[R-G] Khamenei Rides a Storm in a Tea Cup

[Suzanne de Kuyper]

Thnkyou Yoshi for the gifts of Teheran.  suzannedk at gmail.com

On Thu, Jun 18, 2009 at 9:19 AM, Yoshie Furuhashi <
critical.montages at gmail.com> wrote:

> <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KF18Ak01.html>
> Jun 18, 2009
> Khamenei rides a storm in a tea cup
> By M K Bhadrakumar
>
> Western capitals must make a difficult choice: how long to pin hopes
> on the eruption of a "color" revolution in Tehran? The burden falls
> almost entirely on Europe, since Washington has different priorities.
>
> The United States cannot afford to be spotted in the barricades on the
> frontline of any attempt to prise open the Iranian regime at this
> delicate point in Middle Eastern politics. Tehran will not forgive for
> another quarter century at least any such American folly, and the
> Barack Obama administration has no intentions of committing hara-kiri,
> either.
>
> Within Europe, it is unclear who is spearheading the charge of the
> light brigade. No country seems to want to be seen up front - except
> the Czech Republic, which has no choice, since it currently chairs the
> rotating European Union presidency. But then, most European countries
> would probably seldom fail the chance to be Tehran's bete noire, but
> will, true to a pattern, swiftly fall back the moment they estimate
> that the law of diminishing returns is at work and continued tirades
> might jeopardize lucrative commercial interests in Iran.
>
> Tens of thousands of supporters of defeated presidential candidate Mir
> Hossein Mousavi planned to keep up their street protests in Tehran on
> Wednesday, even though the authorities have promised a partial recount
> of Friday's vote that saw incumbent Mahmud Ahmadinejad win another
> four-year term.
>
> No scope for a color revolution
> Europe has no real experience in staging color revolutions. This has
> been the forte of the Americans - conceptualized in the post-Soviet
> space in Eurasia by the Bill Clinton administration and subsequently
> grasped by the neo-conservatives in the George W Bush team. Europeans
> were curious bystanders in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. France to
> some extent might have been on the inside track over Lebanon, but then
> the result turned out to be a mish-mash.
>
> At any rate, to borrow Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin's famous words
> in a philosophical context, staging a color revolution in Tehran is
> not like breaking an egg. The signs are that the color revolution
> struggling to be born on the streets of Tehran has had a miscarriage.
> Ahmadinejad's participation at the summit meeting of the Shanghai
> Cooperation Organization (SCO) at Yekaterinburg, Russia, on Tuesday
> was possible only with the tacit acquiescence of Supreme Leader Ali
> Khamenei. It was an important decision to take at a critical juncture.
> Earlier reports in the Western media speculated that Ahmadinejad might
> stand down in view of the developing political situation.
>
> Evidently, the regime decided that Tehran should not in any way
> project an atmosphere of crisis as that would only play into the hands
> of the proponents of a color revolution within Iran and abroad. To
> quote well-known Iranian dissident Ibrahim Yazdi, "Certainly, the gap
> inside Iran, politically, will be widened. Our main concern is how to
> keep the enthusiasm that was created for the election alive, in order
> to monitor and constrain the power of the government. The only way to
> counter it is the power of the people. We need to organize them."
>
> How is the regime coping? Clearly, Khamenei is in the driving seat and
> is in control of the state apparatus. He is skillfully navigating the
> regime through the choppy waters. Khamenei's meeting with the
> principal opposition candidate in the election, Mousavi, merits
> attention. The official statement makes out certain key points. First,
> Khamenei indicated unambiguously to Mousavi that the regime would not
> tolerate any street protests and he must therefore "channel protests
> through legal bodies". It now becomes extremely difficult for Mousavi
> to be seen as defying the Supreme Leader's diktat.
>
> Second, Khamenei suggested that there was nothing extraordinary about
> the present situation, insofar as "in previous elections also, there
> were some people and candidates who had some problems". But they
> pursued the matter through the Guardians Council, which in any case
> has to approve the conduct of the presidential election in Iran.
>
> Mousavi's existential choice
>
> However, it is the third point made by Khamenei that is most crucial.
> He pointed a finger at the "enemies' provocative actions" as well as
> "certain behind-the-stage plots" which aimed to "create chaos in
> Iran". Khamenei then went on most meaningfully to remind Mousavi that
> "your [Mousavi's] character is different from such people and it is
> necessary that you pursue the problems through calm".
>
> The highly personal remark had a touch of admonition, but also the
> hint of a fulsome invitation to reasoning that could open up doors
> leading into pleasant pathways along which the two interlocutors known
> to each other for long, after all, could take a stroll. It was a very
> Persian remark.
>
> Khamenei virtually reminded Mousavi of their old association, when the
> latter served as Iran's prime minister under him and the two were not
> only close comrades-in-arms for the preservation of the Iranian
> revolution through the critical years of the Iran-Iraq war in the
> 1980s but also worked together to frustrate the cunning ploys of Ali
> Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who as the powerful speaker of the Majlis
> (parliament) constantly conspired to arrogate state power.
