[R-G] Iran- Trapped Between Theocracy and Imperialism: The Reality of Iran

[Macdonald Stainsby]

Trapped Between Theocracy and Imperialism: The Reality of Iran

By Poya Saffari


  Iran is urgently facing both domestic tyranny and foreign imperialism.
Instead of emphasizing opposition to one, in isolation, a balanced
understanding should evaluate both. Iran's current geopolitical reality is
shaped by both a despotic theocracy and threats of US-led imperialist
intervention.


  In the midst of this reality, current anti-war and anti-imperialist
movements in the "West" disproportionately emphasize imperialist threats,
some sympathizing with the Iranian regime as a stronghold against
imperialism and others opposing the regime, but avoiding active criticism
for fear of playing into right-wing agendas and discourses. Conversely, many
in the Iranian Diaspora have focused opposition solely on the Iranian
regime. While both these standpoints are understandable given the contexts
out of which they arise (a brutalized Iranian Diaspora and a passionate
anti-imperialist movement), neither is viable in the face of past and
present realities.


  In the context of looming military intervention against Iran, advocated in
the United States by both Democrats and Republicans, we must root our
analysis in a nuanced understanding, cognizant of colonial and imperialist
histories as well as the unacceptable tyranny of the Islamic Republic of
Iran. A conscientious perspective must seek to explore, criticize and resist
both. The following text seeks to contribute to the development of this
perspective through exploration and analysis of contemporary Iranian history
and current events.

?


  To understand the contemporary reality of Iran1 <#sdfootnote1sym>, it is
useful to start with the important events of the early 1950s. In 1951,
building on decades of popular struggle, Iran's Prime Minister Muhammad
Mossadeq nationalized Iran's oil production, which had to that point been
under the exploitative control of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (known today
as British Petroleum). Just two years after this bold challenge to
imperialist control the CIA - encouraged and aided by British intelligence -
funded, engineered, and executed a military coup that toppled Mossadeq's
government and restored the pro-western and dictatorial rule of Muhammad
Reza Shah. This imperialist attack on Iranian democracy thrust Iran onto a
collision course with a brutal Islamic theocracy. (Keddie 129-31)


  The roots of the anti-imperialist and democratization efforts headed by
Mossadeq in the early 1950's go back to the gradual penetration of Iran by
the West during the nineteenth century and the popular struggle that
occurred in response, most significantly during the Tobacco Revolt (1891-92)
and the Constitutional Movement (1905-11). Western penetration started with
military defeats throughout Central Asia and the Caucasus at the hands of
the Russian and British armies. These defeats resulted in creation of
several treaties that established borders that have endured more-or-less
intact into the contemporary age. Representatives from Russia and Britain
became influential players in Iranian politics and even though Iran was
still ruled by the Qajar monarchy, the quasi-colonial impact of Western
influence was established. (Abrahamian, 36-37) In 1890, Nasir al-Din Shah,
the tyrannical head of the Qajar monarchy, granted the British a monopoly on
the sale of Iranian tobacco. In response, a popular revolt - boycotting the
use of tobacco forced Nasir al-Din Shah to rescind the concession.
(Abrahamian 73-74; Keddie 61-62; Milani 26-27) The Tobacco Revolt of 1891-92
amounted to a dress rehearsal for the Constitutional Movement of 1905-11
that followed.


  In April 1896 at the Adb al-Azim Mosque, just outside Tehran, Nasir 
al-Dine
Shah was shot and killed. (Dabashi 67-70) His death along with an economic
crisis and threats of foreign control went on to trigger a massive uprising,
known as the Constitutional Movement (1905-11), which became the political
vehicle for opposition to foreign domination and the arbitrary powers of the
Shah.2 <#sdfootnote2sym> (Abrahamian, 41) Between June 1905 and June 1908
several waves of resistance - combining mass meetings (under the structure
of popular *anjumans,* or community councils), protests and strikes -
brought the Qajar dynasty to its knees. What had in earnest been fermenting
for several decades, culminated in 1906 with the creation of a Constituent
National Assembly (*Majles-i Meli)* and a constitution. (Ambrahmian 81-85)
Although, the constitution was a progressive accomplishment for its time,
the fragile alliance between secular reformers and religious authorities (*
ulama**)* produced a noteworthy compromise, especially given Iran's present
political reality. Beyond opening the door toward democracy, the
constitution also created an "ecclesiastical committee" of five *ulama* with
veto power over all *Majles* legislation they deemed contrary to Islamic
law. Thus, in 1906, this religiously sanctioned committee, established the
precedent upon which today's Guardian Council, a twelve memeber body
comprising of six *ulama* and six jurists with veto power over bills passed
by parliament and who can bar candidates from standing in elections, along
with other oppressive state organs prevent genuine democracy. (Abrahamian
81-92)


