[R-G] Greg Wilpert Responds to [COHA's] Chávez Analysis

[Anthony Fenton]

  Greg Wilpert Responds to Chávez Analysis

http://www.coha.org/2009/02/greg-wilpert-responds-to-chavez-analysis/

We are placing the full text of Greg Wilpert’s letter on Venezuela on  
our website before we closely examine the textual reservations he has  
regarding our article “Venezuela’s New Constitutional Reform 2009: If  
Not Chávez, then Whom?” by Research Fellows Alex Sánchez and  
Raylsiyaly Rivero, as well as the piece on Chávez that I co-authored  
with COHA Research Associate David Felson (“Venezuelan Synagogue  
Vandalizing Takes New Turn.”) At that point, we will decide whether to  
take down our pieces and correct any errors, distortions or faulty  
interpretations, or whether we will operate on them while they remain  
on site. We have great respect for brother Wilpert’s acumen in all  
things Venezuela, which is why we are proceeding in this manner.

As for some of the large number of other readers who took exception or  
expressed disappointment or dismay with our pieces on some of  
President Chávez’s shortcomings, they might want to reflect upon the  
fact that our articles were very difficult for us to write because at  
no time did we intend to question Chávez’s political or economic  
vision, which we have strongly supported for a long time, but only  
intended to point out that for the Venezuelan leader to be victorious,  
he has to personally fully evolve into being the “21st Century  
socialist” man that he talks so often about. What we tried to  
emphasize here was how costly his errors have been and how much damage  
he is needlessly causing to everything dear to him by his self- 
destructive lack of discipline. His vision is too important to be shot  
down by the derelictions of his well armed critics, whose list  
genuinely doesn’t include any of ourselves here at COHA. This, of  
course, doesn’t mean we will ever be silent on such matters.
- L.B.

February 11, 2009

Dear Larry and friends at COHA,

I am writing to express my disappointment with the two latest articles  
on Venezuela, both of which were weighed down with generalities and  
inaccuracies, which, I believe, led to misguided conclusions.

Let me start with the first one (Venezuela’s New Constitutional Reform  
2009), which was riddled with factual errors and poor reasoning.

1. The article gives the false impression that the amendment  
referendum is just about eliminating the two-term limit on the  
presidency. However, it eliminates this two-term limit on all elected  
offices (this does get mentioned at the end of the article, but why  
not from the start?).

2. Ezequiel Zamora was not an independence fighter as the article  
claims, but fought against the oligarchy 40 years after Venezuelan  
independence.

3. Where did the authors get the idea that Bolivarian ideology has  
anything to do with the ideas of Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche? This is  
the first time I have ever heard such a claim and I have studied the  
movement quite a bit. Would be good if the article provided some  
reference for that.

4. President Caldera was not a member of Copei when he pardoned Chávez  
for the coup, even though he did found the party. Copei was in the  
opposition at the time and Caldera had founded a new political  
movement to bring him to the presidency.

5. Chávez won the presidency in the elections of 1998, not in 1999 (he  
took office then).

6. “Many Venezuelan academics would argue that the Chávez’s Revolution  
is in constant change, with no specific route to guide it, other than  
the pursuit of power and the implementation of a socialist state and,  
theoretically, a high degree of participatory politics. In the  
beginning, Chávez did not have the opportunity to adequately express  
his vision. This rhetoric, combined with his view of a strong, central  
core of beliefs somehow was to mystically reach the country’s lower  
class, which always has been the cornerstone of Chavista support.” -  
This is such a terrible mish-mash of claims, I don’t even know where  
to start. For one thing, Chávez did not embrace socialism until 2005.  
For another, he did expound on his ideas quite a bit before running  
for office, publishing an important pamphlet that was implemented in  
the first years of his presidency, known as the “Bolivarian  
Alternative.” Where in the world do the authors get the idea that the  
core to Chávez’s beliefs was to “mystically reach the lower class”??

7. The authors get the sequence reversed when talking about Chávez’s  
2005 win in the National Assembly (Venezuela has not had a Senate, as  
the article falsely claims, since 2000). They write that due to the  
opposition’s boycott in 2005 chavistas went on take “control of most  
major positions in the cities.” I’m not sure what is being referred  
to, but Chávez supporters won most mayor’s and governor’s positions in  
October 2004, a full year before the December 2005 boycott. If the  
reference is to national assembly positions, Chavistas won practically  
all of them because of the boycott, not just in the cities.

8. The authors refer to the “middle class opposition leadership” -  
again, not sure who they mean, but it would be safe to argue that most  
of the opposition leadership belongs to the upper class.

