[R-G] Hearts and Minds and Empire

Fri Mar 20 17:21:46 MDT 2009

http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5975

Hearts and Minds and Empire
Francis Njubi Nesbitt | March 20, 2009
Editor: John Feffer

While there is no doubt that President Barack Obama is winning hearts  
around world, the jury is still out on whether he can convince  
skeptical intellectuals. A surge in Afghanistan, residual troops in  
Iraq and the resumption of renditions in the Horn of Africa conjure up  
fears of quagmires.

These fears, however, shouldn't detract from the conciliation campaign  
launched by the administration. There is obviously an effort to change  
the tone, language, and image of the United States. The executive  
orders on interrogations, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's trip to  
China, plans to close the prison in Guantánamo, and the pledge to  
close secret detention sites abroad all signal a change in tone.

But do they indicate a fundamental shift away from militarism?

Origin of Hearts and Minds

Lyndon Baines Johnson used the phrase "hearts and minds" in an  
infamous May 1965 speech. In the midst of a U.S. escalation of  
violence in Vietnam, he said victory would depend on the "hearts and  
minds of the people who actually live out there. By helping to bring  
them hope and electricity you are also striking a very important blow  
for the cause of freedom throughout the world." Johnson was referring  
to military counterinsurgency efforts to turn the people of southern  
Vietnam against the guerrillas by participating in development  
projects such as providing electricity.

Under Johnson, the U.S. committed itself to "pacification" of South  
Vietnam by providing both security and development support. U.S.  
officials would provide "advice" and resources for economic  
development projects, such as rebuilding roads and bridges, while the  
military would train and equip South Vietnam's police and paramilitary  
groups to hunt down insurgents. Some scholars trace the strategy to  
the British counterinsurgency model practiced in the 1940s in Malaysia  
and Kenya, and later in Northern Ireland. This strategy created secure  
zones and used minimum force so as to turn the populations against the  
insurgents, but also implemented draconian measures outside these  
secure zones. In the case of Kenya, the colonial power confined  
potential insurgents to "reeducation camps" for "detribalization,"  
primarily through Christian doctrine. These ideas and experiences  
influenced U.S. concepts of low-intensity conflict (pacification)  
designed to deal with wars, insurgencies, and liberation movements in  
developing countries. Pacification, however, didn't live up to its  
promise. The United States invested little in the program and could  
not force the government of South Vietnam to accept its advice. The  
merger of civil and military programs under a military commander was  
also highly problematic.

While LBJ's "hearts and minds" project was a military strategy, it  
should be distinguished from "soft power" or the use of diplomacy,  
cultural dialogue, development assistance, and propaganda to persuade  
others to resolve conflicts without resort to violence. The term "soft  
power" is associated with Harvard scholar Joseph Nye, who argued in  
The Powers to Lead (2008) that leaders project this type of power by  
drawing on resources such as charisma, symbolism, and the ability to  
attract others to dialogue. "Hard power," on the other hand, is  
coercive, using instruments such as the military and sanctions to  
achieve its ends. The Bush administration's shoot-first-and-ask- 
questions-later attitude is a version of "hard power."

Bush largely lacked charisma and communication skills, which  
diminished his ability to use soft power. Obama, however, could use  
his charm, empathy, and oratorical ability to bring adversaries to the  
negotiating table. With an economy on life support, two wars in  
progress, Iran's nuclear ambitions, and actual weapons in shaky India  
and lawless Pakistan, the president obviously has a full plate.  
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in her confirmation hearing  
that the United States would combine soft and hard power into a new  
policy of "smart power." The question, however, is whether this "smart  
power" is merely an appendage to the defense department's goals of  
pacification or a fundamental reversal of the militarism of the last  
decades. All presidents since FDR, for instance, have started a war.  
Will Obama be the first since WWII to end instead of start wars?

Obama's Soft Power

At the end of February, on the "NewsHour with Jim Lehrer" program,  
Obama said that the United States would balance force with diplomacy  
and development in Afghanistan. During the interview, he signaled a  
new 3D strategy combining defense, diplomacy, and development. "We've  
been thinking very militarily," Obama told Lehrer, "but we haven't  
been as effective in thinking diplomatically, we haven't been thinking  
effectively around the development side of the equation."

At the same time, the president announced a new Iraq strategy centered  
around the withdrawal of combat troops. The policy promised a shift to  
nation-building by providing resources to strengthen institutions such  
as the legislature, judiciary and local government and to help Iraq  
reestablish trade relations with neighboring countries. Obama said the  
removal of combat troops would change the mission from combat to  
supporting the (nonsectarian) Iraqi government secure the country. The  
"transitional force" will train, equip, and advise Iraqi forces in  
counterinsurgency techniques while also conducting counterterrorism  
missions and protecting U.S. civilians in the country.

This counterinsurgency strategy is consistent with the low-intensity  
conflict perspectives of Vietnam War-era pacification programs. During  
the Bush administration, a team led by General David Petraeus revised  
and rewrote this counterinsurgency doctrine. The newly published  
Counterinsurgency Guide outlines U.S. plans to support "friendly"  
governments manage insurgencies. The guide anticipates a future  
dominated by insurgencies in developing countries rather than big- 
power conflicts. It seems consistent with the emerging 3D strategy of  
the Obama administration in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa.

