[R-P] (Inglés) Comercio, desarrollo y mercados "monstruosos" (1 de 2)

[Nestor Gorojovsky]

Inicio con este correo una serie de envíos cuyo objetivo es proveer 
munición pesada al pensamiento nacional. Por desgracia, está en 
inglés. Pero juro que vale la pena leerlo.

Henry Liu, dice la línea biográfica que cierra este artículo, es el 
presidente del Grupo de Inversiones Liu, de Nueva York.

En realidad, es muchísimo más que eso.

Es un chino nacido en Hong Kong pero profundamente vinculado a la 
Revolución China y a Mao. Estudió arquitectura, luego tuvo una muy 
exitosa carrera académica en la Costa Oeste de los Estados Unidos y 
ahora se dedica a las finanzas.

Pero también es un pensador marxista que mira a Occidente con algo de 
la lupa del entomólogo. Se ha mantenido chino todo el tiempo, y sus 
observaciones son tan finas como ingeniosas y provocativas. No sólo 
vive "en las entrañas del monstruo", como decía Martí. Conoce hasta 
los más íntimos recovecos del mundillo financiero de Wall Street. Y 
siempre se ha mantenido mirándolo como si desde lo alto de la Gran 
Muralla estuviera oteando las hordas bárbaras.

Lamentablemente, no escribe en español. Y no tengo el tiempo para 
traducir este artículo. Pero me parece que merece que le prestemos 
muchísima atención. Nuevamente, disculpen el idioma.

Entresaco, para que se vea de qué clase de tipo estamos hablando, un 
fragmentito que traduzco a continuación. Este financista dice que 
"It is telling in the manner neo-classical economics treats the trade-
off between return on capital and compensation for labor. An increase 
in return on capital is viewed as economic growth, while a rise in 
pay for workers is viewed as non-productive inflation" (Es sugestivo 
observar el modo en que la economía neoclásica trata el balance entre 
ganancias del capital y compensación al trabajo. Un incremento en las 
ganancias del capital se ve como crecimiento económico, mientras que 
un alza en el pago a los trabajadores se ve como inflación 
improductiva).  Y esto lo publica en uno de los principales diarios 
financieros de Oriente!

------- Forwarded message follows -------
[A-List] Trade, Markets and Development 
Henry C.K. Liu a-list en lists.econ.utah.edu 
Fri Jun 21 05:23:18 2002 

Trade, development and 'monstrous' markets
By Henry C K Liu

An economy is a comprehensive and complex entity of which trade is 
only
one sector. Yet nowadays, neoliberal economists and policy-makers 
tend
to view trade as the economy itself, downplaying the importance of 
the
public sector and other non-market social sectors of the economy.

Neoliberals promote market fundamentalism as the sole, indispensable
path for economic development, despite the fact that data of the past
decade have shown that trade tends to distort balanced development in 
a
way that hurts not only the less developed, but the developed 
economies
as well. Currently, in the United States, the mecca of free-market
entrepreneurism, the statist sectors - government spending, health 
care, social and education services and defense - are keeping the 
economy afloat, while finance, entrepreneurial ventures and high-tech
manufacturing languish in extended doldrums.

Unregulated markets lead naturally to the emergence of monopolistic
enterprises. Thus "free" markets are inherently self-destructive of
their own freedom. Free markets depend on enlightened statism to 
remain
free. Unregulated labor markets lead to slavery. For many human 
social
activities, the market has no positive function. Free markets for 
human
relationships, for example, lead to prostitution. Free markets in 
power
breed corruption. Socio-economic Darwinism will eventually deplete 
the
economic food chain: the fittest cannot survive when all the weak 
that
the strong need to exploit in order to survive disappear. Government,
from monarchy to democracy, exists solely to protect the weak from 
the
strong.

Globalization since the end of the Cold War has been viewed 
increasingly
as neo-imperialism by many even outside of the radical left. This 
view
is amply supported by field data. It has become obvious to many in 
both
developed economies and emerging markets that the undervaluation of
labor is indispensable for the creation of surplus value that 
economists
call capital. This capital then must seek new investment 
opportunities
in less developed economies where labor is even cheaper. The 
investment
opportunities of this adventure capital point not to the beneficial
development of the less developed economies. This capital seeks 
higher
return than it could get at home for the benefit of its owners by
exploiting even cheaper labor overseas. Capital has acquired enormous
market power for the suppression of the value of labor both at home 
and
abroad. Neoliberals rationalize that globalization, while undeniably
exploitative, nevertheless produces tangible collateral benefits, 
even
to the exploited.