  Soon after the creation of the *Majles* and constitution, opposition from
certain members of the *ulama*, began to mount, particularly from Shaykh
Fazallah Nouri. He described the concept of equality as an "alien heresy,"
and labeled the constitutionalists as "atheist." (Abrahamian 95) As a
leading religious figure, his hostility toward the constitution markedly
weakened the movement, creating an opening for Mohammad Ali Shah, with the
help of a brigade under a Russian colonel, to jail and kill
constitutionalists, silence the press, establish martial law and bomb the *
Majles*. However, the Constitutional Movement was able to regroup and
converge on Tehran, finally forcing Mohammad Ali Shah to surrender on July
16, 1909. (Milani 30)


  Two years before this reassertion of popular will, an important event had
set the stage for the end of the Constitutional Movement. The Anglo-Russian
Entente of 1907 divided Iran into three spheres of influence: the north and
central parts under the Russians, the south under the British, and
in-between a "neutral zone." (Keddie 69-70) This colonial agreement set the
stage for imminent foreign intervention. After the Shah's surrender of 1909,
Russia - fearing that the Constitutional Movement, with strong foundations
in northern Iran would hurt its interests - occupied Enzeli and Rasht in the
north and threatened to march on Tehran. (Keddie 69-71) By December 1911,
due to this imperialist intervention, the *Majlis* was forced to dissolve.
(Abrahamian 109) The decades that followed saw mass protests in the face of
the Anglo-Russian occupation, a period of political disintegration and the
rise of another local tyrant: Reza Shah. (Abrahamian 103-165) Nonetheless,
this short-lived revolution inspired generations to follow, ultimately
leading to the strong anti-imperialist movement of the early 1950's.


  ?


  Iran has always been an amalgamation of ideologies, histories, languages
and ethnicities, layered with religious, class, urban-rural and gender
complexities and divisions. These various communities and identities are
tied together by the presumptuous and ultimately false notion of "Iranian
nationhood." Iran, like so many other nations, should be understood as a
complex mix of incongruities and differences. Beyond the dominant Persian
and Twelver Shi'i Islamic identities, there at least another eighteen
languages, religions and ethnicities present in Iran, including but not
restricted to Azeris, Kurds, Baluchis, Turkmens, Armenians, Assyrians,
Georgians, Bakhtiaris, Khamsehs, Lurs, Qashqais, Arabs, Jews, Zoroastrians,
Bahai's, Sunni Muslims and Afghan refugees. Iran's population, numbering
roughly 70 million (not including the 1.9 million Afghan refugees), while in
no way monolithic, does share one commonality: the tyranny of the Islamic
Regime.


  ?


  The Iran of today has deep roots in the events of 1953, when the CIA
reinstalled Reza Shah to act as the United States' main proxy in the Gulf
region. As the Shah re-established his repressive rule, Iran also became the
US' main provider of cheap and accessible oil and an important consumer of
Western military hardware (including nuclear technology). (Abrahamian *Axis
of Evil* 98)


  The 1953 coup lowered an "iron curtain" on Iranian politics, making the
work of progressive and revolutionary movements treacherous. (Abrahamian
450) Still, six decades after the Constitutional Revolution another epic
movement against a native-born tyrant shook Iran. Building on decades of
resistance, wide sectors of Iranian society participated in the monumental
Iranian Revolution (1979). On January 16, 1979 a defeated Muhammad Reza Shah
left the country; however, what had begun as a radical broad-based
initiative, supported and developed by millions was quickly highjacked by
the Islamic leadership trusted to lead it.


