[R-G] Human Rights Watch Goes to War
Anthony Fenton
fentona at shaw.ca
Sun Feb 8 16:51:08 MST 2009
Mouin Rabbani on Human Rights Watch and the Gaza Massacre
Human Rights Watch Goes to War
http://www.normanfinkelstein.com/article.php?pg=11&ar=2667
02.01.2009 | Original (.doc)
By Mouin Rabbani
The Middle East has always been a difficult challenge for Western
human rights organizations, particularly those seeking influence or
funding in the United States. The pressure to go soft on US allies is
in some respects reminiscent of Washington's special pleading for
Latin American terror regimes in the 1970s and 1980s. In the case of
Israel such organizations also face a powerful and influential
domestic constituency, which often extends to senior echelons of such
organizations, for whom forthright condemnation of Israel is anathema.
Given that Israel is reliant on US subventions and public goodwill to
a degree without precedent in the history of American foreign policy,
there is considerably more than vanity at stake. If Israel's stature
in the United States were to be reduced to that of South Africa during
the apartheid era, or Serbia during the Balkan wars, this would almost
certainly have material consequences for the "special relationship".
It is a reality very unlike that between the US and Saudi Arabia, for
example, in which the American public's longstanding contempt for the
House of Saud has proven basically inconsequential. In Israel's case,
image is a political resource of the first order, and its preservation
a matter of national security.
Until the mid-1980s, before which Israel's human rights violations --
from deportation to area bombing and all in-between -- were generally
several orders of magnitude worse than during the subsequent quarter
century, the human rights community simply ignored the question of
Israel. If challenged, organizations would respond that in view of
limited resources they had to go after serious violators, like
Ba'thist Iraq and Iran under the Shah, or hide behind an Israeli
judiciary that although essential to the machinery of occupation at
least went through the motions of oversight, or express fears of being
tarred with the brush of anti-Semitism (or all of the above). In
private, such justifications would be augmented by references to
political pressures and funding issues, often with a barb at one or
more director or board members' Zionist sympathies thrown in. That the
first widespread exposure of the systematic application of torture in
Israel's prison system was reported by the Sunday Times rather than
Amnesty International was no mere coincidence.
The eruption of the Palestinian uprising in December 1987 made it
impossible for human rights organizations to continue relegating the
question of Israel to the backburner. With Israeli leaders like
Yitzhak Rabin publicly exhorting Israel's soldiers to "break the
bones" of unarmed Palestinian protestors, and television images that
made it impossible to explain away such barbarism as a mistranslated
rhetorical flourish, human rights organizations faced a real quandary:
ignore the question of Israel and lose credibility, or confront it and
lose support.
By and large they chose a third way, producing reports that were often
strong on documentation but exceptionally weak when it came to
conclusions and consequences. No less importantly, they adopted the
criteria of ‘balance'. In effect, a Hubble telescope was deployed to
discover Palestinian actions that could in any way be considered
violations of International Humanitarian Law, with these subsequently
placed under an industrial-strength microscope. Treatment of Israeli
actions was rather more selective and careful. Primary issues such as
the legality of Israel's presence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, or
its settlement enterprise in the occupied territories were avoided;
detailed analysis of Israeli abuses, like deportation and summary
executions, that indisputably constituted "grave breaches" of the
Fourth Geneva Convention (the latter's equivalent of war crimes)
steered clear of unambiguous conclusions; and on the key issue of how
to resolve the human rights emergency, such reports typically ended
with exhortations to the Israeli government and military to show
greater concern for Palestinian rights -- as opposed to demands that
Western governments use their various forms of aid to Israel as
leverage to halt abuses.