The infamous Lawrence Summers World Bank memo, in which he, as chief
economist, argued that the export of pollution to poor countries
represented "immaculate" economic logic because Third World lives 
were
worth less, is a classic example of warped neoliberal mentality.

This neoliberal approach of course was the same argument presented by
the defenders of 19th-century imperialism in which moral 
rationalization
was used to justify economic exploitation. Neoliberal values, namely
capitalistic democracy and market fundamentalism, become the new 
smiling
mask for economic exploitation not different from the "white man's
burden" of 19th-century Eurocentrism. The recurring financial crises
associated with financial globalization in the past two decades have
revived economic nationalism worldwide with parallels to the 
political
nationalism against imperialism of the previous century.

John Atkinson Hobson (1858-1940), an English economist, wrote in 1902
one the most insightful critiques of the economic basis of 
imperialism.
Hobson provided a humanist criticism of classical economics, 
rejecting
exclusively materialistic definitions of value. With A F Mummery, he
developed the theory of oversaving that was given a generous tribute 
by
John Maynard Keynes. Hobson's second major contribution was his 
analysis
of capitalism on which Lenin drew freely to formulate the theory of
imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism. "Imperialism is
capitalism at that stage of development at which the dominance of
monopolies and finance capitalism is established; in which the export 
of
capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of 
the
world among the international trusts has begun, in which the division 
of
all territories of the globe among the biggest capitalist powers has
been completed." (Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1870-1924, Imperialism, the
Highest Stage of Capitalism, Chapter 7 - 1916)

Thus until the Cold War, practically all anti-imperialist movements 
were
also anti-capitalist. Hobson did not touch on the economics of
environmental pollution associated with globalization. For all the 
evils
of 19th-century imperialism, environmental pollution was not one of
them.

Critics of globalization, from the left to the right, have focused on
four issues: 1) labor standards, 2) corporatism, 3) environmental 
abuse
and 4) global financial architecture.

A new focus on Hobson's ideas may yield useful insights in the 
current
debate on globalization economics. Specifically, Hobson's view of the
economic system from the standpoint of human values is worth 
discussing.
Hobson believed that the contradictions of production and 
consumption,
cost and utility, physical and spiritual welfare, individual and 
social
welfare, all find their likeliest mode of reconciliation and of 
harmony
in the treatment of global society as an organism, and not as a
collection of competing economies in the market arena.

Karl Polanyi is also worth a revisit in this hour of self-induced
imminent collapse of the globalized market economy. The principal 
theme
of his Origins of Our Time: The Great Transformation (1945) was that 
the
world market economy in effect collapsed in the 1930s. Yet this 
familiar
system was of very recent origin and had emerged fully formed only as
recently as the 19th century, in conjunction with capitalistic
industrialization. The current globalization of markets following the
fall of the the Soviet bloc is also of recent post-Cold War origin, 
in
conjunction with the advent of the information age and finance
capitalism.

Prior to the coming of capitalistic industrialization, the market 
played
only a minor part in the economic life of societies. Even where 
market
places could be seen to be operating, they were peripheral to the 
main
economic organization and activity of society. Polanyi argued that in
modern market economies, the needs of the market determined social
behavior, whereas in pre-industrial and primitive economies the needs 
of
society determined economic behavior. Polanyi reintroduced the 
concepts
of reciprocity and redistribution in human relationships.

Reciprocity implies that people produce the goods and services they 
are
best at producing, and share them with others with joy. This is
reciprocated by others who are good at producing other goods and
services. There is an unspoken agreement that all would produce that
which they could do best and mutually share and share alike, not just
sold to the highest bidder. All find their fulfillment in separate
productive livelihoods. The motivation to produce and share is not
personal profit, but personal fulfillment, and avoidance of social
contempt, ostracism, and loss of social prestige and standing. This
motivation is still fundamental in finance capitalism, with the 
emphasis
on accumulating the most financial wealth, which is accorded the 
highest
social prestige. The annual report on the world's richest 100 as
celebrities by Forbes is a clear evidence of this. The opinion of
figures such as Bill Gates and Warren Buffet are regularly sought by 
the
media on matters beyond finance, as if the possession of money itself
represents a diploma of wisdom.