  In order to mount a united campaign against the monarchy, many nationalist
(most importantly the Liberation Movement led by Mehdi Bazargan and the
prominent progressive cleric Ayatollah Taleqani), socialist (namely the
urban guerilla movement of the Cherik-ha-ye- Fada'i-e Khalq and the
longstanding, Russian backed, Tudeh Party), and non-clerical Islamic
socialists (the Mojahedin-e khalq) rallied behind the populist leadership of
Ayatollah Khomeini, not knowing what horrors were to come. Although, the
religious authority of clerical leadership was deeply anchored into Iranian
culture, and Shi'i sentiments where readily activated toward political ends
(in both positive and negative ways), the 1979 revolution was in no way
exclusively Islamic; rather it was forcefully "Islamicized."


  Through a series of opportunistic and repressive maneuvers following the
Shah's departure - including the systematic annihilation of all opposition -
Ayatollah Khomeini shrewdly transformed a popular revolution into the
tyrannical Islamic Republic of Iran. The clerical regime was able to achieve
its aims by utilizing and manipulating two important events: The American
Embassy Hostage Crisis (1979-80) and the brutal Iran-Iraq war (1980-88).


  The hostage crisis broke when a group of students took American diplomats
and embassy staff as hostages. Khomeini seized the situation as a
smokescreen for the regime's brutal repression of Kurdish autonomy, the
ratification of a draconian Islamic constitution and the suppression of
progressive meetings and gatherings (carried out by the emerging
*Hezbollah*or "party of god"). The
*Hezbollah*, established by Khomeini to impress upon the population his
political ideology, was a ruthless agent of repression.3
<#sdfootnote3sym>(Dabashi 165-166)


  The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) became Khomeini's next
opportunity to cement his rule. The war was started by Iraq, although Iran
happily jumped into it. As a result one million people lost their lives and
another million were displaced. Beyond the opportunistic use of the war to
reinforce the cruel tyrannies of Ayatollah Khomeini and Saddam Hussein, the
war was perpetuated through the sale of arms by foreign powers, particularly
the United States (through Israel, in what become a major scandal, know as
the Iran-Contra Affair), the Soviet-Union and France. Throughout the war the
United States backed Iraq, even deploying its navy into the Persian Gulf,
though their overall strategy aimed to contain both sides. Henry Kissinger's
statement "too bad they can't both lose" is emblematic of this callous
approach. Throughout the war Khomeini brutally clamped down on internal
unrest, using national security as a pretext. Alongside social repression,
an active propaganda campaign that utilized the notion of martyrdom and
attempted to evoke national pride was at the forefront of the regime's
effort to control popular protest. The same propaganda campaign, with
imagery and language from Khomeini's period, is still present in Iran today.



  The Iran-Iraq war and the American Embassy Hostage Crisis afforded the
Iranian regime the opportunity to wipe out its opposition and entrench its
own calculated authority. This power was most tyrannically expressed through
the establishment of *velayat-e-faqih* (rule of the jurisprudent, or
guardianship of the Clerical Jurist), a religious institution that grants
unequivocal and unquestionable authority to a Supreme Leader: at that time
Ayatollah Khomeini and today Ayatollah Khamenehi. (Dabashi 242, Abrahamian
*New
Left Review*) The events surrounding the forced transformation of the 1979
Iranian Revolution into an Islamic Republic have left deep scars upon the
people of Iran, particularly among those who experienced the revolution.


  ?


