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ining breakthroughs, and wage important political struggles against free tr=
ade, globalization, and right-wing governments. It defended the rights of p=
ublic sector workers. During the late 1990s, it organized a series of plant=
 occupations against workplace closures. CAW stood as a respected example o=
f the idea that a union did not have to embrace the ideology of competitive=
ness, even in an era where there seemed to be no real alternatives.=20



When trade agreements transformed the regulatory environment in the 1980s a=
nd early =E2=80=9990s, the industry and the union continued to benefit from=
 the low Canadian dollar, low energy prices, and the existence of public Me=
dicare.=20



UAW, CAW, and the Crisis=20



At the beginning of the millennium, it seemed that the UAW and CAW could no=
t have been more different. Yet, by the onset of the current crisis, the si=
milarities became unmistakable.=20



True to form, the UAW adopted a strategy of jointness and concessions, in r=
eturn for promises of job protection, access to outsourced jobs, and protec=
tionist measures from the state. When a movement arose in opposition to joi=
ntness and concessions, it was defeated by the ruthless power of the admini=
stration and the continuous restructuring and plant closures. The UAW becam=
e increasingly isolated from other sections of the working class and other =
social movements. It opposed the application of more rigorous environmental=
 standards and defended the model choices of the Detroit Three. Its single-=
minded concern with defending only its members and protecting relatively we=
ll-paid jobs (and private benefits) gave it the appearance, to other less s=
ecure and well-paid workers, of a kind of special interest. The failure of =
the UAW to address real divisions within the working class came at a cost.=
=20



The union also never mounted credible efforts to organize the transplants a=
nd major nonunion parts producers, instead relying on voluntary recognition=
 agreements and the imposition of pre-arranged contracts on workers, often =
with no-strike clauses and other limitations.=20



In the context of the massive market losses of the Detroit Three, the union=
 bargained two-tier wages for new hires in the 2007 agreement. It is diffic=
ult to see how a union can continue to operate in an environment where some=
 workers make half as much as others, do not receive the same amount of ben=
efits, and are asked to support tens of thousands of former workers who mig=
ht get more in pensions and benefits than they make slaving away on the ass=
embly line. (Some might argue that, with the crisis, there will be no new h=
ires, but the companies have already begun aggressive buyout and early reti=
rement programs for current workers, to clear out those who have traditiona=
l wage levels and make room for those working for half that.)=20



Overall, Dan La Botz, the American left educator and activist has described=
 it well, =E2=80=9CThe union relegated itself to be the Big Three=E2=80=99s=
 junior partner, then sidekick, and finally, hanger on.=E2=80=9D Clearly, t=
he UAW was in no position creatively to challenge the agenda of the state a=
nd employers, in the face of the current credit crisis.=20



A combination of factors led to a change in the approach of the CAW. In the=
 early 2000s, the Canadian dollar began to rise sharply against the U.S. do=
llar, energy prices began to rise, and the market share of the Big Three be=
gan to decline, in relation to both the transplants and imports. Political =
regulation of the market was reduced through the adoption of neoliberal pol=
icies, and the competitive advantages previously benefiting the Canadian in=
dustry gradually disappeared.=20



The union also began to change. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the leader=
ship =E2=80=94 extremely powerful in this highly centralized union =E2=80=
=94 became frightened by the new political, economic, and regulatory enviro=
nment. Despite their left-wing reputation, and often militant actions, they=
 lacked the kind of broader, anticapitalist or socialist perspective needed=
 to develop the radical strategies and approaches that could challenge the =
employers. Even more, the process of bureaucratization had begun to take ho=
ld, with the top leaders losing any belief that a mass movement of working =
people could ever challenge globalization or the power of major employers.=
=20



The New Democratic Party also accepted the impossibility of challenging neo=
liberalism. As in the United States, without a socialist, working-class-bas=
ed political movement or party operating both outside and inside the union,=
 there was no real political reference point to the left of a right-moving =
social democracy. The entire political space for labor changed during this =
period and this, too, strongly affected the CAW leadership.=20



Partly because of the CAW=E2=80=99s history, the leadership retained enormo=
us prestige, power, and internal support and used these to stifle dissent. =
The left inside the union began to abdicate its critical role and ceased bu=
ilding an independent base inside local unions or other union bodies. The l=
eadership was, therefore, relatively free to make major policy changes, jus=
tifying collaborative strategies as being in keeping with the union=E2=80=
=99s traditions. As long-respected leaders started to make these arguments,=
 it confused and weakened the activist base that had been the driving force=
 behind many of the union=E2=80=99s struggles.=20