Edward Luttwak explains in his recent book Turbo Capitalism,
"Super-winners are not only respected and admired for what they do 
but
also for what they know, or rather for what it is assumed they must
know. They are often asked to pronounce on the great questions of the
day, even those far removed from their fields of competence. During
1997, for example, both the champion software marketeer Bill Gates 
and
the champion currency speculator George Soros were constantly and
respectfully cited in the American media on a great variety of 
subjects,
including public education and the control of narcotics. Their
interviewers assumed as a matter of course that the extent of their
wisdom corresponds to the size of their incomes. Far from being
condemned for greed, winners are held in the highest regard, and the
greatest winners of all have almost an odor of sanctity."

Many religions consider the attitude toward money as often more
indicative of a person's true worth than the mere possession of it. 
The
same might be even more true for societies. This explains why modern
societies, whose members would be obsessed with a single-minded quest
for material wealth, would be constantly faced with recurring crises 
of
values. The pursuit of maximization of wealth leads inevitably to the
betrayal of human values that would otherwise forbid unconscionable
exploitation of and impersonal disregard for others.

Maximization breeds abuse. The Confucian doctrine of the Path of the
Golden Mean (Zhongyong Zhi Dao), a concept of avoiding excesses, is
instructive on this point. More is not necessarily better; most is
seldom best, and best is the mortal enemy of good, as Voltaire has
insightfully pointed out. A rich man amid masses of poverty will not
find himself a paradise on Earth. A society that celebrates only the
best will waste the good. The relentless pursuit of absolute beauty 
will
result in ugliness, which explains why the art world is often 
infested
with revolting characters. The fact that the historical record of
socialist politics is littered with betrayals of the humane ideals of
theoretical socialism should not diminish the valor of those who have
placed their hopes on the noble vision, just as the materialistic
efficiency of unregulated market capitalism is no testimony on the 
moral
validity of greed.

It is telling in the manner neo-classical economics treats the trade-
off
between return on capital and compensation for labor. An increase in
return on capital is viewed as economic growth, while a rise in pay 
for
workers is viewed as non-productive inflation. What moral rules 
enable
the pampered corporate executive to receive a generous bonus for
abruptly firing thousands of workers in a recession? Maximization of
shareholder value through cost reduction is just a euphemism for 
robbing
workers to enrich the owners. It is a very sick society that views as
progress the depreciation of human workers in favor of the 
maximization
of appreciation of material assets.

In a money economy, it is a basic truism that only those who have 
money
can pay the bills at the end. If all are to pay their share, ways 
must
be found for all to earn sufficient money to participate 
constructively
on a healthy financial level, without permanent subsidy from the
economic order to which the poor have become burdensome wards. In a
bountiful world, poverty is seldom caused by someone else's needing 
more
than others. This is particularly true in a society in which both 
greed
and envy are constrained by moral precepts. One does not have to be 
one
of the world's richest men in order to avoid feeling poor. Poverty is
the result of underdevelopment in relation to the production and
consumption norms in a particular socio-economic order. A case can be
made that poverty is a byproduct of the institution of money, with 
which
poverty is often measured. It is the quest for accumulation of money 
as
capital that requires the exploitation of humans at levels that 
produce
poverty.

It is only when some singular segment of society fails extensively to
receive sufficient economic opportunity, or sufficient value for its
labor to maintain its fair share of consumption, as normatively
prescribed in the socio-economic order, that poverty is born. Social
cohesion will be threatened when poverty is perceived as the result 
of
institutionalized maldistribution of wealth, reflecting unfairness in
the sharing of the fruits of co-operative endeavor among different
socio-economic groups.

Poverty, however, cannot be defined by absolute income levels alone,
because poverty is actually a social problem with an economic 
dimension.
It is only because it is most conveniently recognizable in a money-
based
economy by its financial aspect that poverty is often mistaken as a
simple matter of income deficiency.

Poverty is in reality a phenomenon of social despair. The habitually
unemployed, the unemployable, the underemployed and the working poor 
in
developed countries have higher absolute incomes or public assistance
payments than the middle class in other less developed countries, 
whose
members nevertheless do not consider themselves poor because they 
have
not lost hope in themselves or self-respect for their own lot.