>
> During that period, Rafsanjani constantly sniped at Mousavi and tried
> to undercut him, although he enjoyed Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's
> endorsement. On numerous occasions, Rafsanjani gave him hell on the
> floor of the Majlis, embarrassing him when he sought parliamentary
> approval for his moves, whittling down his authority to execute his
> policy and systematically undermining his political standing in public
> opinion.
>
> Rafsanjani had already begun jockeying for position in expectation of
> the post-Khomeini era. As Khomeini fell ill, Rafsanjani became more
> assertive. Mousavi, in fact, found himself identifying with the
> Iranian revolutionaries (like Ahmadinejad), who were appalled by
> Rafsanjani's suggestion to Khomeini to "drink from the chalice of
> poison" and order a ceasefire to end the Iran-Iraq war that
> effectively meant allowing Saddam Hussein the escape route. Those were
> tumultuous times when the fate of the Iranian revolution of 1979 hung
> by a thread.
>
> The main sticking point was the economic policy of the Mousavi
> government. Rafsanjani sought a policy that catered to the Tehran
> bazaar, which would benefit his family members as well as large
> sections of the corrupt clergy, who were aligned with him. But Mousavi
> opted for state control of the economy and insisted he was acting in
> accordance with the ideals of the revolution and Khomeini's wishes.
> What Rafsanjani proposed during those difficult years was to have the
> latitude for his clan and other hangers-on to do some war
> profiteering. Mousavi's answer was a firm "no", and he stuck to the
> austere economic policy.
>
> When the eight-year war with Iraq ended in August 1988, Rafsanjani
> proposed that Iran should dilute its revolutionary ideals and take
> Western help for reconstruction. (The Rafsanjani family initially made
> its fortune by exporting Iranian products such as pistachio nuts and
> carpets to the US.) But Mousavi firmly disagreed and refused to go
> against the grain of the revolution. Finally, when the levers of power
> were passed into his hands as president, Rafsanjani's wrath knew no
> bounds. Vindictive by nature, he literally drove Mousavi into
> political exile. The ex-prime minister summarily abandoned politics
> and returned to his profession of architecture and teaching.
>
> Thus, Khamenei all but jogged Mousavi's memory at their meeting in
> Tehran by suggesting that the latter should not join hands with
> Rafsanjani against him. He suggested that Rafsanjani and his circles
> are simply using him as a political ladder. Khamenei virtually
> reminded Mousavi of his old constituency. Indeed, as prime minister
> (1981-89), Mousavi had an impeccable reputation as a hardliner - every
> bit as much as the "international community" regards Ahmadinejad
> today. In a memorable article penned in 1988, the Economist magazine
> described him as a "firm radical".
>
> Khamenei folded up his conversation with Mousavi by "admiring" the
> massive turnout in Friday's election and "once again underlining its
> healthy and calm nature". In a subtle way, he allowed Mousavi to have
> a peep into his thought processes about the current situation.
>
> Meanwhile, Khamenei has directed the Guardians Council to review the
> appeals about the election and to give its opinion within a week to 10
> days. He also held a joint meeting with the representatives of the
> four candidates in the election and officials from the 12-member
> Guardians Council and the Interior Ministry. At the meeting, Khamenei
> used harsh language describing the street protesters as "vandals" for
> damaging state property. He told the candidates' supporters to
> distance themselves from the "vandals" and to support peace in the
> country as the election "should not cause divisions".
>
> Khamenei added, "If the election result had been different, even then
> such incidents would have occurred" as "some people" are against the
> unity of the Iranian nation and the solidarity of the Islamic system.
> He offered that a partial recount of the votes in the elections could
> be arranged, if necessary. But he concluded by passing his own
> judgment, "Those in charge of supervising the elections are always
> trustworthy people."
>
> Tehran rebuffs Europe
>
> Alongside, Tehran has rebuffed European attempts to interfere. This
> has been done at the appropriate diplomatic level with the Foreign
> Ministry calling in the envoys of Britain, France, Germany, Italy and
> the Netherlands. Besides, a "unity rally" held in Tehran by supporters
> of Ahmadinejad condemned "enemies, particularly the US, Britain and
> Israel ... [for] interfering in Iran's internal affairs, plotting
> against the government and giving media support to the enemy groups,
> rioters and social and political hooligans who are trying to fuel
> chaos in the Islamic Republic".
>
> All in all, therefore, Western capitals will take note that the hope
> that a color revolution might overturn Ahmadinejad's victory or in a
> best-case scenario lead to the toppling of the Iranian regime is
> far-fetched and almost fanciful. The extent of the street protests has
> come down in Tehran, although uncertainties remain. The hope that
> there would be a countrywide popular uprising seems also to be
> far-fetched.
>
> If Rafsanjani's astute political temperament is any guide, he will lie
> very low and generally avoid being noticed for a while. Meanwhile, he
> will do some intense networking with his contacts in the power
> apparatus, putting out his extraordinary political antennae and making
> a careful assessment as to the scope for compromise with the powers
> that be and when he should make his move. He should first live to
> fight another day. That may require making compromises. After all,
> politics is the art of the possible. So, without batting an eyelid, he
> may turn his back on Mousavi and former president Mohammed Khatami,
> who were, after all, his temporary allies in the recent saga.
