[R-G] U.S.: More Troops, More Worries, Less Consensus on Afghanistan
Anthony Fenton
fentona at shaw.ca
Wed Feb 4 13:11:40 MST 2009
U.S.: More Troops, More Worries, Less Consensus on Afghanistan
Analysis by Jim Lobe*
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=45663
WASHINGTON, Feb 3 (IPS) - Even as U.S. President Barack Obama prepares
to deploy more military forces to Afghanistan - what he has called
"the central front" in former President George W. Bush's "global war
on terror" - a consensus on overall U.S. strategy there remains elusive.
Even Washington's precise war aims in Afghanistan more than seven
years after U.S.-backed forces chased the Taliban out of the country
appear subject to continuing debate, as, in the face of what virtually
all analysts and officials concede is a deteriorating situation, the
Pentagon is actively downgrading the Bush administration's hopes of
ushering in a thriving democracy to something far less ambitious.
That was made abundantly clear last week when Defence Secretary Robert
Gates warned Congress "to be very careful about the nature of the
goals we set for ourselves in Afghanistan. If we set ourselves the
objective of creating some sort of Central Asian Valhalla over there,
we will lose, because nobody in the world has that kind of time,
patience, and money," he told the Senate Armed Services Committee.
And while Gates insisted that Washington faces a "long slog" to
achieve even its minimal aims, fears that Afghanistan could become a
"new Vietnam", a deadly quagmire in which already overstretched U.S.
forces could become bogged down in an unwinnable war, have gained
sudden new currency in the mass media.
Indeed, the cover story in the latest edition of 'Newsweek' magazine
is headlined, "Obama's Vietnam: The analogy isn't exact. But the war
in Afghanistan is starting to look disturbingly familiar."
Public statements about the current situation by senior Pentagon
officials, including Gates, have been grim. A Pentagon report released
Monday noted that last spring and summer saw the "highest levels of
violence" since the U.S. intervention in 2001, and that 132 U.S.
troops were killed last year, up from 82 in 2007.
"You all have been covering recent events in Afghanistan long enough
to know that the situation there grows increasingly perilous every
day," the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Michael Mullen,
told foreign reporters at the top of a special briefing here last week.
"Suicide and IED (improvised explosive device) attacks are up, some
say as much as 40 percent over the last year," he went on. "The
Taliban grows bolder implanting fear and intimidating the Afghan
people, and the flow of militants across the border with Pakistan
continues."
The U.S. has about 33,000 U.S. troops currently deployed to
Afghanistan. These are augmented by another 30,000 troops from other
NATO countries, of which, however, only British, Canadian, and Dutch
contingents are fully cleared for combat in largely Pashtun areas in
the east and south where the Taliban and its allies are strongest.
Commanders in the field, led by U.S. Gen. David McKiernan, have
requested an additional 30,000 U.S. troops over the next six to nine
months, a figure that Mullen echoed during last week's press briefing.
Gates has taken a more cautious approach, telling senators last week
that 10,000 to 12,000 troops - or the two to three brigades that Obama
said were necessary during his presidential campaign - are likely to
be deployed over the next six months. At the same time, he said he
would be "deeply sceptical" of further increases, adding that
Washington expected the Afghan military (currently about 100,000
troops) and police to take a stronger role.
The new administration is also hoping that other NATO members, which
were repeatedly pressed by the Bush administration for more support,
will provide more troops - for both combat and accelerated training of
Afghan forces.
Obama is sending a high-powered delegation led by Vice President Joe
Biden; Obama's national security adviser, Gen. James Jones; and his
special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, former Amb Richard
Holbrooke, to Munich next week in the first of a series of
international meetings culminating in NATO's 60th anniversary summit
in April in Strasbourg where he hopes to secure new commitments.
But, despite all the goodwill generated abroad by Obama's election,
public opinion both in Canada and Europe is running strongly against
new deployments, according to recent surveys there, and analysts here
warn that Washington is likely to be disappointed by the response.
Meanwhile, Holbrooke, working with the chief of the U.S. Central
Command (Centcom), Gen. David Petraeus, as well as Washington's new
ambassador-designate to Kabul, ret. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, who has
served two tours of duty in Afghanistan, will take part in a
comprehensive review of U.S. strategy that is unlikely to be concluded
before April.
The review is aimed at both defining U.S. short- and long-term goals
in Afghanistan and elaborating a strategy to achieve them.
The one goal on which virtually all policy-makers and analysts are
agreed is that expressed by Gates during last week's hearing: "To
prevent Afghanistan from being used as a base for terrorists and
extremists to attack the United States and its allies."
But how to achieve even that minimal goal - given obvious constraints
on resources and the secure bases that the Taliban continue to enjoy
in Pakistan's frontier areas - remains the subject of considerable
debate.
The dominant view for now is that increasing security for the civilian
population, particularly in the Pashtun areas where the Taliban is
strongest - much as the U.S. "surge" of 30,000 additional U.S. troops
purportedly accomplished in Iraq - is essential. Success should
deprive the Taliban of much of its popular support and persuade
"reconcilable" leaders to negotiate with the government and reduce the
level of violence.
In addition, pressure on President Hamid Karzai to address the
corruption that has become endemic under his administration and
renewed efforts to persuade - in part through significantly enhanced
training - the Pakistani military to conduct an effective counter-
insurgency campaign against its home-grown Taliban in the frontier
areas, as well as the al Qaeda leadership that is based there, are
also seen as indispensable.
But critics, of which there are a growing number, are sceptical. Among
other things, they question comparisons between Iraq and Afghanistan,
noting, among other things, that, even if 30,000 troops are added to
the existing deployment in Afghanistan, the ratio of troops - both
foreign and indigenous - to people will remain substantially below the
ratio in Iraq, and far below the ratio recommended by conventional
counter-insurgency doctrine.
There is also disagreement - even within the military itself - over
how best to deploy those troops: whether close to the rugged Pakistan
border to try to block supply and infiltration routes; or in cities,
towns, and villages to provide "security" to the population, as the
Surge purportedly did in Iraq.
In a new report released Tuesday by the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Gilles Dorronsoro, a French expert on South Asia,
argued that adding troops would actually be counter-productive because
the mere presence of foreign soldiers in Pashtun areas has fueled the
Taliban's resurgence and that the best way to weaken it is to reduce
military confrontations. In that respect, "the only meaningful way to
halt the insurgency's momentum is to start withdrawing troops."
Indeed, Dorronsoro argues, as do other critics, that most effective
way to ensure that Afghan territory is not used as a base to attack
the U.S. is to "de-link" the Taliban from al Qaeda, "which is based
mostly in Pakistan."
"We will be in a much better position to fight al Qaeda if we don't
have to fight the Afghans," he said. "We have to stop fighting the
Taliban because it is the wrong enemy."
*Jim Lobe's blog on U.S. foreign policy can be read at http://www.ips.org/blog/jimlobe/
.
(END/2009)
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