In the process any sense of context, of this being a struggle for
freedom by a dispossessed and occupied people against a colonial army
-- a context that in other cases the human rights community
communicated so well -- was entirely lost. All the more so because
Israel was systematically spared the type of rhetoric and
denunciations typically deployed with respect to similar situations in
other continents and domestic repression in Arab states. If it was an
approach that left neither the victims nor apologists of Israeli human
rights violations satisfied, it at least met their minimal
requirements -- unprecedented exposure for the Palestinians, continued
impunity for Israel. More importantly, it enabled the human rights
organizations in question to navigate the storm and emerge relatively
unscathed.
The Oslo agreements of 1993 provided a welcome development in this
respect. Henceforth, ‘balance' could be maintained by releasing
reports on both the Israeli and Palestinian Authority judiciary,
discrimination against Arabs in Israel and of violence against women
in the occupied territories, torture in Israeli as well as Palestinian
prisons. The idea of an overarching regime of occupation primarily
responsible for both sets of violations -- a concept that came so
naturally when discussing the brutalities inflicted on the residents
of South Africa's ethnic homelands -- rarely entered into the fray.
The onset of the Al-Aqsa Uprising in September 2000 posed a new set of
challenges. Israel's image was once again under unprecedented pressure
on account of its savage attacks on Palestinians throughout the
occupied territories, while committed staff on the ground -- motivated
by a combination of genuine concern and professional honour --
exercised significant pressure on human rights organizations to step
up to the plate. At the same time, particularly after 11 September
2001, such organizations were under massive pressure by right-wing and
pro-Israeli forces -- the latter of whom often tended towards the
liberal end of the spectrum -- to toe the line. Nowhere was this more
true than at Human Rights Watch, an American organization that by the
late 1990s had emerged as the industry leader.
In the years since 2000, HRW pursued a consistent -- and consistently
effective -- formula: criticize Israel, but condemn the Palestinians.
Challenge the legality of an Israeli aerial bombardment, preferably in
polite, technical terms, and vociferously denounce the Palestinian
suicide bomber in unambiguous language -- especially when raising
questions about the latest Israeli atrocity. In HRW publications,
explicit condemnations and accusations of war crimes were almost
wholly monopolized by Palestinians. With Israeli citizenship a seeming
precondition for the right to self-defense, the right to resist was
for all intents and purposes non-existent.
Where -- as with the obliteration of a good portion of the Jenin
Refugee Camp in 2002 -- accusations of Israeli war crimes could not be
avoided, HRW diluted these by just as prominently reporting that it
did not find evidence of much worse atrocities. Its major report on
the issue, Jenin: IDF Military Operations, was several months later
‘balanced' by Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against
Israeli Civilians.
One need only compare the titles of these two reports to surmise which
party to the conflict stands accused of perpetrating "atrocities" that
HRW "unreservedly condemns", "war crimes", and indeed "crimes against
humanity"; in which of the two cases HRW repeatedly demands that all
those with command or operational responsibility -- and they are many
indeed -- face "criminal liability"; whose national leader must,
despite HRW's finding no evidence of command responsibility, face
"accountability" for not preventing the acts of others, as well as for
"significant political responsibility for the deliberate killing of
civilians"; and whose actions HRW concludes "are among the worst
crimes that can be committed, crimes of universal jurisdiction that
the international community as a whole has an obligation to punish and
prevent".
A comparison of the two reports' covers might also help readers judge
whether it was Israel or the Palestinians who are merely referred for
further examination: "Every case in the report listed below warrants
additional thorough, transparent, and impartial investigation, with
the results of such an investigation made public. Where wrongdoing is
found, those responsible should be held accountable".
Needless to say the press release accompanying Erased in a Moment did
not, as in the case of the Jenin report, use the opening paragraph to
shift discussion to more sensational allegations for which no evidence
could be found -- such as "HRW researchers were unable to substantiate
published claims by prominent advocates of Israel that Palestinian
suicide bombers have been lacing their explosives with AIDS, hepatitis
and rat poison". Its summary did however delve extensively -- in fact
primarily -- on the person of Yasir Arafat, even though most suicide
bombings were carried out by rival organizations and HRW concluded he
was not involved in attacks carried out by his Fatah organization. It
was presumably a simple coincidence that HRW's highly critical account
of the late Palestinian leader -- occupying significantly more space
in the report summary than Hamas and Islamic Jihad combined -- was
published at the height of the Bush administration's campaign for
Palestinian regime change.
