[R-P] (en inglés) three suicides in 1991

[Julio Fernández Baraibar]

Marl Jones, ya se los he nombrado antes, envió a la a-list el siguiente
artículo publicado en Moscow News y firmado por Roy Medvedev. Medvedev
es un reconocido historiador marxista, disidente en tiempos de Brezhnev
y luchador por la democratización de la sociedad soviética, en el marco
del socialismo. Curiosamente, sus escritos, que antes de la caída del
muro de Berlín aparecían profusamente en la prensa occidental, incluído
nuestro provinciano Clarín, dejaron de aparecer después que el
capitalismo salvaje inició su inhumana marcha en Rusia tratando de
construir una burguesía, sobre la base del desmantelamiento del Estado
Soviético, proceso que entre otros efectos, bajó la expectativa de vida
de los ex ciudadanos soviéticos de 78 a 65 años, en un período menor a
los diez años.
Mevedev cuenta aquí la historia de tres suicidios ocurridos en Moscú
hace once años, durante los días del golpe de Estado que llevó al
borracho Yeltsin al poder e inició el proceso de disolución, ya no de la
Unión Soviética, sino de la Rusia histórica. Altos funcionarios
partidarios y militares, los tres dejaron en sus cartas postreras un
testimonio sobre sus convicciones y el futuro que se avecinaba para su
Patria.
Esa vieja patria rusa es la que hoy está, como puede, deteniendo su
caída libre. Puttin, el antiguo hombre del espionaje, -¿leyeron a John
Le Carré?- pareciera que está poniendo al oso sobre sus pies. Sus
acuerdos con China y con Irak, su uso oportunístico de la alianza
anterrorista de Bush, para detener la secesión chechena a sangre y a
fuego, están dando cuenta de una realpolitik que tiene como eje impedir
que EE.UU. ocupen militar y políticamente el Cáucaso.
Sé que todo esto suena a soliloquio de un viejo coronel de inteligencia
de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, que hojea un Atlas mientras fuma un puro y
saborea un oporto. Lean la nota y practiquen su inglés.

Julio Fernández Baraibar
julfb en sinectis.com.ar



> Moscow News
> August 21-27, 2002
> THREE SUICIDES
> By Roy Medvedev
> Every August, Russia recalls one of the most tragic pages in its
history - a
> coup staged by the State Committee for the State of Emergency, or
GKChP.
> Eleven years on, those events can be viewed more impartially, and so
too can
> their masterminds and victims. Today their death arouses, at the most,
> compassion and regret
> The well-known historian offered MN an excerpt from his forthcoming
book, The
> Soviet Union: The Last Year of Life.
> "I put too much trust in people"
> Boris Pugo was appointed Soviet interior minister in December 1990, at
age
> 53. Soon afterward he was awarded the rank of colonel general. In
making
> those appointments, Mikhail Gorbachev made no secret of the fact that
Pugos
> Lettish descent was as important to him as his personal and business
> qualities. Before taking up the main office at the Interior Ministry,
Pugo
> had for three years been chairman of the CPSU Central Control
Commission.
> Prior to that, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central
> Committee and before that, chairman of the Latvian KGB. I met Boris
Pugo in
> the summer of 1989, when I was assigned to head a USSR Congress of
Peoples
> Deputies investigation commission on corruption. Pugo seemed an
extremely
> well organized and decent man, but somewhat jittery and oversensitive
to real
> or imagined attempts at belittling the role of leading Party agencies
that he
> represented.
> At the time few were afraid of Communist Party penalties or even
expulsion
> from the Party while "partocrats" were at times attacked in the media
even
> more vigorously than the "dumb generals." Pugo was, above all, a
Communist
> Youth League and Party functionary, and did not particularly
distinguish
> himself as interior minister or KGB chief.
> In 1991, the course of events inexorably pushed a person like Pugo
toward
> protest and opposition. This was clear from, among other things, his
rare
> presentations at the Supreme Soviet. In early August, the interior
minister
> took a vacation, going to a sanitarium in the Crimea. In the morning
of
> August 18 he was spotted on the Black Sea beach, but in the evening of
the
> same day he returned to Moscow, joining the GKChP without any
hesitation,
> even though he was not a leading figure in it.
