[R-G] Talking to the Taliban

Anthony Fenton fentona at shaw.ca
Mon Mar 9 12:52:27 MDT 2009


Talking to the Taliban
  By Imran Khan in Islamabad
http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2009/03/200939102529353355.html

Islamabad has been accused of caving in to Pakistani Taliban demands  
[EPA]

Barack Obama, the US president, has hinted at holding talks with  
"moderate" elements of the Taliban, but are they willing to engage?

The Pakistani Taliban, black-turbaned and bearded, stand in full view  
of the public.

One grips a rocket launcher, and casually leans against a wall.  
Another, his AK 47 assault rifle slung underneath his arm with the  
safety trigger off, smiles.

These are men who would like you to think, at least, that they are  
prepared for anything.

But are they prepared for peace?

This was the scene I saw on a recent trip to the Swat valley. Once a  
tourist haven, it is now controlled by the Pakistani Taliban and  
visited, very rarely, by journalists.

But more than anything else, this ancient valley and what happens here  
could have crucial effect on the US’s fortunes in neighbouring  
Afghanistan.

Barack Obama, the US president, has said success in Afghanistan  
involves more than just troops. He talks of reaching out to people who  
are, in his words, "Islamic fundamentalists".

That is exactly what has happened in the Swat valley and Bajaur; key  
battlegrounds in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province.

The Pakistanis, involved in a bitter battle with the Taliban for a  
number of years, have began to realise that military force alone will  
not win the war.

Stalemate

According to most experts in Pakistan, the battle was at a stalemate.  
So, in a move that surprised and concerned Pakistan's friends in  
Washington, they reached out to the Taliban in the Swat Valley through  
the use of intermediary Mullah Sufi Mohammed.

It was a risky gesture. The mullah had spent time in jail for  
commanding fighters in cross-border raids into Afghanistan. He is  
avowedly pro-Taliban and religiously conservative - exactly the type  
of man who has made life difficult for the Americans in the past.

Yet the Pakistanis took the decision to engage. They found in Sufi  
Mohammed a moderate cleric they could do business with. He in turn sat  
down with Mullah Fazlullah, leader of the Pakistani Taliban in the  
Swat valley, and talked.

Sufi Mohammed had an advantage; Mullah Fazlullah was his son in law  
and here that relationship matters.

However, according to General Talat Masood, a retired Pakistani army  
lieutenant, the Pakistanis had little choice. They had to do something  
as their war in the Swat Valley was losing support domestically, as  
well as draining resources for very little return.

"At least three times the Pakistan launched a major offensive in the  
Swat Valley, but it was the follow up that was poor and after each  
offensive when the army left the Taliban came back, and came back in  
major strength," he says.

After intense negotiations a peace deal was signed and Pakistan  
breathed a little more easily.

Fragile truce

The Taliban have waged war with the Pakistani army over control of the  
North West Frontier
So far it has been a fragile truce with one journalist killed and the  
government’s top administrator kidnapped briefly. It could yet fall  
apart over a key sticking point - the implementation of Sharia, or  
Islamic law, in the valley and what form that could take.

The peace deal has also attracted criticism from those who believe  
Pakistan has given up too much and that the armed group has won.

Crucially, though, the ceasefire is holding. The markets are busier  
and people forced to flee their homes are returning slowly to rebuild  
lives. The Pakistani army is now in a reactive, rather than  
aggressive, mode and policemen are back out on the streets.

According to Swati resident Nawab Ali the peace deal is welcome: "It’s  
something. If the Taliban stick to it then yes, I am hopeful, I hope  
it lasts."

It is a hope shared by many.

Moderates' fears

The US has been watching this deal closely. But can they replicate it  
in Afghanistan? Are there "moderate" Taliban they can reach out to?

Talat Masood, the retired army lieutenant, is sceptical: "The  
leadership of the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan is in the hands  
of people who are not moderate.

"There are moderate Taliban but they won't talk for fear of offending  
the senior leadership, and this is the problem the Americans face."

There is also mounting evidence that the peace deal struck in the Swat  
valley and the neighbouring Bajaur agency may conceal another - for  
the US at least - dangerous agenda.

Three of Pakistan's top Taliban leaders have come together to form  
what they have called a  The Council of United Holy Warriors.

The men were once bitter rivals: Baitullah Mehsud, Hafiz Gul Bahudar  
and Maulvi Nazeer fought Pakistani troops and favoured their Jihad  
against them.

Together they control huge swathes of North and South Waziristan, The  
lawless tribal region that sits next to the Paktia, Paktika and Khost  
Provinces in Afghanistan.

That is a region that has seen some of the most intense fighting  
between the Taliban and US and Coalition  forces.

Exporting the fight

In Bajuar, Maulvi Faqir Mohammed, a Taliban spokesman, has told Al  
Jazeera that they will take their fight  to Afghanistan instead of the  
Pakistani army.

The reason for this change in tactics? Afghan Taliban leader Mullah  
Omar.

Omar has reportedly been watching events in Pakistan with concern. He  
is said to have dispatched a high-level delegation to Taliban fighters  
with a simple message: "Unite and fight not your own people, but the  
occupiers of Afghanistan."

It would appear that message has now being heeded and that may be the  
real reason the Taliban have decided to engage in the Swat valley and  
Bajuar.

This is a real issue for the Americans who want to reach out to the  
Taliban.

According to Masood, the US is weak. "It's in no position to negotiate  
with anyone. The Taliban have made it clear that peace talks cannot  
take place without the occupier first leaving Afghanistan."

Perceptions

It is that perceived weakness that many say has led the US president  
to talk of alternative strategies.

It may not be that easy, however. Any peace deal with the Taliban has  
to include men like Mullah Omar and Baitullah Mehsud. Hardliners who  
are no mood to compromise.

By wondering aloud whether there are moderates he can talk to, the US  
president has shown he is taking advice from those who have long  
advocated a more reconciliatory approach.

But, rather predictably, peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan is more  
complicated than just talking to the Taliban.

It is a widely held view here that Pakistan needs the Taliban to  
remain strong in Afghanistan in order to thwart any plans their  
traditional rival India has in the region.

The US has long accused Pakistan of playing a double game when it  
comes to the Taliban - one that sees them publicly back the so called  
"war on terror" but privately need the Taliban as a strategic asset.  
It is a charge the Pakistanis deny.

Experts also say the Pakistanis are well aware that one day the US and  
coalition forces will leave Afghanistan. Pakistan will need all the  
influence it can muster if it is to have a say in future Afghan affairs.

Sources have also told Al Jazeera that despite the peace deal in the  
Swat Valley, the Taliban still have training camps and are sending  
young men into Afghanistan to fight. That is something the US has long  
feared would happen under any peace deal.

Facing challenges

The US now has a serious challenge on its hands. Finding moderates to  
talk to will be difficult and the US may well be asking for too much.  
It will want the Taliban to lay down arms, drop its support for al- 
Qaeda and participate in the democratic process it hopes will take  
root in Afghanistan.

All things the Taliban on both sides of the border may not be willing  
to do.

As the drone attacks continue in Pakistan and Taliban fighters mount  
raids on US forces and both Pakistan and Afghanistan face political  
crises at home, domestic conditions for dealing with the Taliban are  
rapidly deteriorating.

It would seem the US has made a bold leap in its thinking. Translating  
that into action, however, may prove to be difficult.


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