Moving forward, and in an incident that might otherwise be considered
comic, HRW in November 2006 went so far as to denounce Palestinians
who refused to vacate homes threatened with imminent aerial
bombardment, rather than the state bent on obliterating their houses,
as war criminals. By the time it retracted its claims in a rare
recantation -- the howls of outrage from less partisan lawyers and
human rights professionals were simply too loud to be ignored -- the
damage had already been done.
Interestingly, Palestinians were denounced by HRW on the legally
correct (but in this case factually inaccurate) assumption that "It is
a war crime to seek to use the presence of civilians to render certain
points or areas immune from military operations or to direct the
movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order
to attempt to shield military objectives from attack". Yet HRW's 2002
report, In a Dark Hour: The Use of Civilians During IDF Arrest
Operations, which according to the accompanying press release
"documents how the IDF routinely has taken civilians at gunpoint to
open suspicious packages, knock on doors of suspects, and search the
houses of ‘wanted' Palestinians during its military operations",
pointedly declines to define human shielding as a war crime. Indeed,
the only differences between the documented 2002 cases and falsely
alleged 2006 incidents are that the former were conducted by Israel
and reached the level of systematic practice.
In 2006 HRW additionally leveled war crimes charges against
Palestinian militants who captured Gilad Shalit -- a uniformed soldier
on active duty -- on the grounds that they intended to exchange him
for Palestinians imprisoned by Israel. Consequently, the main and
clearest finding of "Israel: Gaza Offensive Must Limit Harm to
Civilians" (28 June 2006), is that "A hostage is a person held in the
power of an adversary in order to obtain specific actions, such as the
release of prisoners, from the other party to the conflict ... which
is a war crime under the laws of war". Against this apparently
unprecedented act in the annals of military history, Israel's own
actions, which included the mass arrest of Palestinian
parliamentarians and in some respects resembled a test run for
Israel's latest onslaught on the Gaza Strip (and which were the
alleged subject of the press release), elicited only legal exegesis,
shorn of meaningful conclusions.
More recently, the organization has issued a fatwa that any Arab
launching a projectile at an Israeli target is by definition a war
criminal, because such rockets and mortars are -- unlike the state-of-
the-art shells and missiles fired by Israel at apartment blocks,
schools, hospitals, and UN facilities -- not precision-guided and
therefore according to HRW incapable of distinguishing between a
military and civilian target. Such gunners can also not hide behind
the excuse that they hit an empty field or even that they successfully
aimed at and struck a legitimate military target; for HRW it is the
act of using yesterday's weapon rather than its impact that defines
the crime. (There is, parenthetically, no record of HRW condemning
Israel or the US of committing war crimes by virtue of using unguided
projectiles).
Asked about this rather bizarre state of affairs, every current and
former HRW staff member spoken to over many years -- most of them in
rather senior positions - point at least two fingers at HRW director
Kenneth Roth's affinity for Israel. At least as important, apparently,
is Roth's exceptional ability to divine the political wind, and do
whatever is necessary to ensure that HRW retains the resources and
credentials to remain the industry leader. It is that rare case where
principle and opportunism merge rather than collide. (While Roth
undoubtedly has allies on the organisation's board and among its staff
for his approach to the question of Israel, these are easily
outnumbered by critics who would like to see a more uniform standard
applied by their organisation).
Thus, in a 2006 missive to then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on
the eve of her Mideast sojourn at the height of Israel's US-sponsored
onslaught on Lebanon Roth, in perhaps the outstanding act of political
courage during the Bush years, insisted on drawing her attention to
the war crimes being perpetrated in the conflict -- by Hizballah.