Reflecting this evolving perspective, the union sought new bases for the co=
mpetitiveness of the Canadian industry. It argued for subsidies to lure new=
 Big Three investments and made political alliances with business-oriented =
parties to do so. It created political campaigns calling on members to get =
community support for subsidies and limitations on imports. It formed corpo=
ratist institutions and committees to jointly develop demands for policy ch=
anges, in partnership with industry and state representatives and the large=
st parts producers. It encouraged appeals to =E2=80=9Cbuy domestic,=E2=80=
=9D in a context where much of the competition was from the transplants, lo=
cated in Ontario and the United States. Many people close to the leadership=
 dismissed trying to organize the transplants because they were =E2=80=9Cfo=
reign.=E2=80=9D=20



Long before the current round of concessions, the union agreed to a series =
of contract reopenings, reducing break times, and allowing the outsourcing =
of unionized positions, in exchange for promises of new products.=20



Rather than building the power of the working class, the union decided on a=
 growth at all costs strategy. However, union growth was secured mainly thr=
ough mergers, rather than organizing campaigns. Instead of proposing and de=
veloping a larger crusade to organize the transplants and major suppliers, =
the union sought bureaucratic solutions similar to those of the UAW and the=
 SEIU. At Magna International, the huge Canadian-based parts manufacturer, =
the CAW bargained what it called the =E2=80=9CFramework for Fairness,=E2=80=
=9D which would take away the workers=E2=80=99 right to strike and eliminat=
e independent union shopfloor representation, in a joint effort with the em=
ployer. This was justified by the =E2=80=9Cnecessity of getting our foot in=
 the door.=E2=80=9D=20



In the last set of negotiations in 2008, the CAW started negotiations early=
 and bargained away $400 million worth of new concessions, claiming, defens=
ively, that =E2=80=9Cat least we didn=E2=80=99t bargain two-tier wages.=E2=
=80=9D The union committed to the notion that it had to remain competitive =
with the declining cost structure of its U.S. brothers and sisters in order=
 to convince the corporations to maintain branch plant investment in Canada=
.=20



Canadian autoworkers, too, became fairly isolated from the rest of the high=
ly segmented working class. The CAW had previously built solidarity with an=
ti-poverty, anti-globalization, and low-wage struggles. It also led a highl=
y popular strike against outsourcing at GM in 1996 that captured the imagin=
ation of working people across Canada. Those kinds of actions have more or =
less disappeared in the past few years. The anger and frustration of other =
workers against the CAW=E2=80=99s appeals for the auto loan guarantees refl=
ect the union=E2=80=99s distance from the working class as a whole today.=
=20



Limited collective struggles, isolation, the =E2=80=9Csave our employers=E2=
=80=9D mentality, and the endless series of plant closings and job losses, =
left the union increasingly weakened and demoralized. This hardly placed th=
e CAW in a strong position when the credit crisis actually hit at the end o=
f 2008. 19=20



The weakness of the UAW, CAW, and larger labor movements in both countries =
was not missed by the ruling classes and the U.S. and Canadian governments,=
 when they imposed the conditions for the loan guarantees.=20



Alternative Policies and Approaches=20

1. Socialist Perspectives=20



A socialist approach to the search for solutions to the auto crisis might p=
roperly begin with a set of principles: class solidarity, democracy, indepe=
ndence from employers, alternatives to the logic of competitive markets, th=
e development of democratic and productive capacities, and environmental re=
sponsibility and sustainability. 20=20



If we were to apply these principles, what might we demand?=20



First, the =E2=80=9Cprivate welfare state=E2=80=9D needs to be replaced by =
a set of strengthened, democratically administered, universal public progra=
ms. Pensions, health care, dental, vision, and pharmaceuticals cannot be gu=
aranteed through private plans, dependent on corporate profitability and ad=
ministered by private insurance companies. These should be fundamental righ=
ts that strengthen the independence and well-being of working people. For n=
ow, governments should at least guarantee already negotiated plans, which, =
after all, were funded by the deferred wages of the workers in the first pl=
ace.=20



Second, the banking and finance sector should be nationalized and socialize=
d and run by democratic bodies. Finance needs to become in fact what curren=
t bailouts implicitly assume that it is=E2=80=94a public utility. It should=
 be used to fund the legitimate social and economic needs of society.=20



