[R-G] Khamenei Rides a Storm in a Tea Cup

[Yoshie Furuhashi]

<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KF18Ak01.html>
Jun 18, 2009
Khamenei rides a storm in a tea cup
By M K Bhadrakumar

Western capitals must make a difficult choice: how long to pin hopes
on the eruption of a "color" revolution in Tehran? The burden falls
almost entirely on Europe, since Washington has different priorities.

The United States cannot afford to be spotted in the barricades on the
frontline of any attempt to prise open the Iranian regime at this
delicate point in Middle Eastern politics. Tehran will not forgive for
another quarter century at least any such American folly, and the
Barack Obama administration has no intentions of committing hara-kiri,
either.

Within Europe, it is unclear who is spearheading the charge of the
light brigade. No country seems to want to be seen up front - except
the Czech Republic, which has no choice, since it currently chairs the
rotating European Union presidency. But then, most European countries
would probably seldom fail the chance to be Tehran's bete noire, but
will, true to a pattern, swiftly fall back the moment they estimate
that the law of diminishing returns is at work and continued tirades
might jeopardize lucrative commercial interests in Iran.

Tens of thousands of supporters of defeated presidential candidate Mir
Hossein Mousavi planned to keep up their street protests in Tehran on
Wednesday, even though the authorities have promised a partial recount
of Friday's vote that saw incumbent Mahmud Ahmadinejad win another
four-year term.

No scope for a color revolution
Europe has no real experience in staging color revolutions. This has
been the forte of the Americans - conceptualized in the post-Soviet
space in Eurasia by the Bill Clinton administration and subsequently
grasped by the neo-conservatives in the George W Bush team. Europeans
were curious bystanders in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. France to
some extent might have been on the inside track over Lebanon, but then
the result turned out to be a mish-mash.

At any rate, to borrow Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin's famous words
in a philosophical context, staging a color revolution in Tehran is
not like breaking an egg. The signs are that the color revolution
struggling to be born on the streets of Tehran has had a miscarriage.
Ahmadinejad's participation at the summit meeting of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) at Yekaterinburg, Russia, on Tuesday
was possible only with the tacit acquiescence of Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei. It was an important decision to take at a critical juncture.
Earlier reports in the Western media speculated that Ahmadinejad might
stand down in view of the developing political situation.

Evidently, the regime decided that Tehran should not in any way
project an atmosphere of crisis as that would only play into the hands
of the proponents of a color revolution within Iran and abroad. To
quote well-known Iranian dissident Ibrahim Yazdi, "Certainly, the gap
inside Iran, politically, will be widened. Our main concern is how to
keep the enthusiasm that was created for the election alive, in order
to monitor and constrain the power of the government. The only way to
counter it is the power of the people. We need to organize them."

How is the regime coping? Clearly, Khamenei is in the driving seat and
is in control of the state apparatus. He is skillfully navigating the
regime through the choppy waters. Khamenei's meeting with the
principal opposition candidate in the election, Mousavi, merits
attention. The official statement makes out certain key points. First,
Khamenei indicated unambiguously to Mousavi that the regime would not
tolerate any street protests and he must therefore "channel protests
through legal bodies". It now becomes extremely difficult for Mousavi
to be seen as defying the Supreme Leader's diktat.

Second, Khamenei suggested that there was nothing extraordinary about
the present situation, insofar as "in previous elections also, there
were some people and candidates who had some problems". But they
pursued the matter through the Guardians Council, which in any case
has to approve the conduct of the presidential election in Iran.

Mousavi's existential choice

However, it is the third point made by Khamenei that is most crucial.
He pointed a finger at the "enemies' provocative actions" as well as
"certain behind-the-stage plots" which aimed to "create chaos in
Iran". Khamenei then went on most meaningfully to remind Mousavi that
"your [Mousavi's] character is different from such people and it is
necessary that you pursue the problems through calm".

The highly personal remark had a touch of admonition, but also the
hint of a fulsome invitation to reasoning that could open up doors
leading into pleasant pathways along which the two interlocutors known
to each other for long, after all, could take a stroll. It was a very
Persian remark.

Khamenei virtually reminded Mousavi of their old association, when the
latter served as Iran's prime minister under him and the two were not
only close comrades-in-arms for the preservation of the Iranian
revolution through the critical years of the Iran-Iraq war in the
1980s but also worked together to frustrate the cunning ploys of Ali
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who as the powerful speaker of the Majlis
(parliament) constantly conspired to arrogate state power.