> The failure of the GKChP plan became obvious in the afternoon of
August 21,
> and the RF Prosecutor Generals Office announced that all GKChP members
would
> be called to account. When he came home in the evening, Pugo found
that all
> top-level internal government telephones had been cut off.
> He and his wife, Valentina, went upstairs to the apartment of their
son
> Vadim, an engineer, whose family lived in the same building on the
upper
> floor. Their conversation was a sad one: In effect, Pugo was saying
good-bye
> to his son and daughter-in-law, but at that stage the reference was to
his
> inevitable arrest. Prior to that, however, Valentina had asked her
husband
> exactly where in their apartment weapons were hidden, for she would
not live
> another minute after he was gone.
> No one knows what the couple talked about during that night. In the
morning
> of August 22, at 9 a.m., Boris Pugo called his deputies at the
Interior
> Ministry to ask how they were getting along. Asked whether the
minister would
> come to the office that day, Pugo replied with a question, "Whatever
for?" At
> the end of the conversation he asked them to give his best regards to
Gen.
> Boris Gromov, his first deputy. Before long, Pugo received a call on
the same
> line from Russian intelligence services: "Could we have a meeting with
you?"
> Viktor Barannikov and Viktor Yerin, generals from Boris Yeltsins inner
> circle, were looking for him. Pugo said: "Come over to my place."
> When they arrived, the door was opened by an old man - Boris Pugos
> father-in-law. "Something terrible has happened," he said. "Come in."
The
> minister was lying on his bed with blood flowing from his temple. His
wife
> was sitting on the floor, by the other bed. She also had a head wound,
but
> was still alive and died at the hospital without regaining
consciousness.
> Both had left notes before shooting themselves. "I put too much trust
in
> people," he wrote. "I have honestly lived my life." Valentina Pugo was
even
> more laconic: "I do not want to live anymore. Do not condemn us. Take
care of
> grandpa. Mother." An inquiry concluded that it was a suicide.
> The Pugos funeral took place in Moscow two days later, almost
> inconspicuously.
> A Marshals Death
> The day Pugo and his wife were buried, Saturday, August 24, Marshal
Sergei
> Akhromeev, 68, Hero of the Soviet Union and military advisor to the
Soviet
> president, committed suicide in his office in the Moscow Kremlins Unit
1.
> Akhromeev had no weapons at hand, but he could not and did not want to
wait.
> He hanged himself using a nylon curtain rope, one end of which he had
tied to
> a massive copper handle on a high window frame.*
> On Saturday there was no secretary in the reception room in front of
the
> marshals office, and his body was not discovered until late in the
evening,
> by an officer from the Kremlin commandants office who was to inspect
all
> premises in his charge. Investigators from the Military Prosecutors
Office
> with a video camera were immediately called to the scene. All safes
were
> locked. There were six hand-written notes on the marshals desk - two
of them
> for his family and one with a request to pay his debt to the Kremlin
> cafeteria (the money was lying nearby). A separate note explained the
reason
> for his action. "I am unable to live on when my Motherland is dying
and when
> everything that I have thought to be the whole point of my existence
is being
> destroyed. My age and my entire life give me the right to leave. I
have
> fought to the last."
> Akhromeev was not a member of the GKChP. He did not learn about the
creation
> of the committee until the morning of August 19, when he, his wife,
and their
> grandchildren were vacationing in Sochi. But Akhromeev decided to
return to
> Moscow, leaving his family at the sanitarium. In the evening of August
19,
> the marshal was at the Kremlin, where he met with Vice President
Gennady
> Yanayev at 10 p.m. Akhromeev said that he supported the GKChPs appeal
and was
> ready to help. He spent the night at his dacha, where his younger
daughter
> lived with her family. The marshal worked the whole of August 20 at
the
> Kremlin and the Defense Ministry, collecting information about the
> military-political situation in the country. Akhromeev slept on a cot
in his
> office. He phoned his daughters and wife in Sochi from his office.