Third, auto production and trade must be regulated. Democratic planning bod=
ies need to be created to regulate trade, the entry and location of product=
ion facilities, and the movement of capital. Whatever the immediate result =
of current restructuring efforts, all of the companies cannot produce vehic=
les at full capacity and continue to sell their products in North America.=
=20



Fourth, the need to deal with climate change and the general environmental =
crisis requires that there be fewer personal and commercial vehicles. We ne=
ed: (1) new, smaller vehicles that use non-fossil fuels; (2) closed-loop pr=
oduction processes; (3) reusable and recyclable materials and an infrastruc=
ture to handle the collection and recycling process; and (4) mass transport=
ation and the infrastructure for it; (5) development of alternative sources=
 of fuel and energy; and (6) new forms of living, working, and enjoying rec=
reation time. All of this requires changes in industry and society that go =
far beyond the logic of private capital accumulation and competition.=20



Fifth, much of the productive capacity currently used to produce cars must =
be redirected to produce other goods or services. Government-owned corporat=
ions should be created to take over the productive facilities and resources=
 =E2=80=94 such as tool and die making =E2=80=94 left idle by today=E2=80=
=99s downsizing, to create environmentally friendly goods, such as wind gen=
erators, solar technologies, and mass transit. These resources have been su=
bsidized by the state and communities, so why should we allow them to disap=
pear because they no longer fit into the logic of market profitability? The=
 unemployed and underemployed would have to be mobilized and organized to d=
emand these changes and ultimately work in this new sector, earning decent =
union wages.=20



Sixth, communities must be organized to defend their right to decent jobs a=
nd a share of new production facilities. New institutions have to be create=
d to allow working-class communities like Pontiac, Michigan and Windsor, On=
tario to investigate and analyze their needs (be it infrastructure, housing=
, transportation, services, recreation, etc.), and then to access the techn=
ical and financial resources to address them. This is one way to avoid the =
proliferation of deindustrialized urban centers across North America.=20



Seventh, we need a bold alternative vision for transforming the auto indust=
ry. Some call for a nationalized auto, mass transit, and energy corporation=
, which would take over the auto companies, reintegrate key supplier facili=
ties, dramatically increase investment in mass transit, phase out fossil an=
d nuclear fuels, and move towards renewable forms of energy. 21 They point =
out the enormous success of nationally planned industries during the Second=
 World War, when GM =E2=80=94 although still privately owned =E2=80=94 beca=
me the largest aerospace manufacturer, under public control in a planned en=
vironment. If nationalized industry and planning worked then, why couldn=E2=
=80=99t they work now? Others have called for strong regulation and a serie=
s of transformative experiments, arguing that without changing the larger e=
conomic and political environment, a nationalized industry would have a har=
d time operating =E2=80=9Cdifferently.=E2=80=9D Whichever approach is taken=
, transforming the current industry will require major structural reform, c=
hallenging the logic of capitalism and capitalist state institutions. 22=20



Eighth, there need to be solidaristic strategies to protect jobs and income=
. These might include work sharing (using unemployment insurance programs t=
o subsidize incomes) and extension of various negotiated forms of time off,=
 such as vacation, parental leaves, reduction of overtime, and the like.=20



2. Getting from Here to There=20



How could we fight for these things and what kinds of political projects wo=
uld we have to build to make them possible? Two necessary conditions come t=
o mind. Our unions must be changed, and we must develop an alternative poli=
tics.=20



The UAW and CAW are seen by many simply as advocates of the narrow sectiona=
l interests of their members. The anger and envy that mark the outlook of m=
any workers towards autoworkers are more than just ideas caused by the medi=
a. They reflect the real life experiences of many workers who, in this neol=
iberal era, have never participated in collective, class-oriented struggles=
 to address their concerns and needs. They, therefore, tend to dismiss the =
trade union movement and look towards individualistic solutions.=20



Unions =E2=80=94 and not just the UAW and CAW =E2=80=94 need a fundamental =
cultural change, much like the one that took hold in some of the industrial=
 unions of the CIO in the 1930s, in response to the hidebound and narrow cr=
aft unionism of the old AFL unions. Unions must see their role as represent=
ing and mobilizing both the employed and unemployed; in communities as well=
 as in workplaces. They must fight against the increasing stratification wi=
thin their membership and become involved in concrete forms of rebuilding w=
orking-class communities, all in the spirit of solidarity. This kind of app=
roach might go a long way toward addressing the isolation of workers in pri=
mary labor markets in oligopolistic industries like auto.=20



