[R-G] The Afghan Speech Obama Should Give (But Won't)

[Sid Shniad]

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  Tomgram: "This Administration Ended, Rather Than Extended, Two Wars"

November 19, 2009
 The Afghan Speech Obama Should Give

*(But Won't)*


By Tom Engelhardt

Sure, the quote in the over-title is only my fantasy. No one in Washington
-- no less President Obama -- ever said, "This administration ended, rather
than extended, two wars," and right now, it looks as if no one in an
official capacity is likely to do so any time soon. It's common knowledge
that a president -- but above all a Democratic president -- who tried to
de-escalate a war like the one now expanding in Afghanistan and parts of
Pakistan, and withdraw American troops, would be so much domestic political
dead meat.

This everyday bit of engrained Washington wisdom is, in fact, based on not a
shred of evidence in the historical record. We do, however, know something
about what could happen to a president who escalated a counterinsurgency
war: Lyndon Johnson comes to mind for expanding his inherited war in Vietnam
out of fear <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20091130/schell/single> that he
would be labeled the president who "lost" that country to the communists (as
Harry Truman had supposedly "lost" China). And then there was Vice President
Hubert Humphrey who -- incapable of rejecting Johnson's war policy -- lost
the 1968 election to Richard Nixon, a candidate pushing a fraudulent "peace
with honor" formula for downsizing the war.

Still, we have no evidence about how American voters would deal with a
president who didn't take the Johnson approach to a losing war. The only
example might be John F. Kennedy, who reputedly pushed back against
escalatory advice over Vietnam, and certainly did so against his military
high command during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In both cases, however, he
acted in private, offering quite a different face to the world.

We know that there would be those on the right, and quite a few war-fightin'
liberals as well, who would go nuclear over any presidential minus option in
Afghanistan. Many of them will, in fact, do so over anything less than the
McChrystal plan anyway. And we know that a media storm would certainly
follow. But when it comes to how voters would react, especially at a moment
when unhappiness with the Afghan War (as well as the president's handling of
it) is on the rise<http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2009/11/17/politics/politicalhotsheet/entry5687214.shtml>,
there is no historical evidence.

Sometime in the reasonably near
future<http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20091112/wl_nm/us_afghanistan_nato>,
President Obama will undoubtedly address the American people on whatever
decision he makes about the war in Afghanistan. Every sign indicates that he
will hew to Washington's political wisdom about what a war president can do
in this country.

Ever since late September when someone
leaked<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/20/AR2009092002920.html>Afghan
War commander General Stanley McChrystal's report to the president on
the disastrous situation in Afghanistan and the counterinsurgency war he
wants to wage there, we've been all but living inside Obama's
endless<http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-mcmanus15-2009nov15,0,381782.column>comprehensive
review of war strategy. After all, we get daily reports from
"the front," largely in the form of a flood of leaks to the media, on just
what's being considered -- from General McChrystal's estimated troop
escalation numbers, to Ambassador Karl Eikenberry's private
cables<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/11/AR2009111118432_pf.html>to
the president suggesting no more troops be sent, to recent outbursts
by Secretary
of Defense <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/us/politics/13gates.html>Robert
Gates and the
president<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/11/18/earlyshow/main5693527.shtml>decrying
all the leaks and rumors.

This, of course, is what happens when your deliberations drag out over
months while the key players, military and civilian, jostle, jockey, and
elbow <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/227/story/78813.html> each other for
advantage. In these last weeks, we've grown accustomed to previously
esoteric terms like the "hybrid
option"<http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2009/11/11/Obama-weighs-hybrid-Afghan-war-plan/UPI-83041257962537/>and
"counterterrorism-plus." <http://www.newsweek.com/id/217090> While we don't
know what exactly is going through Obama's mind, or just when or in what
form he will address us, we do know something about what his conclusions are
likely to be.