According to several senior HRW employees, Roth subsequently tried to
arrange for a critic who questioned HRW's partisanship to be fired by
filing a written complaint to the critic's director.
As a case study of HRW's response to the question of Israel, its
publications during the recent Israeli onslaught on the Gaza Strip -
all of which were consulted on www.hrw.org on 25 January 2009 -- only
confirm the pattern discussed above, and in some respects go beyond it
as well.
True to form, HRW's first pronouncement on the conflict, issued on 30
December 2008 and entitled "Israel: Artillery Poses Risk to Gaza
Civilians", despite its brevity meticulously documents relevant
Israeli practice and the cost it has exacted in Palestininian life and
limb. That said, there is no condemnation to be found. "In assessing
the legality of the IDF's artillery fire under international
humanitarian law, or the laws of war", it politely concludes, "it is
necessary to determine for each attack whether it was targeted at a
specific military objective; whether the weapon used could be aimed
with sufficient accuracy to differentiate between the military
objective and civilians; and whether the anticipated civilian
casualties were not disproportionate to the expected military gain
from the attack".
Turning next to a subject entirely unrelated to the publication's
title -- namely Palestinian rocket attacks -- the arcane technical
analysis suddenly comes to a screeching halt. Rather than ‘if on the
one hand, but then on the other', we read the following: "Human Rights
Watch has repeatedly condemned the launching of rockets at population
centers in Israel by Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups. The
rockets are highly inaccurate, and those launching them cannot
accurately target military objects. Deliberately firing indiscriminate
weapons into civilian-populated areas, as a matter of policy,
constitutes a war crime".
For good measure HRW that same day released "Israel/Hamas: Civilians
Must Not be Targets". On the one hand, "Human Rights Watch
investigated three Israeli attacks that raise particular concern about
Israel's targeting decisions and require independent and impartial
inquiries to determine whether the attacks violated the laws of war.
In three incidents detailed below, 18 civilians died, among them at
least seven children". Indeed, "Some other Israeli targets may have
also been unlawful under the laws of war".
Yet, on the other hand, "Human Rights Watch has long criticized
Palestinian rocket attacks against Israeli civilians - most recently,
in a public letter to Hamas on November 20 (http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/11/20/letter-hamas-stop-rocket-attacks
). The rockets are highly inaccurate, and those launching them cannot
accurately target military objects. Deliberately firing indiscriminate
weapons into civilian populated areas, as a matter of policy,
constitutes a war crime".
Nevertheless by the following day, in the lengthy "Q&A: Hostilities
between Israel and Hamas" Hamas leaders were no longer being led to a
war crimes tribunal in HRW chains. Confronted with evidence too
overwhelming to ignore that Israel was deliberately firing much
greater quantities of precision-guided weapons not only into civilian-
populated areas, but directly at the civilian population and to much
greater effect, HRW was confronted with a stark choice: accuse Israel
of war crimes, or change Hamas's rap sheet. It prudently opted for the
latter, accusing Israel only of "indiscriminate attacks in violation
of the laws of war".
For the rest of the conflict, Hamas was able to "deliberately fire
indiscriminate weapons into civilian populated areas, as a matter of
policy", with total impunity, not once being denounced by HRW for
committing war crimes. Too clever by half, Roth apparently believed no
one would notice this sudden about-face.
As the devastation of the Gaza Strip continued apace, and the death
toll reached horrific levels, it was becoming increasingly clear that
civilians were very much in Israel's crosshairs. In an orgy of
organized savagery entire families were obliterated with the press of
a button; refugees were herded into buildings, the premises shelled,
and survivors denied medical care and essential supplies for days
afterward; UN facilities, including the UNRWA headquarters and schools
transformed into safe havens (whose precise coordinates and functions
were communicated to the Israeli military) were repeatedly bombed;
women and children seeking refuge with white flags raised were
summarily gunned down; and entire neighborhoods were systematically
razed to the ground. Yet, from HRW's perspective, none of these acts
-- whether individually or collectively -- merited the same
characterization that had until 30 December 2008 been routinely meted
out to their Palestinian adversaries.