>
> Will he get another chance? That is a big question. Time seems to have
> run out for Rafsanjani. Ahmadinejad has repeatedly projected an
> "anti-corruption" drive as a major plank of his new presidency. Was
> that mere election rhetoric, or will he go for the Rafsanjani family,
> which has many skeletons in its cupboard? Everything depends on what
> Khamenei thinks. He may assess that this time the "Shark" went too far
> to plot a lethal attack that might have succeeded. Or, he might let
> bygones be bygones.
>
> Rafsanjani is undoubtedly the West's favorite poster boy - and of the
> "pro-West" Arab authoritarian rulers in the region. The difficult
> choice for European capitals is how much propaganda mileage to extract
> at this stage before moving on. Once US-Iranian engagement begins,
> European companies will scramble for oil contracts. If the European
> Union's ill-starred Nabucco gas pipeline project has a fighting chance
> to materialize, that will depend primarily on gaining access to
> Iranian gas.
>
> Also, European capitals will have noted that there is great reticence
> on the part of Middle Eastern countries to point fingers at Tehran for
> not practicing Western style democracy. Autocratic Arab regimes will
> be nervous that if the contagious disease of the color revolution were
> to appear in Iran, it might eventually spread on the Middle Eastern
> political landscape. Unsurprisingly, the lone exception has been
> Israel (and its media friends), which has a vested interest in
> scuttling US-Iran engagement and will not easily pass up an
> opportunity to malign Ahmadinejad.
>
> On the other hand, three important neighbors of Iran - Pakistan,
> Afghanistan and Azerbaijan - promptly greeted Ahmadinejad, quite ahead
> of protocol requirements to do so. Ahmadinejad was warmly greeted at
> the SCO summit, too.
>
> "Iran, Russia and China are three major economic and political poles
> attending the [SCO] summit ... [They] play important roles in dealing
> with the world's current and upcoming developments," Ahmadinejad was
> reported as saying in the People's Daily and it also highlighted
> Ahmadinejad's tirade against the "unipolar world order" in his speech.
> On its part, Moscow said in a structured statement, "The Iranian
> elections are the internal affair of Iran. We welcome the fact that
> elections took place, we welcome the new president on Russian soil and
> see it as symbolic that he made his first visit [as newly-elected
> president] to Russia. This allows hope for progress in bilateral
> relations." Russian President Dmitry Medvedev scheduled a bilateral
> with Ahmadinejad at Yekaterinburg.
>
> Khamenei has made it clear in recent weeks that the Obama
> administration will meet a resolute interlocutor when US-Iran direct
> negotiations begin shortly. No amount of Western pressure tactics on
> the democracy plank is going to soften up Khamenei. With Ahmadinejad
> continuing as president for a second term, Khamenei has his chosen
> team in position.
>
> The Obama administration faces difficult choices. The stir in Tehran
> is fast becoming a "Twitter revolution". No such thing has ever
> happened there, despite the best efforts of former US vice president
> Dick Cheney and his covert team for well over four years for
> triggering "regime change".
>
> The US is sensing the potential of a "Twitter revolution" in Iran.
> Earlier, in Moldova, the potential of Twitter to trigger convulsions
> in popular moods was studied. The US State Department confirmed on
> Tuesday it had contacted Twitter to urge it to delay a planned upgrade
> that would have cut daytime service to Iranians. But a department
> spokesman denied that the contacts with Twitter amounted to meddling
> in Iran's internal affairs - US sensitivity about causing annoyance to
> the Iranian regime is self-evident.
>
> At the same time, Obama has to worry that unrest in Iran may scuttle
> his plans to commence direct engagement with Tehran within the coming
> days or weeks. On the contrary, he must face the music from the
> influential Israel lobby in the US, which is unhappy that Washington
> is not pressing the pedal hard enough on a color revolution in Iran.
> But Obama is treading softly. He said late on Tuesday there appeared
> to be no policy differences between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi. "The
> difference between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi in terms of their actual
> policies may not be as great as has been advertised. Either way, we
> are going to be dealing with an Iranian regime that has historically
> been hostile to the United States."
>
> That's a cleverly drafted formulation. Prima facie, Obama pleases the
> regime in Tehran insofar as he appears "stand-offish" as to what
> ensues through the coming days by way of the street protests or out of
> the deliberations of Iran's Guardians Council. Fair enough. But, on
> the other hand, Obama also is smartly neutralizing any allegation that
> the Rafsanjani-Khatami-Mousavi phenomenon is in any way to be branded
> by the Iranian regime as "pro-US". Obama's remark helps the Iranian
> opposition to maintain that its motivations are purely driven by
> Iran's national interests.
>
> Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign
> Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri
> Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
>
> _______________________________________________
> Rad-Green mailing list
> Rad-Green at lists.econ.utah.edu
> To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/rad-green
>