[R-G] Obama Steps on the Pentagon Escalator
Anthony Fenton
fentona at shaw.ca
Mon Feb 23 14:49:45 MST 2009
February 23, 2009
Will He be Able to Get Off?
Obama Steps on the Pentagon Escalator
http://counterpunch.org/spinney02232009.html
By FRANKLIN SPINNEY
Marmaris, Turkey.
Perhaps the greatest weakness in any foreign policy is the temptation
to shape it according to the dictates of domestic politics. This
seduction corrupts the synthesis of a sensible grand strategy as well
as the formulation of sound military strategies. Although the
temptation afflicts all nations, recent history has shown the United
States to be dangerously prone to seeing and acting on the world
through the disorienting lens of domestic politics. One need only
recall Bush's asinine grand-strategic assessment that the terrorists
hate us, because they hate our way of life, to realize how dangerously
misleading this kind of self referencing can become.
Bush's inward focus was no anomaly, however. One of JFK's most
successful campaign tactics in presidential campaign of 1960, for
example, was his phoney allegation of a missile gap between the Soviet
Union and the United States, when in fact he knew the opposite was the
case. JFK's reckless campaign rhetoric unnecessarily intensified the
cold war and reinforced militarists in both political parties. No
doubt, his "bear any burden" rhetoric encouraged an atmosphere that
helped to pave the way to Vietnam.
Ronald Reagon played the same game in 1980, with the same effects,
using a phoney assertion of a "window of vulnerability," together with
equally spurious claim that the so-called hollow military of the
Carter years was the product of budget cuts made by Democrats, when in
fact the hollow military was a self-inflicted wound created by a
perverse pattern of decision making within the Pentagon. The success
of Reagan's gambit intensified the Cold War in the early 1980s and
launched an unprecedented "peacetime" spending spree that not only did
not fix the Pentagon's decision making pathologies, but put the US
defense budget on a budget escalator that now can only be justified by
continuing wars after the USSR had collapsed, much as George Kennan
had predicted it would (i.e., due more to its internal contradictions
than Reagan's spending spree). That the continuing addiction to cold-
war level defense budgets needs continuing war to justify the high
spending levels can be seen clearly in the obsessive predilection
toward bullying coercive diplomacy punctuated by the use of military
force, especially bombing, exhibited by President Clinton and
especially President George W. Bush.
Fast forward to 2008. During the last election, Candidate Barack Obama
chose to attack President Bush's catastrophically flawed grand
strategy of belligerent warmongering (you are either with us or
against us) by portraying Iraq, correctly in my opinion, as an
unnecessary war that distracted attention away from Al Qaeda. But to
shore up support from the "pro-military" parts of the democratic and
independent electorates, Obama contrasted Iraq, the bad war, to
Afghanistan, the good war. To that end, he pledged to draw down troops
in Iraq and increase troops in Afghanistan, implicitly buying into
Bush's grand strategy of an open-ended, militarized, global war on
terror -- where al Qaeda remains forgotten but with the anti-Taliban
war mutates into a far more dangerous anti-Pashtun war. Pointedly,
Candidate Obama never called for reductions in the defense budget.
Candidate Obama's domestic politicking is now coming back to haunt
President Obama's foreign policy and military strategy.
Specifically, Obama's promise to focus on the "good war" is
undermining his formulation of a sensible grand stategy as well as a
sound military strategy, particularly with regard to the question of
escalating our war in Afghanistan and intervening in Pakistan, which
is clearly destabilizing Pakistan, the world's only Muslim nation with
atomic weapons.
To wit -- Obama just approved an increase of 17,000 troops for
Afghanistan, which is in line with his campaign promise, but far less
than the 30,000 increase requested by the military. According to an
unnamed source interviewed by Gareth Porter, the reason he reduced the
military's request is because the commander in Afghanistan, General
McKiernan, could not tell Obama how the increased force would be used,
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not tell him what the end-game in
Afghanistan would be. In other words, the leaders of the military told
Obama they have no strategy in Afghanistan, except doing more of the
same, which everyone agrees is not working, and therefore, echoing the
peculiar logic found in the Pentagon Papers, the military wants to
redeem failure by escalating.
Rather than just saying no and telling the military to go back to the
drawing board, Obama chose to make good on his campaign pledge by
approving a smaller increase than requested (domestic politics),
perhaps thinking he could keep his options open by buying himself a
little time while he did a strategy study. However, in so doing, he
bought into an admittedly strategy-free escalation decision (foreign
policy), without understanding the future consequences of that
decision. Straddling the fence may make sense in the context of day-to-
day domestic politics, but Mr. Obama needs to understand Pentagon
plays long-term bureaucratic politics, and over in Versailles on the
Potomac, the stakes are high, because careers, budgets, and contracts
are at stake.
Porter is right, President Obama has made a crucial mistake that could
very well come back to haunt him, like the initial decision to
escalate in Vietnam, made in 1965 against his better judgement, came
back to haunt Lyndon Johnson. That is because, with his approval of a
partial escalation in Afghanistan, Mr. Obama is now a vested party in
General McKiernan's strategy of mindlessness escalation. And Obama
knows it is not good domestic politics to unring the bell. So, Mr.
Obama will be under tremendous pressure and temptation to construct a
strategy ex-post facto to justify his decision. Moreover, given his
approval of an initial escalation, the priniciple of escalation is now
an agreed-to option and he will soon learn that his credibility is at
stake. You can be sure the milcrats understand this, because Front
Loading decisions (i.e., getting politicos to commit to things before
they understand the future consequences of their approval) has been
raised a high art form in Versailles on the Potomac. It is now
virtually certain the milcrats will try to use Obama's initial
escalation decision as the thin edge of the wedge to lever in a "new
strategy" that will include sending even more troops into the Afghan/
Paki meatgrinder.
So, is Obama repeating the mistakes of the Americans in Vietnam or the
Russians in Afghanistan? General McKiernan apparently doesn't think
so, because the arrogantly dismissed analogies to the Russian
experience in Afghanistan at a news conference on February 18 by
saying, "There's always an inclination to relate what we're doing with
previous nations ... I think that's a very unhealthy comparison." Old
timers, however, will remember, however, this is exactly how
McKiernan's predecessors blew off the warnings of Bernard Fall in the
early 1960s, when they dismissed France's experience in Indochina.
The sooner Obama realizes that studying and learning from past
mistakes is a good idea, the easier it will be for him to jump off the
Pentagon's escalator, but he is just where the apparat wants him to
be ... alone. He has no George Ball in the Ms. Clinton's State
Department to act as the canary in the coal mine. And as for the
dilletentes he appointed to sub-cabinet levels in Mr. Gate's Pentagon,
the milcrats know it will be far easier to roll over them that it was
for their predecessors to successfully roll the best and the brightest
in Mr. McNamara's Pentagon.
Franklin “Chuck” Spinney is a former military analyst for the
Pentagon. He currently lives on a sailboat in the Mediterranean and
can be reached at chuck_spinney at mac.com
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