> On August 21 it became clear that the GKChP had failed, but Akhromeev
> realized that even earlier. On August 22 he learned about Gorbachevs
return
> and the arrest of Defense Minister Dmitry Yazov. Akhromeev did not
meet with
> Gorbachev. He began writing a letter to Gorbachev as well as the text
of his
> statement at a Supreme Soviet session, set for August 26. There were
plenty
> of notes on that score in the notebook that was later given to his
family.
> "Why did I return to Moscow from Sochi? No one had ordered me to come.
I was
> sure that this adventurous plan would fail, and I saw my misgivings
confirmed
> when I arrived in Moscow. But our country has been heading for
disaster ever
> since 1990. Gorbachev is dear to me, but dearer still is the
Fatherland. At
> least, let a mark be left in history: There was a protest against the
> destruction of such a great state."
> According to the marshals daughters, Natalya and Tatyana, in the
evening of
> August 23, their father did not look distressed. They all met at
dinner; they
> had bought a large melon and were discussing the latest developments.
The
> marshal went to the Kremlin at 9 a.m., promising to take his
granddaughters
> for a walk in the evening. From his Kremlin office, he talked to
Tatyana
> about meeting her mother, who was arriving at 3 p.m. An hour later,
however,
> Akhromeev was dead.
> As can be judged from his notes, the marshal was already considering
> committing suicide on August 23, but had not yet made up his mind. In
the
> morning of August 24, radio and television broadcast a statement by
> Gorbachev, who announced that he was stepping down as secretary
general of
> the CPSU Central Committee and called for self-dissolution of the CPSU
> Central Committee. Some of the marshals friends thought it had been
the last
> straw - the method of suicide was too unusual for a military man.
> Marshal Akhromeev was a good military leader, greatly respected in the
> military and in the Party. During World War II he began, in 1941, as
marine
> platoon commander, ending up as battalion commander. In 1979-88, he
was first
> deputy chief and then chief of the General Staff and first deputy
defense
> minister of the USSR. He oversaw the planning of military operations
in
> Afghanistan at all stages, including the withdrawal. Akhromeev was the
chief
> expert at arms reduction negotiations while Gorbachev admitted that
without
> Akhromeev the negotiations would have been less successful.
> The marshal was greatly upset by the anti-military campaign conducted
by a
> large part of the media in 1989-90 without any objections from
Gorbachev.
> Akhromeev often took up the issue at sessions of the Congress of
Peoples
> Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet. I discussed these matters with
> Akhromeev in his office on several occasions.
> The marshals suicide was not announced on television until the evening
of
> August 25; on August 26, newspapers reported on it in some more
detail,
> citing the Prosecutor Generals Office to the effect that investigation
was in
> progress. There was no obituary even after August 26. Neither the
president
> nor the newly appointed defense minister expressed condolences in
public over
> Akhromeevs death.
> The greatest concern about the fate of the late marshal was shown by
U.S.
> Admiral William J. Crowe, who was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in
> the Reagan administration. Crowe had spent a considerable amount of
time with
> Akhromeev at various negotiations on military matters and treated him
with
> great respect. The admiral tried calling Akhromeevs family several
times, but
> without success. In the end he asked some U.S. journalists he knew in
Moscow
> to find the late marshals wife and daughters in the Soviet capital and
convey
> his condolences to them. He also asked for a wreath to be laid at his
> colleagues grave. Adm. W. Crowe wrote the first long obituary in
memory of
> Marshal A.F. Akhromeev, publishing it in Time magazine.
> The article in Time was accompanied by a photo that showed Marshal
Akhromeev
> and Admiral Crowe at a military exercise watching an air assault
operation.
> In 1991, Akhromeev co-authored - with his friend Georgy Korniyenko, a
> diplomat - a small book, Through the Eyes of a Marshal and a Diplomat,
which
> was published in 1992 with the marshals name on the title page placed
in a
> black box.
> "I am not a traitor, but I am afraid"
> Early in the morning of August 26, 1991, on the pavement near the
entranceway
> to No. 13 Plotnikov Pereulok, where only the most high-ranking CPSU
Central
> Committee officials and some ministers lived, was found the body of
Nikolai
> Kruchina, a member of the CPSU Central Committee and administrator of
CPSU
> Central Committee affairs, closely associated with Mikhail Gorbachev.