During that period, Rafsanjani constantly sniped at Mousavi and tried
to undercut him, although he enjoyed Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's
endorsement. On numerous occasions, Rafsanjani gave him hell on the
floor of the Majlis, embarrassing him when he sought parliamentary
approval for his moves, whittling down his authority to execute his
policy and systematically undermining his political standing in public
opinion.

Rafsanjani had already begun jockeying for position in expectation of
the post-Khomeini era. As Khomeini fell ill, Rafsanjani became more
assertive. Mousavi, in fact, found himself identifying with the
Iranian revolutionaries (like Ahmadinejad), who were appalled by
Rafsanjani's suggestion to Khomeini to "drink from the chalice of
poison" and order a ceasefire to end the Iran-Iraq war that
effectively meant allowing Saddam Hussein the escape route. Those were
tumultuous times when the fate of the Iranian revolution of 1979 hung
by a thread.

The main sticking point was the economic policy of the Mousavi
government. Rafsanjani sought a policy that catered to the Tehran
bazaar, which would benefit his family members as well as large
sections of the corrupt clergy, who were aligned with him. But Mousavi
opted for state control of the economy and insisted he was acting in
accordance with the ideals of the revolution and Khomeini's wishes.
What Rafsanjani proposed during those difficult years was to have the
latitude for his clan and other hangers-on to do some war
profiteering. Mousavi's answer was a firm "no", and he stuck to the
austere economic policy.

When the eight-year war with Iraq ended in August 1988, Rafsanjani
proposed that Iran should dilute its revolutionary ideals and take
Western help for reconstruction. (The Rafsanjani family initially made
its fortune by exporting Iranian products such as pistachio nuts and
carpets to the US.) But Mousavi firmly disagreed and refused to go
against the grain of the revolution. Finally, when the levers of power
were passed into his hands as president, Rafsanjani's wrath knew no
bounds. Vindictive by nature, he literally drove Mousavi into
political exile. The ex-prime minister summarily abandoned politics
and returned to his profession of architecture and teaching.

Thus, Khamenei all but jogged Mousavi's memory at their meeting in
Tehran by suggesting that the latter should not join hands with
Rafsanjani against him. He suggested that Rafsanjani and his circles
are simply using him as a political ladder. Khamenei virtually
reminded Mousavi of his old constituency. Indeed, as prime minister
(1981-89), Mousavi had an impeccable reputation as a hardliner - every
bit as much as the "international community" regards Ahmadinejad
today. In a memorable article penned in 1988, the Economist magazine
described him as a "firm radical".

Khamenei folded up his conversation with Mousavi by "admiring" the
massive turnout in Friday's election and "once again underlining its
healthy and calm nature". In a subtle way, he allowed Mousavi to have
a peep into his thought processes about the current situation.

Meanwhile, Khamenei has directed the Guardians Council to review the
appeals about the election and to give its opinion within a week to 10
days. He also held a joint meeting with the representatives of the
four candidates in the election and officials from the 12-member
Guardians Council and the Interior Ministry. At the meeting, Khamenei
used harsh language describing the street protesters as "vandals" for
damaging state property. He told the candidates' supporters to
distance themselves from the "vandals" and to support peace in the
country as the election "should not cause divisions".

Khamenei added, "If the election result had been different, even then
such incidents would have occurred" as "some people" are against the
unity of the Iranian nation and the solidarity of the Islamic system.
He offered that a partial recount of the votes in the elections could
be arranged, if necessary. But he concluded by passing his own
judgment, "Those in charge of supervising the elections are always
trustworthy people."

Tehran rebuffs Europe

Alongside, Tehran has rebuffed European attempts to interfere. This
has been done at the appropriate diplomatic level with the Foreign
Ministry calling in the envoys of Britain, France, Germany, Italy and
the Netherlands. Besides, a "unity rally" held in Tehran by supporters
of Ahmadinejad condemned "enemies, particularly the US, Britain and
Israel ... [for] interfering in Iran's internal affairs, plotting
against the government and giving media support to the enemy groups,
rioters and social and political hooligans who are trying to fuel
chaos in the Islamic Republic".

All in all, therefore, Western capitals will take note that the hope
that a color revolution might overturn Ahmadinejad's victory or in a
best-case scenario lead to the toppling of the Iranian regime is
far-fetched and almost fanciful. The extent of the street protests has
come down in Tehran, although uncertainties remain. The hope that
there would be a countrywide popular uprising seems also to be
far-fetched.

If Rafsanjani's astute political temperament is any guide, he will lie
very low and generally avoid being noticed for a while. Meanwhile, he
will do some intense networking with his contacts in the power
apparatus, putting out his extraordinary political antennae and making
a careful assessment as to the scope for compromise with the powers
that be and when he should make his move. He should first live to
fight another day. That may require making compromises. After all,
politics is the art of the possible. So, without batting an eyelid, he
may turn his back on Mousavi and former president Mohammed Khatami,
who were, after all, his temporary allies in the recent saga.