  After less than two decades of failed reconstruction and reform under
Presidents Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-97) and Mohammad Khatami
(1997-2005), Iranians went to polls, on June 25, 2005. This election made
the conservative populist, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, president. Although, Iran
has the semblance of democracy with an elected president and parliament,
ultimate power resides in the hands of the Supreme Leader and a few cleric
controlled state organs - the Judiciary, the Guardian Council and the
Expediency Council. Nonetheless, American foreign policy planners, pursuing
regime change, have exaggerated Ahmadinejad's power, which is limited (for
example, he does not control the military or foreign policy). (Abrahamian
98)


  From his side, Ahmadinejad has opportunistically embraced the 
spotlight, in
order to divert attention away from social and economic distress and to spur
nationalism. To this end, he has pursued the ludicrous questioning of the
Holocaust and the chauvinistic defense of Iran's nuclear program. While
elected into office by Iran's poor and disenfranchised - left out of
Rafsanjani's neo-liberal reconstruction project - Ahmadinejad has not been
able to deliver on his election promises. Iran's harsh economic and social
realities have overtaken his empty populist rhetoric. Meanwhile, Ahmadinejad
has become a useful villain for American policy makers, trying to convolute
the realities of Iranian politics in an attempt to prepare the stage for
self-serving intervention.


  The issue of Iran's nuclear program has gained tremendous attention
recently. It has been exploited by both the Iranian and US governments
towards their own strategic ends. Iran has manipulated the issue into a
question of national pride and used it as a way to suppress political
opposition as treasonous.4 <#sdfootnote4sym> The US motivated by an agenda
seeking strategic control of the entire region including Iran, has pushed
the issue onto the international table in order to manufacture an
opportunity for intervention. Moreover, the hypocrisy of US foreign policy
is glaring: as it was the same United States, beginning in 1957, that
enthusiastically supported and provided nuclear technology for its strategic
ally, Iran's dictatorial ruler, Muhammad Reza Shah. (Malm & Esmailian
140-141) This technology and infrastructure is being used today by the
Islamic regime.

  The criminal invasions and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq on the
Eastern and Western sides of Iran, by the United States and its allies
(including Canada) have allowed the Islamic regime to ratchet up misguided
nationalism. In the wake of the Bush doctrine, unveiled in a document
entitled* National Security Strategy of the United States of America* and
former President Bush's "Axis of Evil" speech (on January 29th 2002),
America's aim for the strategic control of the middle east region, with Iran
as a key component is more than ever clear. The pressure and warmongering so
far directed at Iran have only fed into the strategies of the Iranian
conservativ*e *block. This section of the Iranian regime has welcomed US
aggression as a means of propelling nationalism and camouflaging internal
repression. 5 <#sdfootnote5sym> Through indirect collusion, the United
States and the Islamic Republic have worked in tandem to silence resistance
within Iran. For all intents and purposes creating an atmosphere where
Iranians fighting to change or oust the regime, are isolated as supporters
of the United States. An example was the arrest of the widely respected,
Mansour Ossanlou, the leader of the Vahed bus workers union who was accused
of "maintaining relations with and receiving financial support from a
foreign power." (Malm & Esmailian 201) Bolstering the existence and threat
of an "enemy," in order to fan nationalist sentiments, divert attention away
from internal tensions and increase repression, is an old trick of both the
United States and the Islamic Republic. Consequently, Iran's true
geopolitical realities have been seriously skewed.


  In this light, the challenge facing Iran's peoples remains the same as a
hundred years ago; overthrow an oppressive domestic regime (with clerics
replacing monarchs) and defend against foreign intervention (with the United
States replacing Russian and Britain as the main imperialist force).


  ?


  With half of the population under the age of 24, Iran's youth are an
important factor toward change. (CBC;
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/iran/) This demographic reality placed
next to rampant unemployment, rising inflation and increasing poverty has
produced bewilderment and opposition among many Iranians, youth in
particular. In an attempt to side track this reality, the regime has
continued its militarization of poverty, through the absorption of youth and
poor into the various military branches (*Pasdaran*, *Basijj* and *Hezbollah
*). Nonetheless, people are still motivated by the dire realities of their
day-to-day lives, ranging from repressive social controls to economic
hardship.