While there may be
"off-ramps"<http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2009/11/seeking-benchmarks-and-offramps-president-obama-sends-pentagon-officials-back-to-their-desks.html>and
an "end
game"<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/18/AR2009111800374.html?hpid=topnews>for
the Afghan War lurking somewhere in the distance in his plan, we know,
as a start, that he's not going to recommend a minus option. We have long
been assured that any proposals for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from
Afghanistan were never "on the
table."<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/08/world/asia/08troops.html>And
despite Ambassador Eikenberry's near zero-option position, we also
know
that the president is likely to choose some form of military
escalation<http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175133/afghanistan_as_a_bailout_state>(even
if these days, unlike in the Vietnam era, the word used is usually
"surge"). We don't
know<http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20091112/ts_nm/us_afghanistan_usa>how
many U.S. troops will be involved or whether they will be weighted
toward trainers and advisors or combat forces, but it seems clear that some
will be sent. It's not for nothing that the Pentagon is ramping
up<http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175135>new Afghan bases and
reinforcing old ones.

Undoubtedly, the President's speechwriters are already preparing the text
for his Afghan... well, we don't really know whether it will be "remarks,"
an announcement as part of a press conference, or a more formal address to
the American people. In any case, we -- the rest of us -- have had all the
disadvantages of essentially being in on the president's councils, and none
of the advantages of offering our own advice. But I don't see why we
shouldn't weigh in. Personally, I prefer not to leave the process to his
speechwriters and advisors.

What follows, then, is my version of the president's Afghan announcement.
I've imagined it as a challenging prime-time address to the American people.
Certainly, the subject is important enough for such an address, even if the
last time Obama did this, in
March<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/>,
it was via an unannounced appearance on a Friday morning. So here's my
President Obama -- in, I hope, something like his voice -- doing what no
American president has yet done. Sit down, turn on your TV, and see what you
think. *Tom*


The White House


Office of the Press Secretary


*A New Way Forward:* *The President's Address to the American People on
Afghan Strategy*


Oval Office


For Immediate Release December 2nd

8:01 P.M. EDT

My fellow Americans,

On March 28th, I outlined what I called a "comprehensive, new strategy for
Afghanistan and Pakistan." It was ambitious. It was also an attempt to
fulfill a campaign promise that was heartfelt. I believed -- and still
believe -- that, in invading Iraq, a war this administration is now ending,
we took our eye off Afghanistan. Our well-being and safety, as well as that
of the Afghan people, suffered for it.

I suggested then that the situation in Afghanistan was already "perilous." I
announced that we would be sending 17,000 more American soldiers into that
war zone, as well as 4,000 trainers and advisors whose job would be to
increase the size of the Afghan security forces so that they could someday
take the lead in securing their own country. There could be no more serious
decision for an American president.

Eight months have passed since that day. This evening, after a comprehensive
policy review of our options in that region that has involved commanders in
the field, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Security Advisor James Jones,
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Vice
President Joe Biden, top intelligence and State Department officials and key
ambassadors, special representative on Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard
Holbrooke, and experts from inside and outside this administration, I have a
very different kind of announcement to make.

I plan to speak to you tonight with the frankness Americans deserve from
their president. I've recently noted a number of pundits who suggest that my
task here should be to reassure you about Afghanistan. I don't agree. What
you need is the unvarnished truth just as it's been given to me. We all need
to face a tough situation, as Americans have done so many times in the past,
with our eyes wide open. It doesn't pay for a president or a people to fake
it or, for that matter, to kick the can of a difficult decision down the
road, especially when the lives of American troops are at stake.

During the presidential campaign I called Afghanistan "the right war." Let
me say this: with the full information resources of the American presidency
at my fingertips, I no longer believe that to be the case. I know a
president isn't supposed to say such things, but he, too, should have the
flexibility to change his mind. In fact, more than most people, it's
important that he do so based on the best information available. No false
pride or political calculation should keep him from that.

And the best information available to me on the situation in Afghanistan is
sobering. It doesn't matter whether you are listening to our war commander,
General Stanley McChrystal, who, as press reports have indicated, believes
that with approximately 80,000 more troops -- which we essentially don't
have available -- there would be a reasonable chance of conducting a
successful counterinsurgency war against the Taliban, or our ambassador to
that country, Karl Eikenberry, a former general with significant experience
there, who believes we shouldn't send another soldier at present. All agree
on the following seven points:

*1.* We have no partner in Afghanistan. The control of the government of
Afghan President Hamid Karzai hardly extends beyond the embattled capital of
Kabul. He himself has just been returned to office in a presidential
election in which voting fraud on an almost unimaginably large scale was the
order of the day. His administration is believed to have lost all
credibility with the Afghan people.

