political parties about to assume power—many
of whom were brutalized by Baathists now coordinating the
insurgency—that it's in their interests to reach a peaceful 
settlement
with their former tormentors. In the U.S. command, there is 
increasing
skepticism that the insurgency can be defeated through military might
alone. Says a senior U.S. officer: "The Iraqis are the solution to 
the
insurgency, and they are the solution to our departure."

Insurgent sources say both sides have been feeling each other out for
months. Some of the earliest advances were made last year through
Jordanian intelligence officers, but insurgents balked at the idea of
meeting in Jordan. U.S. diplomats also initiated contact with
conservative Sunnis known to have influence with the insurgents, such
as Harith al-Dhari, the head of the Association of Muslim Scholars.

Insurgent sources say that last summer a loose amalgam of nationalist
groups—Mohammed's Army, al-Nasser al-Saladin, the 1920 Revolution
Brigades and perhaps even the Islamic Army of Iraq—met to discuss
forging a common political platform.

Meanwhile, some Americans showed openness to a dialogue. In meetings
with Sunni tribal leaders, Lieut. Colonel Rick Welch, the senior
special-operations civil-military affairs adviser to the commanding
general of the 1st Cavalry Division in Baghdad, put word out that the
military was willing to talk to hard-liners about their grievances 
and
that, as Welch says, "the door is not closed, except for some very 
top
regime guys." Welch, a reservist and prosecutor from Morgan County,
Ohio, told TIME, "I don't meet all the insurgent leaders, but I've 
met
some of them." Although not an authorized negotiator, Welch has 
become
a back channel in the nascent U.S. dialogue with the insurgents.
Insurgent negotiators confirm to TIME that they have met with Welch.

What do the insurgents want? Top insurgent field commanders and
negotiators informed TIME that the rebels have told diplomats and
military officers that they support a secular democracy in Iraq but
resent the prospect of a government run by exiles who fled to Iran 
and
the West during Saddam's regime. The insurgents also seek a 
guaranteed
timetable for U.S. troop withdrawal, a demand the U.S. refuses. But
there are some hints of compromise: insurgent negotiators have told
their U.S. counterparts they would accept a U.N. peacekeeping force 
as
the U.S. troop presence recedes. Insurgent representative Abu 
Mohammed
says the nationalists would even tolerate U.S. bases on Iraqi soil.
"We don't mind if the invader becomes a guest," he says, suggesting a
situation akin to the U.S. military presence in Germany and Japan.

As promising as such proffers might sound, it's far too early for
optimism. The new U.S. policy of engagement is aimed at driving a
wedge between nationalist insurgents and the jihadists. But al-
Zarqawi
and his allies have silenced nationalists by threatening to kill them
if they negotiate. The Western observer close to the discussions 
says,
"Al-Zarqawi keeps pulling the process away from 'fight and negotiate'
to 'pure mayhem.'"

The engagement strategy faces another obstacle: the new Iraqi
government. Leaders of the victorious political parties say they have
no interest in continuing dialogue with the insurgents. "The voters
gave us a mandate to attack these insurgents, not negotiate with
them," says Humam Bakr Hammoudi, a political strategist for the
dominant sciri party. U.S. negotiators say they believe the new
government will eventually realize that only a political settlement
will subdue the insurgency—which may soon direct its wrath at the new
Iraqi rulers if it believes its interests are being ignored.

While some in the Bush Administration might find the idea of backing
an accord with archenemy Baathists distasteful, the Western observer
says, "I think you've got a pretty flexible [U.S.] government." Now
it's up to the others to follow.

— With reporting by Aparisim Ghosh/Baghdad and Douglas Waller/
Washington

 From the Feb. 28, 2005 issue of TIME magazine





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Néstor Miguel Gorojovsky
nestorgoro en fibertel.com.ar

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"Sí, una sola debe ser la patria de los sudamericanos".
Simón Bolívar al gobierno secesionista y disgregador de 
Buenos Aires, 1822
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