> Kruchinas apartment was on the fifth floor.
> Kruchina was dead, and preliminary examination of the body and the
deceaseds
> study showed that he had committed suicide. His wife and younger son
were
> still in their bedrooms, and everything they were told at 6 a.m. came
as a
> terrible shock to them. When they had gone to bed, their husband and
father
> was still in his study. He had so much work to do that in the last few
days
> he had hardly had any sleep. Two notes written before his death were
found
> immediately. One of them lay on the coffee table in the hall. The
other, a
> more detailed one, was found on his body in the course of an
examination at
> the hospital. "I am not a traitor or conspirator," Kruchina wrote,
"but I am
> afraid..." He also declared his loyalty to Gorbachev. He had a clear
> conscience and asked this to be made known to the people.
> Kruchinas suicide provoked plenty of speculation. He had been in
charge of
> all CPSU bank accounts at home and abroad. Unlike in the case of Pugo
and
> Akhromeev, all premises where Nikolai Kruchina had worked were
thoroughly
> searched. His apartment in Plotnikov Pereulok was subjected to an
especially
> careful search, which was conducted by a team of criminologists under
the
> supervision of three chief investigators from the USSR Prosecutors
Office and
> in the presence of the prosecutor of Moscows Leninsky district. No
signs of
> the presence of unauthorized persons were discovered in Kruchinas
apartment.
> Neither were there any signs that any papers or documents might have
been
> destroyed. Quite the contrary, it became clear that after August 19,
Nikolai
> Kruchina had moved many of the papers from safes in Staraya Ploshchad
to his
> apartment. But all of those folders with documents were in order with
> appropriate inscriptions on their covers and authentic signatures by
the most
> high-ranking officials. Those materials were seized and appropriate
records
> filed.
> Nikolai Kruchinas office at the CPSU Central Committee was not quite
so tidy.
> In the evening of August 23, Gorbachev, who had returned from the
Crimea,
> ordered Kruchina to tie up the loose ends, in particular pay wages to
Party
> apparatus workers for two to three months and issue them work record
books.
> Kruchina, however, was unable to comply as the large six-story
building of
> the Administration of Affairs on Staraya Ploshchad was closed.
> After Kruchinas suicide, his office and all the other main offices at
the
> CPSU Central Committee were sealed, including the famous Room 6 on the
fifth
> floor of the main Central Committee building - the office of the
secretary
> general of the CPSU Central Committee who had resigned.
> The assets that Kruchina was in charge of were vast: thousands of
office and
> residential buildings, hundreds of out-of-town dacha estates, dozens
of
> vehicles, and a large number of sanitariums, holiday hotels, and
hospitals.
> The Party controlled about 200 publishing houses that printed books,
> newspapers, and magazines. The CPSU provided considerable financial
> assistance to many Communist Parties abroad, funding a great number of
> various projects. The Partys financial operations were built not only
on
> membership dues or proceeds from the sale of print publications.
Kruchina,
> therefore, had serious cause to expect less-than-pleasant questioning,
and
> not only on the GKChP case.
> Fortunately, there were not many victims in the GKChP coup, but they
proved
> symbolic. Nikolai Kruchina represented the Party; Sergei Akhromeev,
the
> military, and Boris Pugo, the KGB and the Interior Ministry.
> The young Muscovites who were buried on August 24 - also three -
represented
> new Russian democracy. It came to us with plenty of flaws, defects,
and
> mistakes, but it did not divide society into Reds and Whites. On
various
> formal receptions at the Kremlin in the past two years we could see
not only
> Gorbachev and Yeltsin but also such people as V. Varennikov, D. Yazov,
and A.
> Lukyanov. All of these people are OAPs now, but they have yet to
retire from
> politics. GKChP members Vasily Starodubtsev and Col. Gen. Boris
Gromov, Pugo's
> deputy and prior to that a close associate of Akhromeev, are
governors.
>
>
>
>
>