9. The authors write: “At the time, Chávez stressed the need for a  
single, united Bolivarian party, which would be named the PSUV.  
However, outside of Venezuela, not much was known about some of the  
key individuals who made up the highest levels of Chávez’s party,  
whether it was known as the MBR-200, MVR or the PSUV.” How is that for  
a non-sequitur? What does the need for a united party have to do with  
people outside of Venezuela not knowing the leadership?

10. “many [military officers] did so [join] in order to obtain more  
personal benefits from supporting the “National Cause.” The current  
vice-president of the PSUV is a retired army officer, General Alberto  
Müller.” this makes it sound like Müller Rojas is one of the officers  
who is in it for personal gain. Actually, Rojas retired from the  
military long before he joined Chávez. Not only that, until recently  
Muller Rojas was a leader of the Causa R party and then of the PPT,  
only joining the PSUV when it was formed last year (he never was a  
member of the MVR). Also, he is one of Venezuela’s most highly  
regarded politicians, which is probably why he was elected by the PSUV  
membership to be the party’s vice-president.

11. the whole section headed, “the Rise of Chávez-style politics” - it  
is never said what is meant by this. The implication, though, is that  
the formation of the PSUV meant the entrenchment of Chavista cronyism.  
Actually, the opposite is true, that establishing the PSUV was a  
decisive step towards democratizing the Bolivarian movement, since the  
MVR almost never had internal elections, but the PSUV does.

12. The authors write that the appointment of Maduro as Foreign  
Minister meant “turning one’s back on any sustained effort to build a  
respectable and professional practice of foreign-policy making,  
represented by such major figures like Rómulo Betancourt, Manuel Pérez  
Guerrero, Ramón Escovar Salom, among others.” Indeed, Chávez wanted to  
turn his back on such a foreign service because this “professional”  
foreign service is at the service of the country’s old elite. It takes  
time to create new professionals and Venezuela is working on this now.  
To imply that a subway union activist has no business in the foreign  
ministry is nothing short of classism. If the authors believe that  
Maduro is not up to the job, then they should refer to specific things  
he has said or done, not to his union background.

13. Oddly, in the listing of Venezuela’s vice-presidents, the authors  
leave out Chávez’s second vice-president, Adina Bastidas, the  
country’s first ever female vice-president.

14. Mario Silva ran for governor of Carabobo state, not Tachira. The  
authors say that he was rejected by both Chavistas and opposition  
supporters – this is exaggeration. He would have won, if the ex- 
Chavista Acosta Carlez hadn’t run for reelection, who split the  
Chavista vote. Acosta Carlez got a mere 6.5% of the pro-Chavez vote to  
Silva’s 44.5%.

15. The PSUV platform is still being discussed and a draft of that  
platform is available to party members. Presumably during the next  
party congress they will approve of it, at which point it should be  
posted.

16. According to the article, the 2007 constitutional reform had  
“existence hedgings of the right of private property. “ I’m not sure  
what that means. In any case, the reform did not cast any doubt on the  
legitimacy of private property.

17. Supposedly the reason the opposition made gains in the regional  
elections was because “there are shortages of food staples, high  
inflation and an elevated unemployment rate (up to 7.2% in June 2008,  
6.1% in December 2008).” Actually, during that vote there were hardly  
any shortages. Inflation, while high, was no where near as high as  
during previous presidencies (an average of 50% in each of the two  
prior presidencies, compared to 30% for Chavez). Third, unemployment  
is at one of its lowest levels in Venezuelan history. I believe the  
main reasons for the losses ought to be sought elsewhere, such as the  
high crime rate.

18. To use anti-government talk shows such as La Entrevista and  
programs on Globovision as indicators of anything is ludicrous. These  
talk shows can always find poor people to voice their discontent about  
Chavez and they always have (I have been watching these programs since  
2000).

19. The authors buy the opposition argument that Simon Bolivar would  
not have supported getting rid of the two-term limit. However, Bolivar  
was writing in a time when there were no elections for President. In  
the full quote Bolivar speaks about the importance of having “repeated  
elections” and contrasts this with a presidency for life, not with the  
lack of a limit on running for office again.

20. What is “The world gas crisis “? And what are Chávez’s “domestic  
oil politics”?

21. That Chávez says he needs until 2019 to complete the Bolivarian  
Revolution and that he therefore “would have to remain in office  
indefinitely in order to perpetuate his vision.” makes no sense at  
all. Where is the logic?

22. Finally, the conclusion that if Chávez cannot run for president  
again in 2012 his movement would fragment shows that the authors  
really don’t know Venezuela. As long as Chávez is leader of his party,  
such a scenario is exceedingly unlikely.

Given this truly enormous number of errors and poor reasoning, I think  
it would be good for COHA’s reputation to remove the article from its  
website and to thoroughly revise it before reposting it.

Sincerely,
Greg Wilpert
Editor, venezuelanalysis.com
This analysis was prepared by COHA Staff
February 12th, 2009
Word Count: 1700