The opening statement of this new emphasis was Obama's January 26  
interview with Al-Arabiya in which he outlined the 3D policy. The  
president called for cooperation, promised to speak to the Arab world  
from an Arab capital, and vowed to "hunt [al-Qaeda] down." Obama  
indicated his interest in re-engaging the Israeli-Palestinian peace  
process from a regional perspective. Obama said that it was possible  
to envision a Palestinian state that is contiguous and allows freedom  
of movement and trade with other countries. The bottom line, however,  
is that he talked about poverty, education, and health rather than  
Bush's patronizing codes of freedom and democracy. Thus, although he  
insisted that Israel's security is paramount, there was an  
unmistakable message that the new administration would welcome a  
dialogue with moderate forces.

Africa in 3D

The United States first tested the 3D strategy in the Horn of Africa,  
where the new Africa Command, AFRICOM, became operational in October  
2008. AFRICOM is part of four U.S. "combatant commands" headed by  
General David Patraeus. AFRICOM initially announced that it would  
oversee military and humanitarian programs in Africa. Joint Chiefs  
Chairman Peter Pace said, at the time, that the challenge was to help  
Africa build governance institutions because "ungoverned areas"  
provided opportunities for terrorists. The Pentagon billed AFRICOM as  
a humanitarian effort that would train African forces to fight  
insurgents while providing support for humanitarian activities such as  
delivering food aid and rebuilding infrastructure.

Africans, however, were highly skeptical of AFRICOM. Many saw it as a  
further militarization of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. There  
were credible fears about Pentagon's plans to subcontract humanitarian  
and peacekeeping activities in Africa to "private security firms" such  
as DynCorp, Pacific Engineers, and Blackwater. These contractors were  
lining up to provide base logistics, construction management,  
helicopters, and vehicles for peacekeepers. Under the Bush  
administration, AFRICOM took over responsibility for the $100 million  
East African Counter-Terrorism Initiative based in Djibouti and  
involving Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, and Eritrea. It also  
coordinates the Trans-Sahara initiative involving numerous countries  
in West and Central Africa.

Although Clinton indicated in her confirmation hearing that the State  
Department would retain control of humanitarian operations, the 3D  
strategy continues to drive U.S. foreign policies in the region.  
AFRICOM is engaged in advising, training, and equipping armies in the  
region in counterinsurgency techniques. Marines based in Djibouti are  
rebuilding schools, hospitals, and churches destroyed during Kenya's  
post-election violence in January 2008.

Training and equipping African militaries in counterterrorism may have  
unintended consequences. AFRICOM should learn from the British who are  
embroiled in allegations of training an elite company of Kenyan  
soldiers accused of torture and rape. The British Operation Monogram  
trained an elite unit "20 Para" to stop extremists from crossing  
Kenya's border with Somalia. In March, the Kenyan government decided  
to move the unit to Mt. Elgon where an insurgency escalated two years  
ago. Last week, UN special envoy Philip Alston accused Kenya's  
security forces of extrajudicial killings and called on the attorney  
general and the police commissioner to resign. Kenya has emphatically  
denied the claims. Human Rights Watch is calling on Britain to stop  
training Kenya's security forces. Britain is now reportedly reviewing  
its counterinsurgency program. Its Operation Monogram also funds  
counterinsurgency programs in Yemen, Ethiopia, and Morocco, all  
governments that have been accused of using torture and excessive force.

The Future of 3D

As Obama put it, the United States has not "been thinking effectively"  
about diplomacy and development. The previous administration focused  
on the first "D" defense and managed only to increase anti-Americanism  
in much of the world. For the 3D strategy to work there would have to  
be a massive investment in development, an unlikely prospect in these  
uncertain economic times.

Without such an investment, the new administration's 3D rhetoric is in  
danger of going down in history as yet another example of empty and  
cynical propaganda in the midst of a surge in violence and repression.  
It's also difficult to imagine an effective coordination of military  
and civilian projects in places such as Afghanistan and Somalia. Even  
if a good-faith effort is made to provide security and development  
support to "friendly" governments, the records of counterinsurgency  
programs in Vietnam — and more recently in Kenya, Yemen, and Ethiopia  
— show that it's difficult to stop these regimes using such support  
for nefarious purposes.

Militarizing development is not the answer. The prudent direction  
would be to divorce development assistance from defense and invest  
resources in building relations with nongovernmental and civil society  
organizations instead of militaries. The United States would have a  
more positive impact if it focused on supporting the  
institutionalization of conflict resolution processes in multilateral  
organizations such as the United Nations. Such multilateral  
institutions have been starved of resources and recognition during the  
last two decades. In the final analysis, it's much cheaper and more  
effective to address the root causes of conflict, and seek nonviolent  
means of resolution such as conciliation, mediation, and negotiation.

Francis Njubi Nesbitt is a Foreign Policy In Focus contributor and  
teaches African politics and conflict resolution at San Diego State  
University. He is the author of Race for Sanctions (Indiana University  
Press, 2004) and is completing a book on peacemaking in the Horn of  
Africa.

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Recommended citation:
Francis Njubi Nesbitt, "Hearts and Minds and Empire," (Washington, DC:  
Foreign Policy In Focus, March 20, 2009).

Web location:
http://fpif.org/fpiftxt/5975

Production Information:
Author(s): Francis Njubi Nesbitt
Editor(s): John Feffer
Production: Jen Doak