[R-G] Serbian spy's trial lifts cloak on his CIA alliance

[Anthony Fenton]

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-serbia-spy-cia1-2009mar01,0,5662696.story
 From the Los Angeles Times
Serbian spy's trial lifts cloak on his CIA alliance
As Milosevic's intelligence chief, Jovica Stanisic is accused of  
setting up genocidal death squads. But as a valuable source for the  
CIA, an agency veteran says, he also 'did a whole lot of good.'
By Greg Miller

March 1, 2009

Reporting from Belgrade, Serbia — At night, when the lawns are empty  
and the lamps along the walking paths are the only source of light,  
Topcider Park on the outskirts of Belgrade is a perfect meeting place  
for spies.

It was here in 1992, as the former Yugoslavia was erupting in ethnic  
violence, that a wary CIA agent made his way toward the park's gazebo  
and shook hands with a Serbian intelligence officer.

Jovica Stanisic had a cold gaze and a sinister reputation. He was the  
intelligence chief for Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, and  
regarded by many as the brains of a regime that gave the world a  
chilling new term: "ethnic cleansing."

But the CIA officer, William Lofgren, needed help. The agency was all  
but blind after Yugoslavia shattered into civil war. Fighting had  
broken out in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Milosevic was seen as a menace to  
European security, and the CIA was desperate to get intelligence from  
inside the turmoil.

So on that midnight stroll, the two spies carved out a clandestine  
relationship that remained undisclosed: For eight years, Stanisic was  
the CIA's main man in Belgrade. During secret meetings in boats and  
safe houses along the Sava River, he shared details on the inner  
workings of the Milosevic regime. He provided information on the  
locations of NATO hostages, aided CIA operatives in their search for  
grave sites and helped the agency set up a network of secret bases in  
Bosnia.

At the same time, Stanisic was setting up death squads for Milosevic  
that carried out a genocidal campaign, according to prosecutors at the  
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, which was  
established by the U.N. Security Council in 1993 to try those  
responsible for serious human rights violations in the Balkan wars.

Now facing a trial at The Hague that could send him to prison for  
life, Stanisic has called in a marker with his American allies. In an  
exceedingly rare move, the CIA has submitted a classified document to  
the court that lists Stanisic's contributions and attests to his  
helpful role. The document remains sealed, but its contents were  
described by sources to The Times.

The CIA's Lofgren, now retired, said the agency drafted the document  
to show "that this allegedly evil person did a whole lot of good."  
Lofgren, however, doesn't claim to disprove the allegations against  
Stanisic.

"But setting the indictment aside," he said, "there are things this  
man did that helped bring hostilities to an end and establish peace in  
Bosnia."

Through his attorney, Stanisic, 58, declined to comment, citing the  
tribunal's ban on communications with the media. But Stanisic has  
pleaded not guilty, and denies any role in creating the squads or even  
being aware of the crimes they committed.

The CIA's effort puts it in the unusual position of serving as  
something of a character witness for a war crimes defendant. The  
agency declined to comment on the document. Because its contents are  
classified, the letter could be considered by the court only in closed  
session. Court officials said it was unclear whether the document  
would be of significant use to the Stanisic defense, or would come  
into play mainly in seeking a more lenient sentence if he is convicted.

Prosecution dubious of Stanisic claims

This account is based on dozens of interviews with current and former  
officials of U.S. and Serbian intelligence agencies, as well as  
documents obtained or viewed by The Times. Among them are official  
records of the Serbian intelligence service, and a seven-page account  
of that bloody period that Stanisic wrote while in prison in The Hague.

In that memo, Stanisic portrays himself as someone who sought to  
moderate Milosevic, and who worked extensively with the CIA to contain  
the crisis.

"I institutionalized cooperation with the U.S. intelligence community  
in spite of the notoriously bad relations between our two countries,"  
Stanisic writes. That collaboration, he continues, "contributed  
significantly to the de-escalation of the conflict."