Will he get another chance? That is a big question. Time seems to have
run out for Rafsanjani. Ahmadinejad has repeatedly projected an
"anti-corruption" drive as a major plank of his new presidency. Was
that mere election rhetoric, or will he go for the Rafsanjani family,
which has many skeletons in its cupboard? Everything depends on what
Khamenei thinks. He may assess that this time the "Shark" went too far
to plot a lethal attack that might have succeeded. Or, he might let
bygones be bygones.

Rafsanjani is undoubtedly the West's favorite poster boy - and of the
"pro-West" Arab authoritarian rulers in the region. The difficult
choice for European capitals is how much propaganda mileage to extract
at this stage before moving on. Once US-Iranian engagement begins,
European companies will scramble for oil contracts. If the European
Union's ill-starred Nabucco gas pipeline project has a fighting chance
to materialize, that will depend primarily on gaining access to
Iranian gas.

Also, European capitals will have noted that there is great reticence
on the part of Middle Eastern countries to point fingers at Tehran for
not practicing Western style democracy. Autocratic Arab regimes will
be nervous that if the contagious disease of the color revolution were
to appear in Iran, it might eventually spread on the Middle Eastern
political landscape. Unsurprisingly, the lone exception has been
Israel (and its media friends), which has a vested interest in
scuttling US-Iran engagement and will not easily pass up an
opportunity to malign Ahmadinejad.

On the other hand, three important neighbors of Iran - Pakistan,
Afghanistan and Azerbaijan - promptly greeted Ahmadinejad, quite ahead
of protocol requirements to do so. Ahmadinejad was warmly greeted at
the SCO summit, too.

"Iran, Russia and China are three major economic and political poles
attending the [SCO] summit ... [They] play important roles in dealing
with the world's current and upcoming developments," Ahmadinejad was
reported as saying in the People's Daily and it also highlighted
Ahmadinejad's tirade against the "unipolar world order" in his speech.
On its part, Moscow said in a structured statement, "The Iranian
elections are the internal affair of Iran. We welcome the fact that
elections took place, we welcome the new president on Russian soil and
see it as symbolic that he made his first visit [as newly-elected
president] to Russia. This allows hope for progress in bilateral
relations." Russian President Dmitry Medvedev scheduled a bilateral
with Ahmadinejad at Yekaterinburg.

Khamenei has made it clear in recent weeks that the Obama
administration will meet a resolute interlocutor when US-Iran direct
negotiations begin shortly. No amount of Western pressure tactics on
the democracy plank is going to soften up Khamenei. With Ahmadinejad
continuing as president for a second term, Khamenei has his chosen
team in position.

The Obama administration faces difficult choices. The stir in Tehran
is fast becoming a "Twitter revolution". No such thing has ever
happened there, despite the best efforts of former US vice president
Dick Cheney and his covert team for well over four years for
triggering "regime change".

The US is sensing the potential of a "Twitter revolution" in Iran.
Earlier, in Moldova, the potential of Twitter to trigger convulsions
in popular moods was studied. The US State Department confirmed on
Tuesday it had contacted Twitter to urge it to delay a planned upgrade
that would have cut daytime service to Iranians. But a department
spokesman denied that the contacts with Twitter amounted to meddling
in Iran's internal affairs - US sensitivity about causing annoyance to
the Iranian regime is self-evident.

At the same time, Obama has to worry that unrest in Iran may scuttle
his plans to commence direct engagement with Tehran within the coming
days or weeks. On the contrary, he must face the music from the
influential Israel lobby in the US, which is unhappy that Washington
is not pressing the pedal hard enough on a color revolution in Iran.
But Obama is treading softly. He said late on Tuesday there appeared
to be no policy differences between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi. "The
difference between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi in terms of their actual
policies may not be as great as has been advertised. Either way, we
are going to be dealing with an Iranian regime that has historically
been hostile to the United States."

That's a cleverly drafted formulation. Prima facie, Obama pleases the
regime in Tehran insofar as he appears "stand-offish" as to what
ensues through the coming days by way of the street protests or out of
the deliberations of Iran's Guardians Council. Fair enough. But, on
the other hand, Obama also is smartly neutralizing any allegation that
the Rafsanjani-Khatami-Mousavi phenomenon is in any way to be branded
by the Iranian regime as "pro-US". Obama's remark helps the Iranian
opposition to maintain that its motivations are purely driven by
Iran's national interests.

Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign
Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri
Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.