*2.* Afghanistan floats in a culture of corruption. This includes President
Karzai's administration up to its highest levels and also the warlords who
control various areas and, like the Taliban insurgency, are to some degree
dependent for their financing on opium, which the country produces in
staggering quantities. Afghanistan, in fact, is not only a narco-state, but
*the* leading narco-state on the planet.

*3.* Despite billions of dollars of American money poured into training the
Afghan security forces, the army is notoriously understrength and largely
ineffective; the police forces are riddled with corruption and held in
contempt by most of the populace.

*4.* The Taliban insurgency is spreading and gaining support largely because
the Karzai regime has been so thoroughly discredited, the Afghan police and
courts are so ineffective and corrupt, and reconstruction funds so badly
misspent. Under these circumstances, American and NATO forces increasingly
look like an army of occupation, and more of them are only likely to
solidify this impression.

*5.* Al-Qaeda is no longer a significant factor in Afghanistan. The best
intelligence available to me indicates -- and again, whatever their
disagreements, all my advisors agree on this -- that there may be perhaps
100 al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan and another 300 in neighboring
Pakistan. As I said in March, our goal has been to disrupt, dismantle, and
defeat al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and on this we have, especially
recently, been successful. Osama bin Laden, of course, remains at large, and
his terrorist organization is still a danger to us, but not a $100
billion-plus danger.

*6.* Our war in Afghanistan has become the military equivalent of a massive
bail-out of a firm determined to fail. Simply to send another 40,000 troops
to Afghanistan would, my advisors estimate, cost $40-$54 billion extra
dollars; eighty thousand troops, more than $80 billion. Sending more
trainers and advisors in an effort to double the size of the Afghan security
forces, as many have suggested, would cost another estimated $10 billion a
year. These figures are over and above the present projected annual costs of
the war -- $65 billion -- and would ensure that the American people will be
spending $100 billion a year or more on this war, probably for years to
come. Simply put, this is not money we can afford to squander on a failing
war thousands of miles from home.

*7.* Our all-volunteer military has for years now shouldered the burden of
our two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even if we were capable of sending
40,000-80,000 more troops to Afghanistan, they would without question be
servicepeople on their second, third, fourth, or even fifth tours of duty. A
military, even the best in the world, wears down under this sort of stress
and pressure.

These seven points have been weighing on my mind over the last weeks as
we've deliberated on the right course to take. Tonight, in response to the
realities of Afghanistan as I've just described them to you, I've put aside
all the subjects that ordinarily obsess Washington, especially whether an
American president can reverse the direction of a war and still have an
electoral future. That's for the American people, and them alone, to decide.

Given that, let me say as bluntly as I can that I have decided to send no
more troops to Afghanistan. Beyond that, I believe it is in the national
interest of the American people that this war, like the Iraq War, be drawn
down. Over time, our troops and resources will be brought home in an orderly
fashion, while we ensure that we provide adequate security for the men and
women of our Armed Forces. Ours will be an administration that will stand or
fall, as of today, on this essential position: that we ended, rather than
extended, two wars.

This will, of course, take time. But I have already instructed Ambassador
Eikenberry and Special Representative Holbrooke to begin discussions,
however indirectly, with the Taliban insurgents for a truce in place. Before
year's end, I plan to call an international conference of interested
countries, including key regional partners, to help work out a way to settle
this conflict. I will, in addition, soon announce a schedule for the
withdrawal of the first American troops from Afghanistan.

For the counterinsurgency war that we now will not fight, there is already a
path laid out. We walked down that well-mined path once in recent American
memory and we know where it leads. For ending the war in another way, there
is no precedent in our recent history and so no path -- only the unknown.
But there is hope. Let me try to explain.