The chief prosecutor, Dermot Groome, says that Stanisic's actions to  
help the CIA and counter Milosevic only underscore the power he had.  
In his opening argument, Groome said that the "ability to save lives  
is tragically the very same authority and the very same ability that  
[Stanisic] used . . . to take lives."

Belgrade still bears the scars of war. Bombed-out buildings are  
scattered across the Serbian capital, including a charred concrete  
structure on Knez Milos Street that used to be the headquarters for  
Serbia's State Security Service.

Stanisic used to occupy the corner office on the top floor. In his  
prime, he was in charge of 2,000 employees. He wore dark suits and  
sunglasses, a Balkan James Bond. His nickname was "Ledeni," Serbian  
for "icy."

Stanisic joined the Yugoslav service in 1975, when the country was  
still under the communist rule of Josip Broz Tito. He was never  
regarded as an ideologue or rabid nationalist. But he had a rare  
aptitude for espionage.

"Stanisic was not an ordinary intelligence officer," said Dobrica  
Cosic, a writer and former dissident who was president of Serbia in  
1992 and 1993. "He is an intellectual, not a radical policeman. He was  
educated and skilled, and he knew how to organize that service."

Because of those skills, Milosevic made Stanisic his top spy, despite  
long-standing distrust between the two.

Milosevic had come to power by exploiting Serbian nationalistic fervor  
and religious animosity. He cast himself as the Serbs' protector, a  
posture that resonated powerfully with people who still mark the day  
their ancestors were defeated by Ottoman Turks, who were mostly  
Muslim, in the 14th century.

In 1991, as ethnic violence escalated, Milosevic ordered the creation  
of secret paramilitary units, with names like Red Berets and  
Scorpions, that would roam the Balkans. They wore unmarked uniforms,  
were led by thugs and committed some of the worst atrocities of the war.

As the trial got underway last year, Groome showed photos of Stanisic  
posing with members of the special units. He played audio of  
intercepted communications in which Stanisic appears to refer to the  
units as his "boys."

At one point, Groome introduced a videotape showing images of Muslim  
men and boys -- their hands bound with wire -- being led into the  
woods and shot, one by one, by members of the Scorpions.

"Jovica Stanisic established these units," said Groome, an American  
lawyer. And Stanisic made sure "they had everything that they needed,  
including a license to clear the land of unwanted people, a license to  
commit murder."

CIA saw no evidence of war crimes

Former members of the State Security Service dispute those  
allegations. "We were doing our jobs, according to the law," said  
Vlado Dragicevic, who served for years as Stanisic's deputy. "We never  
committed acts of genocide. On the contrary, we were trying to stop  
that."

CIA officers who served in the region said that they had assumed  
Stanisic was no choirboy, but they never saw evidence that he was  
involved in war crimes. Instead, they viewed him as a key ally in a  
situation spinning rapidly out of control.

 From early on, Stanisic was eager to cement his relationship with the  
CIA. At one of his meetings with Lofgren, he turned over a sheaf of  
documents, including diagrams of bomb shelters and other structures  
that Serbian companies had built in Iraq for Saddam Hussein.

But Stanisic also drew boundaries. He never took payment from the CIA,  
worked with the agency on operations or took steps that he would have  
considered a blatant betrayal of his boss.

Over time, Stanisic sought to move his relationship with the agency  
out of the shadows. Well after his secret meetings had started,  
Stanisic persuaded Milosevic to let him open contacts with the CIA as  
a back channel to the West. The midnight meetings in the park gave way  
to daylight sessions in Stanisic's office.

The two spies shared a dark sense of humor. Lofgren liked to wander  
over to the window, aim his phone at the sky and joke that he was  
getting GPS coordinates for a missile strike.

In the letter to The Hague, submitted in 2004, the CIA describes  
Stanisic's efforts to defuse some of the most explosive events of the  
Bosnian war.

In spring 1993, at CIA prodding, Stanisic pressured Ratko Mladic,  
military commander of the breakaway Serb republic in Bosnia, to  
briefly stop the shelling of Sarajevo.