As part of its response, the organization simply feigned ignorance.
"Israel's refusal to grant access to Gaza for all international media
and human rights monitors since the fighting began on December 27", it
complained on 12 January, "has limited severely the flow of
information and investigation from impartial observers into events on
the ground". "Human Rights Watch," it had the cheek to report on 16
January, "is unable to conduct full investigations into alleged laws
of war violations by either side because of Israel's continuing denial
of access to Gaza". This despite the fact that the Gaza Strip was
saturated with Arab journalists, local and international humanitarian
staff, medical personnel including several Europeans, and
approximately 1.5 million residents most of whom had at least
intermittent access to telecommunications. Yet none of these,
apparently, met the criteria of credible witness. Indeed, HRW's main
and almost exclusive source of reliable information consisted of staff
located on the Israeli side of the boundary on account of Israel and
Egypt's ban on entry to the Gaza Strip.
HRW's insistence on the most scrupulous standards of quality control
for information emanating from the Gaza Strip, while in principle
laudable, stands in rather sharp contrast to its operations in
Ba'thist Iraq, where much more severe restrictions didn't preclude the
organization from concocting stories about babies thrown out of
incubators and issuing detailed accounts of genocide. Similarly, even
during the Gaza conflict HRW had no problem lending its imprimatur to
reports of state repression of pro-Palestinian demonstrations in Iran,
Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia -- countries in which it was also denied
access. "Gaza Crisis: Regimes React with Routine Repression", issued
on 21 January, didn't hesitate to assert as fact various beatings and
arrests in the darker parts of the Middle East, using precisely those
forensic methods deemed insufficiently impartial in the Gaza Strip.
Nor did denial of access prevent HRW from denouncing such regimes for
throwing not one but two shoes at their people -- a wholly appropriate
turn of phrase but also the type of rhetoric one never sees deployed
when addressing the question of Israel.
At several points HRW's coverage of the conflict descended to the
level of obscenity. On 16 January, in a press release entitled
"Israel: Stop Shelling Crowded Gaza City", the organization once again
provides an accurate account, based primarily on the testimony of HRW
senior military analyst Marc Garlasco, of the facts -- in this case
Israel's use of heavy artillery against the centre of Gaza City,
including the shelling of UNRWA headquarters with white phosphorous.
Yet rather than conclude that a war crime had been perpetrated, or
even suggest that the time may be ripe for investigation and
accountability, the microphone is handed to Israel's Prime Minister:
"Ehud Olmert apologized for the attack, but said Israeli forces had
come under fire from the UN compound. ‘It is absolutely true that we
were attacked from that place, but the consequences are very sad and
we apologize for it', he said".
Curiously, UNRWA officials, who are quoted elsewhere in the press
release describing the attack, are not cited as "categorically
rul[ing] out any possibility that militants had been firing from the
compound," as they had to the Associated Press and other media. Nor is
the lay reader informed about the legality of the attack even if
Olmert's version of events was substantiated, or of the consequences
in terms of accountability even if he was genuinely saddened and
apologetic. Indeed, the only reference to an investigation is to the
one HRW was purportedly unable to conduct.
Further down the same press release reports: "Israeli fire also hit
the al-Shurouq tower, which houses media outlets such as Reuters, al-
Arabiyya Television, and al-Hayat newspaper, causing substantial
damage and wounding at least two journalists ... Media organizations
had provided the Israeli military with the GPS locations of all their
offices. Israeli forces told the media that they had come under fire
from the building". Seemingly, the recently pardoned war criminals of
Hamas successfully transformed the building into the headquarters of
their rocket battalion without even being noticed by the dozens of
journalists and their dozens of cameras in, on and around the building
- though a more likely explanation is that the journalists, all of
them Arab, fail to meet Roth's standards for "impartial observers into
events on the ground".