Recently, comparisons between the Vietnam War and our current conflict in
Afghanistan have been legion. Let me, however, suggest a major difference
between the two. When Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson faced
their crises involving sending more troops into Vietnam, they and their
advisors had little to rely on in the American record. They, in a sense,
faced the darkness of the unknown as they made their choices. The same is
not true of us.

In the White House, for instance, a number of us have been reading a book on
how the U.S. got itself ever more disastrously involved in the Vietnam War.
We have history to guide us here. We know what happens in counterinsurgency
campaigns. We have the experience of Vietnam as a landmark on the trail
behind us. And if that weren't enough, of course, we have the path to defeat
already well cleared by the Russians in their Afghan fiasco of the 1980s,
when they had just as many troops in the field as we would have if I had
chosen to send those extra 40,000 Americans. That is the known.

On the other hand, peering down the path of de-escalation, all we can see is
darkness. Nothing like this has been tried before in Washington. But I
firmly believe that this, too, is deeply in the American grain. American
immigrants, as well as slaves, traveled to this country as if into the
darkness of the unknown. Americans have long braved the unknown in all sorts
of ways.

To present this more formulaically, if we sent the troops and trainers to
Afghanistan, if we increased air strikes and tried to strengthen the Afghan
Army, we basically know how things are likely to work out: not well. The war
is likely to spread. The insurgents, despite many losses, are likely to grow
in strength. Hatred of Americans is likely to increase. Pakistan is likely
to become more destabilized.

If, however, we don't take such steps and proceed down that other path, we
do not know how things will work out in Afghanistan, or how well.

We do not know how things will work out in Pakistan, or how well.

That is hardly surprising, since we do not know what it means to end such a
war now.

But we must not be scared. America will not -- of this, as your president, I
am convinced -- be a safer nation if it spends many hundreds of billions of
dollars over many years, essentially bankrupting itself and exhausting its
military on what looks increasingly like an unwinnable war. This is not the
way to safety, but to national penury -- and I am unwilling to preside over
an America heading in that direction.

Let me say again that the unknown path, the path into the wilderness,
couldn't be more American. We have always been willing to strike out for
ourselves where others would not go. That, too, is in the best American
tradition.

It is, of course, a perilous thing to predict the future, but in the
Afghanistan/Pakistan region, war has visibly only spread war. The beginning
of a negotiated peace may have a similarly powerful effect, but in the
opposite direction. It may actually take the wind out of the sails of the
insurgents on both sides of the Afghan/Pakistan border. It may actually
encourage forces in both countries with which we might be more comfortable
to step to the fore.

Certainly, we will do our best to lead the way with any aid or advice we can
offer toward a future peaceful Afghanistan and a future peaceful Pakistan.
In the meantime, I plan to ask Congress to take some of the savings from our
two wars winding down and put them into a genuine jobs program for the
American people.

The way to safety in our world is, I believe, to secure our borders against
those who would harm us, and to put Americans back to work. With this in
mind, next month I've called for a White House Jobs Summit, which I plan to
chair. And there I will suggest that, as a start, and only as a start, we
look at two programs that were not only popular across the political
spectrum in the desperate years of the Great Depression, but were remembered
fondly long after by those who took part in them -- the Civilian
Conservation Corps and the Works Progress Administration. These basic
programs put millions of Americans back to work on public projects that
mattered to this nation and saved families, lives, and souls.

We cannot afford a failing war in Afghanistan and a 10.2% official
unemployment rate at home. We cannot live with two Americas, one for Wall
Street and one for everyone else. This is not the path to American safety.

As president, I retain the right to strike at al-Qaeda or other terrorists
who mean us imminent harm, no matter where they may be, including
Afghanistan. I would never deny that there are dangers in the approach I
suggest today, but when have Americans ever been averse to danger, or to a
challenge either? I cannot believe we will be now.

It's time for change. I know that not all Americans will agree with me and
that some will be upset by the approach I am now determined to follow. I
expect anger and debate. I take full responsibility for whatever may result
from this policy departure. Believe me, the buck stops here, but I am
convinced that this is the way forward for our country in war and peace, at
home and abroad.

I thank you for your time and attention. Goodnight and God bless America.

END 8:35 P.M. EDT