Poverty is a symptom of economic inefficiency and social dislocation 
in
society. Its existence in an economy hurts the rich as well as the 
poor,
and its pervasiveness in society alienates its members from one 
another.
Aside from being dehumanizing to those suffering from it, it is
destructive to the society tolerating it. Poverty becomes a political
issue when the poor are structurally excluded from contributing to 
the
economic process at levels that enable its constituents to support a
dignified life in a healthy environment consistent with the cultural
traditions of their society. While there may always be those who 
enjoy
higher income than others, there is no socio-economic necessity for 
the
poor to exist. Thus when Ronald Reagan, leader of the free world,
proclaimed that there would always be poor people, he was defaulting 
on
the responsibility of political leadership.

Life without growth will become a zero-sum game in which winners will
gain only from the losers. In such a game, eventually all would lose
because of the game's self-terminating nature. Wealth redistribution
without growth always leads to social conflicts, the final phase of
which is generally settled with violence, the organized form of which 
is
war and the unorganized form is terrorism, and the end game is
revolution.

But growth cannot be defined simply in quantitative terms. Quality of
life and the range of available options are often more revealing
measures. Chinese society during the early part of the Tang Dynasty
(618-907), the golden age of Chinese civilization, was fortunate in 
that
its economy enjoyed long periods of continuous growth. Along with
material growth, cultural development and social mobility also
accelerated. Poverty in the form of pathological social despair was 
not
prevalent in Tang time. To be sure, there were severe hardship and
upheavals caused by war, particularly in the border regions, by 
policy
errors and religious fanaticism, by natural disasters and even by
personal misfortune. There were also recurring incidents of 
governmental
abuse and corruption. There were periodic regional famines caused by
natural calamities exacerbated by inadequate transportation, despite
government-sponsored relief efforts. But these events were generally
perceived by people as transient anomalies or force majeure, and not 
as
structural defects of the social system. In other words, such 
calamities
were caused by nature or personal failings of the individuals who ran
the system rather than shortcomings of the social order itself. 
People
readily accepted periodic disasters, the prevention of which was 
beyond
the people's expectation of the scope and ability of the political
system. However, the occurrences of natural disasters were sometimes
interpreted as retribution for the immoral behavior of the ruling
sovereign. This connection between the moral image of the sovereign 
and
the fortune of the empire required the ruler to ensure the well-being 
of
the people, not just the efficient operation of the market.

The flowering of Tang culture has its roots in the high quality of 
life
enjoyed by all its citizens, regardless of their social positions and
income levels, and the high standard of the efforts of their labor,
manual or intellectual, regardless of their commercial values. Since
money was only one of the determinants of a good life rather than the
all-consuming ingredient, the pleasures of life were not denied to 
those
who did not aspire to financial wealth, or those who were unable to
achieve it because they did not care to surrender to society's 
financial
rules. The inner peace preached by Taoist and Buddhist precepts were
verifiable by the individual's direct personal experience in the
socio-economic realm of the Tang era. The rejection of materialistic
concerns did not necessarily reduce one to abject poverty, nor earned
society's scorn. On the contrary, hermits were respected by society 
and
donations toward their upkeep were considered as enlightened 
expressions
of the donors' own sagacious insight rather than ostentatious acts of
charity. The "Selected Biographies" (Lie Zhuan) section of the Old 
Book
on Tang (Jiu Tang Shu), compiled in 945 by court historiographers,
contains a chapter on hermits, with 21 entries, prefaced by a 
statement
that the cultivation of hermitage traditionally encourages the virtue 
of
humility and self-restraint while discouraging vulgar trends of
competition and greed, although its Confucian authors failed to 
address
the irony that a celebrated hermit is an oxymoron.

Generally, an imbalance existed between donors and recipients, the
number wishing to give frequently exceeding the number prepared to
receive. Whenever a seng (Buddhist monk) or a dao'shi (Taoist priest) 
or
a wandering free spirit should show up in a village, his presence 
would
be celebrated by an spontaneous outpouring of generous giving by the
villagers that would resemble an instant festival. Even in modern 
time,
sengs in Southeast Asia still receive daily meals by simply walking
through villages, without begging, while the pious lay population 
awaits
their habitual schedule with the finest food in the house ready to 
give
with eagerness, the way bird-lovers feed their ornithic idols.

Presumably examples of this kind of non-monetary behavior would be
village communities where men made hunting parties and women grew
vegetables and tended to children. No money changed hands but all
contributed according to their abilities to the common welfare, and 
all
shared according to their needs. The family structure in modern
societies, while under constant financial attack, is still 
precariously
based on non-monetary bonds. Families still do not trade their 
children
the way professional sport teams trade valuable players. The 
widespread
bending of free-market regulations and peer pressure to rules of
behavior against predatory trading on Wall Street in the days 
following
September 11 also highlighted this motivation.