Two years later, Stanisic helped secure the release of 388 North  
Atlantic Treaty Organization troops who had been taken hostage,  
stripped of their uniforms and strapped to trees as human shields  
against NATO bombing runs. In his own written account, Stanisic said  
he negotiated the release "with the support of agency leadership."

That same year, Stanisic tried to intervene when French pilots were  
shot down and taken captive. Mladic "refused to admit that he was  
holding the pilots," Stanisic wrote. But "my service managed to  
discover the circumstances and location of their captivity," and  
shared the information with the CIA and French authorities.

By then, the Clinton administration was engaged in an all-out  
diplomatic push to end the war. Stanisic accompanied Milosevic to  
Dayton, Ohio, for peace talks, then returned to Serbia to carry out  
key pieces of the accord.

It was left to Stanisic to get the president of Bosnia's Serb  
republic, Radovan Karadzic, to sign a document pledging to leave  
office. And Stanisic helped the CIA establish a network of bases in  
Bosnia to monitor the cease-fire.

Doug Smith, the CIA's station chief in Bosnia, recalled meeting with  
Stanisic and a group of disgusted Bosnian Serb officials in Belgrade.  
As Stanisic instructed them to cooperate with the CIA, Smith said, the  
assembled guests "shifted uneasily in their seats."

Smith began meeting with Stanisic regularly, including once on a boat  
on the Sava. In typically dramatic fashion, Stanisic arrived late at  
the docks.

"He emerged out of the darkness with bodyguards" and spent much of the  
evening talking about his boss, Smith said. "He intensely disliked  
Milosevic. He went off on how awful Milosevic was -- dishonest and  
crooked."

Asked whether Stanisic was capable of committing war crimes, Smith  
replied, "I think he would do as little bad as he could."

At the time, CIA Director John M. Deutch was trying to clean up the  
agency's image by cracking down on contacts with human rights  
violators. Years later, the "Deutch rules" were cited as a reason the  
agency hadn't done better penetrating groups such as Al Qaeda.

But Deutch had no problems with Stanisic. He invited the Serbian to  
CIA headquarters in 1996, and an itinerary of the visit indicates that  
Stanisic got a warm welcome.

The Serbian spy chief was taken to hear jazz at the Blues Alley club  
in Georgetown, Va., and driven to Maryland's eastern shore for a bird  
hunt. Deutch even presented Stanisic with a 1937 Parker shotgun, a  
classic weapon admired by collectors.

Deutch, now a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,  
declined to comment.

Stanisic's expanding ties to the CIA became a source of friction with  
Milosevic, who worried that his top spy was plotting against him. In  
1998, Stanisic was fired.

The ensuing years were chaotic. After a new campaign of violence  
against Kosovo, Milosevic was forced from office in 2000, arrested the  
next year and taken to The Hague, where he went on trial for war  
crimes and died of a heart attack in 2006. A series of political  
assassinations occurred amid suspicion that Stanisic was somehow still  
pulling the strings.

When Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic -- who had sent Milosevic  
to The Hague -- was assassinated in 2003, Stanisic was arrested and  
detained for three months. Then, without explanation, he too was sent  
to The Hague.

For the last five years, Stanisic has gone back and forth between  
Belgrade and the detention center in the Netherlands. His trial was  
postponed last year to allow him to return to Belgrade for treatment  
of an acute intestinal disorder that according to court records had  
caused substantial blood loss. If Stanisic's health stabilizes, his  
trial is expected to resume this year.

Stanisic is still seen in Belgrade from time to time, occasionally  
greeted by well-wishers. But much of his life has crumbled. He is  
divorced from his wife, estranged from his children and spends  
alternating weeks in the hospital.

"The last time I saw him, he was connected to tubes," said Dragicevic,  
Stanisic's longtime deputy.

Sometimes Stanisic is in good spirits and talks of prevailing in his  
case. But most of the time, Dragicevic said, "he looks like a person  
who has already surrendered."

"The person who was in charge of so many things, the person who was so  
very important and well-known, is now a very lonely one."

greg.miller at latimes.com