Unions need to be open, democratic, and participatory, going beyond formal =
democracy to develop member capacities through education, access to informa=
tion, and mobilization. Work time must also be reduced, so workers have an =
opportunity to play a role in their union and in political life.=20



Aside from standing up against concessions, unions have to take up the almo=
st forgotten struggle for creative, rewarding, and productive alternatives =
to lean production and management-controlled work organization. Such effort=
s would address a major concern of all employed workers.=20



There also has to be a new movement =E2=80=94 a crusade =E2=80=94 to pass t=
he Employee Free Choice Act in the United States and to organize the transp=
lants and other nonunion strongholds in both countries.=20



In a larger sense, the union movement must recognize the impossibility of r=
eturning to the days when traditional collective bargaining approaches woul=
d bring ongoing gains to their members. Today, a radicalized capital is ben=
t on fundamentally altering the power of unions and the living and working =
conditions of workers =E2=80=94 especially autoworkers. Mutually beneficial=
 forms of competitiveness are impossible. Unions need to radicalize their p=
ractices, policies, and politics. The lack of mass resistance to the curren=
t round of concession demands is a sad reflection of the failure to recogni=
ze the urgency of this task.=20



While unions must play a critical role in the process of change, they have =
important limitations. They must collectively bargain for their members and=
 are dependent on the success of employers in specific segments of the mark=
etplace. They have to deliver gains in the short run in order to retain cre=
dibility with their membership, and this often conflicts with longer-term g=
oals and the interests of other workers.=20



What=E2=80=99s needed is a socialist political movement =E2=80=94 one that =
challenges the logic of private capital accumulation and seeks to fight for=
 an alternative social system. Such a movement would provide an alternative=
 pole of reference for workers and unions, bringing a deeper and clearer an=
alysis of the necessary strategies and demands needed to address the curren=
t crisis and contribute to the building of a more ambitious resistance move=
ment.=20



In the 1930s, the existence of radical anti-capitalist movements and partie=
s inspired working-class activists to create the industrial union movement =
and other mass community struggles in the face of seeming impossible odds. =
They ended up mobilizing tens of thousands of working people, forcing gover=
nments to implement key social reforms and institutionalize the CIO unions.=
=20



Today, we are left with a small number of radical groups, individuals, and =
networks in both Canada and the United States, with a tenuous base in the u=
nion movement and ties to a number of community projects. A larger anti-cap=
italist or socialist political movement has to be built, working inside and=
 alongside working-class communities and trade unions to: (1) support organ=
ized resistance (such as demonstrations, rent strikes, and workplace occupa=
tions); (2) push them further (occupations could become first steps towards=
 demanding that workplaces remain open, part of a larger plan for transform=
ing the industry and our economy); (3) argue for structural reforms that co=
uld create possibilities for transformational changes; and (4) promote educ=
ation on the crisis, the system, and strategies for fighting back.=20



How can we begin to do these things? First, we need to talk and plan togeth=
er. In Toronto, for example, a group of socialist and other radical activis=
ts=E2=80=94trade unionists, community organizers, and others =E2=80=94 are =
organizing a mass assembly this fall to (1) address some of the differences=
 and similarities in various aspects of working-class life; (2) build on an=
d deepen our common understanding of the roots of the current crisis; (3) w=
ork toward linking our short-term defensive struggles to more ambitious eff=
orts to challenge the system; and (4) to see what might be the most appropr=
iate organizational forms for moving forward.=20



Second, we need to support, help build, and participate in ongoing struggle=
s. In the United States, anger over the bonuses and massive bailout money f=
or capitalists =E2=80=94 in the face of continuing demands for sacrifices a=
nd job losses for workers =E2=80=94 is growing. Here in Canada, labor union=
s are starting to mobilize around modest defensive demands, such as the ext=
ension of unemployment insurance, severance guarantee funds, and the rights=
 of temporary and precarious workers. New links between unions and non-unio=
nized workers are being re-established as well. The CAW has organized occup=
ations to demand improved severance packages in workplace closures and a hu=
ge demonstration in defense of pensions. The Steelworkers are building oppo=
sition to the possible closure of major steel facilities. Local labor counc=
ils are creating larger campaigns. Hopefully, each struggle will build conf=
idence to do more and provide space to talk about how we can raise the poli=
tical level of our demands and the breadth of the movement.=20

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