The press release then states, ""Human Rights Watch is unable to
conduct full investigations into alleged laws of war violations by
either side because of Israel's continuing denial of access to Gaza.
Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups have also violated the laws
of war by continuing to fire unguided Qassam and Grad rockets at
population centers in Israel." Once again, HRW insists on having it
both ways: If violations can only be alleged pending confirmation by
exhaustive investigations in situ, how can a mere reference to the
type of weapon used by one party prove sufficient for finding that it
has in fact committed such violations? By the time the reader gets to
the final paragraph of the press release, a recommendation to Israel
to "Collect and analyze data regarding Palestinian civilian casualties
from artillery shelling in order to assess the harm to civilians
caused by the use of artillery in particular locales and situations,
and thus to base targeting decisions on a proper weighing of
foreseeable civilian harm", the reader could be forgiven for reading
this as an exhortation for further Israeli shelling to ensure
sufficient data is collected.
The low point of HRW's coverage of Israel's onslaught on the Gaza
Strip was not its consistent refusal to apply a single standard --
whether legal or rhetorical -- to Israel and the Palestinians, nor its
effective contribution to Israeli impunity, but rather a personal
betrayal of an HRW colleague in his hour of greatest need.
"On the afternoon of January 3, 2009", according to HRW's "Israel:
Investigate Former Judge's Killing in Gaza" (issued on 9 January), "an
Israeli bomb or missile from an F-16 jet fighter killed the two Gazans
at the al-Ghoul farm, northwest of Beit Lahiya and close to Gaza's
border with Israel. Akram al-Ghoul was a judge who worked in the
Palestinian Authority courts and resigned after Hamas took over the
Gaza Strip in June 2007. He is the father of Fares Akram, Human Rights
Watch's research consultant in Gaza. Mahmoud al-Ghoul, 17, was a
student".
One aspect of the question of Israel on which HRW has pulled
considerably fewer punches than others concerns internal
investigations conducted by the Israeli military. Only two days before
it issued the above press release, in fact, in a separate press
release entitled "Gaza: Israeli Attack on School Needs Full
Investigation", the organization noted that according to its previous
studies of the matter, "IDF investigations into alleged laws-of-war
violations, when they have occurred, have been deeply flawed ... To
Human Rights Watch's knowledge, Israel never conducted impartial and
thorough investigations of those [previously recounted] incidents or
held any of its military personnel accountable. During Israel's last
major ground offensive in Gaza in March 2008, Human Rights Watch found
that Israeli forces committed several targeted killings and other
serious violations of the laws of war. To date, no IDF investigation
has taken place in these cases".
Yet how did Kenneth Roth and the world's leading human rights
organization respond to the killing of their colleague's father and
relative? "Human Rights Watch today called on the Israel Defense
Forces (IDF) to conduct a thorough and impartial investigation into
the deaths by an Israeli airstrike of Akram al-Ghoul, 48, and Mahmoud
Salah Ahman al-Ghoul, 17, the father and cousin of Human Rights
Watch's research consultant in Gaza. In a letter to Brig.-Gen. Avichai
Mandelblit, IDF Military Advocate General, Human Rights Watch urged
the military to investigate the attack, make the results of the
investigation public, and prosecute any persons it finds to have acted
in serious violation of international humanitarian law". HRW didn't
even bother to go through the motions of calling for an "independent"
investigation of the killing of their Arab informant's father.
In doing so, HRW chose to pursue justice for a colleague by steering
his case into what they better than perhaps any others know to be
meaningless dead end. The impression that the murder of Fares Akram's
father was instrumentalised by HRW to lend a much-needed veneer of
respectability to the Israeli military's investigations of itself is
particularly reprehensible.
Mouin Rabbani is a Contributing Editor to Middle East Report
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