  The rise of mass communication, especially the Internet (with some
estimates reporting the existence of as many as 75,000 Persian blogs, and
Persian being one of the most popular languages for blogs in the world) has
become a key window toward change. This has occurred despite the regimes
attempts to censor web access and restrict the speed of Internet
connections. At the same time the relentless work of labor, student and
women's movements, who in the face systematic repression continue to forge
ahead, are another important factor. Thus, the existence of resentment
toward the regime, especially by youth with access through the Internet to
alternative ideas and messages along with the work of many grassroots
movements fighting to change Iran's current reality, are fueling another
broad-based struggle for revolution.


  Hostilities and the looming prospect of an attack by the United States 
have
only served to stifle the voice of resistance movements and strengthen the
grip of the Islamic regime. US aggression has sparked fear and nationalism
amongst the population, which in turn has been insidiously manipulated by
the regime in order to further impose its rule. Not only is any kind of
forced intervention dangerous for those living in Iran (and should be
understood as part of a long history of imperialist aggression built upon
centuries of brutal colonialism), but it will also undermine the persistent
work of movements within Iran, by affording the regime more opportunities to
repress resistance in the name of national security.


  As an "Iranian" forced to leave Iran by a brutal regime, who is very
conscious of past and present imperialist and colonial realities, I see no
choose, but to expose and resist, with equal urgency, the Iranian regime and
US-led imperialism.


  -- Poya Saffari is a farmer and activist, born in Iran, and based in
Quebec. He is active with migrant justice and indigenous solidarity
struggles in Montreal with groups like No One Is Illegal and Solidarity
Across Borders. For feedback on this article, and for a full bibliography,
contact poya at resist.ca.


  1 <#sdfootnote1anc> "Iran" will be employed throughout this text in
reference to both the present nation-state labeled as such, as well as the
entity formerly called "Persia"(before 1935).

2 <#sdfootnote2anc> The period between June 1905 and August 1906 - beginning
with a protest in the form of a procession during the religious mourning of
Muharram and ending with the creation of a Constituent National Assembly, is
know as the Constitutional Revolution, although the struggle for a
constitution continued for years after. Consequently, the entire span
between 1905 and 1911 is considered the period of the Constitutional
Movement.

3 <#sdfootnote3anc> The passionate opinions of many left-wing Iranians
regarding the Lebanese *Hezbollah* are rooted in the brutality of the
Iranian *Hezbollah* following the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The Lebanese *
Hezbollah* was created from conditions spurred by devastating Israeli
oppression, the liberation efforts of Lebanon's historically marginalized
Shi'i population and Iran's desire to propagate its political ideology and
influence. Even though Iran did play a critical role during the formation of
the Lebanese *Hezbollah,* it is today an independent political entity,
though it still receives considerable financial and military support from
Iran. Moreover, its foundations and present political ideologies are
arguably tied to Khomeini (still revered in Iran, Lebanon and elsewhere, as
a saint).

4 <#sdfootnote4anc> It should be obvious that nuclear weapons in the hands
of anyone, whether Iran or the United States, is unacceptable and
disastrous. Furthermore, it should be made obvious that Iran is pursuing
nuclear capacity as both a supplemental energy source and to pursue the
potentiality of a nuclear weapon for strategic power reasons. We should
remember that Iran has ample motivation, to seek a nuclear arsenal, since it
is surrounded by nuclear states; Russia, Pakistan, Israel and the United
States in the Persian Gulf.

5 <#sdfootnote5anc> The clerical power structure within Iran is divided into
two main camps, with relatively differing perspectives on US hostility. The
pragmatists, led by Rafsanjani, prefer to maintain the regime through
relatively neutral and in-offensive positioning in the face of US
aggression. Rafsanjani, one of the wealthiest people in the world, holds a
great deal of power in Iranian politics, but cannot climb to the position of
supreme leader due to his lack of cleric credentials and thus is pushing to
do away with *velayat-e-fagih* in order to increase his potential power. The
strategy of the pragmatist branch is also fueled by a desire to open the
Iranian market to foreign investment (meaning they want to see an end to the
long standing American boycott on investment in Iran) and increased
neo-liberal economic strategies. Meanwhile the conservatives, led by Mehsbah
Yazdi and Khamenehi, hold a strategy that aims to maintain power by
aggressive posturing against the US that can be transformed into public
support.