Redistribution is involved where a chief gathers together a harvest 
into
safe storage, then redistributes it to members of his group by 
holding
communal feasts and festivals. This serves both to share the communal
wealth fairly, and also to reinforce the social structure, allocation
indicating status and importance. These festivals may also be used to
reinforce relationships with neighboring tribes, and the store may be
used to supply the community's warriors if circumstances require.

Polanyi recognized that marketplaces existed in ancient times, and 
were
present in primitive economies, but he argued that they existed 
within a
context of reciprocity. Money was often present, but it was 
unimportant,
and also operated within the context of reciprocity. Often, money was
used to settle the difference of value between exchange of goods. 
These
money-using daily markets were merely convenient localized exchange
places operating within the broad system of reciprocity. There were 
also
marketplaces for long-distance trade, such as ports. But these were 
only
for items which could not be obtained within the area, and therefore
could not be provided within the local system of reciprocity.

Ancient and primitive economies had marketplaces but they were not
market economies. They were embedded economies. According to Polanyi, 
a
market economy is an economic system controlled by prices, these 
prices
determining how much is produced, and how what is produced is
distributed. Social considerations have no part in this system. Money
exists, which serves as purchasing power and enables its possessors 
to
acquire goods and services, which are priced in money terms. People 
are
motivated to acquire money with which they can then purchase whatever
they want, often including political influence or privileges above 
the
law.

Polanyi believed this monetary-based market economy sprang suddenly 
into
existence in the 19th century, thrusting aside the old systems based 
on
reciprocity and redistribution.

"The outstanding discovery of recent historical and anthropological
research is that man's economy, as a rule, is submerged in his social
relationships. He does not act so as to safeguard his individual
interests in the possession of material goods; he acts as to 
safeguard
his social standing, his social claims, his social assets. He values
material goods only in so far as they serve this end." (Polanyi 
1945).
Of course, in a culture that celebrates wealth accumulation for its 
own
sake, people will work to accumulate wealth. Napoleon belittled 
Britain
as a nation of shopkeepers.

Polanyi challenged Adam Smith, who suggested that the division of 
labor
depended upon the existence of the market, or upon man's "propensity 
to
barter, truck and exchange one thing for another", because the market
economy had not appeared to much extent in Smith's time. Even where 
it
had appeared, it was a subordinate feature of economic life.

In his Trade and Market in the Early Empires, Polanyi wrote, "What is 
to
be done, though, when it appears that some economies have operated on
altogether different principles, showing a widespread use of money, 
and
far-flung trading activities, yet no evidence of markets or gain made 
on
buying or selling? It is then that we must re-examine our notions of 
the
economy."

Polanyi wrote on the formal and substantive meanings of the term
"economic". This distinguishes the methodology of economics from that 
of
economic anthropology. He argued that economics as we know it 
depended
on "formal" principles. Thus a set of allegedly self-evident 
assumptions
are made, which become premises used as the basis for a sequence of
logical deductions to a set of irrefutable conclusions. Thus one can
take Smith's statement about man's "propensity to barter, truck and
exchange one thing for another" and develop it to show how money and
markets came into being, and how they led in turn to specialization 
of
function, and increased productivity. But the method of economic
anthropology was "substantive" and depended upon empirical 
observation
from which principles of economic behavior were induced from 
perceived
evidence. Societies are first observed and the principles of their
economic activity recognized from their actual behavior.

Polanyi's claim is that the empirical observations of the 
substantivists
reveal economic life in archaic and primitive economies to be 
entirely
different from that assumed by the formalists. The McCarthy-era
witch-hunt left an intellectual aversion to Marxism in the US that
Polanyi conveniently filled because of his broadly socialist
perspective.


Néstor Miguel Gorojovsky
nestorgoro en fibertel.com.ar

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Compañeros del exercito de los Andes. 

...La guerra se la tenemos de hacer del modo que podamos: 
sino tenemos dinero, carne y un pedazo de tabaco no nos 
tiene de faltar: cuando se acaben los vestuarios, nos 
vestiremos con la bayetilla que nos trabajen nuestras mugeres, 
y sino andaremos en pelota como nuestros paisanos los indios: 
seamos libres, y lo demás no importa nada...

Jose de San Martín, 27 de julio de 1819.

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