No subject

oyments in Afghanistan continue to rise along with the American air-strike =
rates =E2=80=93 there is consistent messaging about the need to "stay the c=
ourse," even while bypassing such tainted phrases.=20

The dynamic that Tuchman describes as operative in the first years of the 1=
960s, while the Vietnam War gained momentum, is no less relevant today: "Fo=
r the ruler it is easier, once he has entered a policy box, to stay inside.=
 For the lesser official it is better, for the sake of his position, not to=
 make waves, not to press evidence that the chief will find painful to acce=
pt. Psychologists call the process of screening out discordant information =
=E2=80=98cognitive dissonance,=E2=80=99 an academic disguise for =E2=80=98D=
on=E2=80=99t confuse me with the facts.=E2=80=99" Along the way, cognitive =
dissonance "causes alternatives to be =E2=80=98deselected since even thinki=
ng about them entails conflicts.=E2=80=99"=20

Such a psycho-political process inside the White House has no use for the r=
eport from the Congressional Progressive Caucus that came out of the caucus=
=E2=80=99 six-part forum on Capitol Hill this spring, "Afghanistan: A Road =
Map for Progress."=20

Souped up and devouring fuel, the war train cannot slow down for the Progre=
ssive Caucus report=E2=80=99s recommendation that "an 80-20 ratio (politica=
l-military) should be the formula for funding our efforts in the region wit=
h oversight by a special inspector general to ensure compliance." Or that "=
U.S. troop presence in the region must be oriented toward training and supp=
ort roles for Afghan security forces and not for U.S.-led counterinsurgency=
 efforts."=20

Or that "the immediate cessation of drone attacks should be required." Or t=
hat "all aid dollars should be required to have a majority percentage of do=
llars tied or guaranteed to local Afghan institutions and organizations, to=
 ensure countrywide job mapping, assessment, and workforce development proc=
ess to directly benefit the Afghan people."=20

The policymakers who are gunning the war train can=E2=80=99t be bothered wi=
th such ideas. After all, if the solution is =E2=80=93 rhetoric aside =E2=
=80=93 assumed to be largely military, why dilute the potency of the soluti=
on? Especially when, as we=E2=80=99re repeatedly made to understand, there=
=E2=80=99s so much at stake.=20

During the mid-1960s, while American troops poured into Vietnam, "enormity =
of the stakes was the new self-hypnosis," Tuchman comments. She quotes the =
wisdom =E2=80=93 conventional and self-evident =E2=80=93 of New York Times =
military correspondent Hanson Baldwin, who wrote in 1966 that U.S. withdraw=
al from Vietnam would bring "political, psychological, and military catastr=
ophe," signaling that the United States "had decided to abdicate as a great=
 power."=20

Many Americans are eager to think of our nation as supremely civilized even=
 in warfare; the conceits of noble self-restraint have been trumpeted by ma=
ny a president even while the Pentagon=E2=80=99s carnage apparatus kept spi=
nning into overdrive. "Limited war is not nicer or kinder or more just than=
 all-out war, as its proponents would have it," Tuchman notes. "It kills wi=
th the same finality."=20

For a president, with so much military power under his command, frustration=
s call for more of the same. The seductive allure of counterinsurgency is a=
pt to heighten the appeal of "warnography" for the commander in chief; what=
ever the earlier resolve to maintain restraint, the ineffectiveness of more=
 violence invites still more =E2=80=93 in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as in V=
ietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.=20

"The American mentality counted on superior might," Tuchman commented, "but=
 a tank cannot disperse wasps." In Vietnam, the independent journalist Mich=
ael Herr wrote, the U.S. military=E2=80=99s violent capacities were awesome=
: "Our machine was devastating. And versatile. It could do everything but s=
top."=20

And that is true, routinely, of a war-making administration.=20

The grim and ultimately unhinged process that Barbara Tuchman charts is in =
evidence with President Obama and his approach to the Afghan war: "In its f=
irst stage, mental standstill fixes the principles and boundaries governing=
 a political problem. In the second stage, when dissonances and failing fun=
ction begin to appear, the initial principles rigidify. This is the period =
when, if wisdom were operative, re-examination and re-thinking and a change=
 of course are possible, but they are rare as rubies in a backyard. Rigidif=
ying leads to increase of investment and the need to protect egos; policy f=
ounded upon error multiplies, never retreats. The greater the investment an=
d the more involved in it the sponsor=E2=80=99s ego, the more unacceptable =
is disengagement."=20

A week ago, one out of seven members of the House of Representatives voted =
against a supplemental appropriations bill providing $81.3 billion to the P=
entagon, mainly for warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan. An opponent of the fun=
ding, Congressman John Conyers, pointed out that "the president has not cha=
llenged our most pervasive and dangerous national hubris: the foolhardy bel=
ief that we can erect the foundations of civil society through the judiciou=
s use of our many high-tech instruments of violence."=20

Conyers continued:=20

"That belief, promoted by the previous administration in the wake of the te=
rrorist attacks of September 11, assumes that the United States possesses t=
he capacity and also has a duty to determine the fate of nations in the gre=
ater Middle East.=20

"I oppose this supplemental war funding bill because I believe that we are =
not bound by such a duty. In fact, I believe the policies of empire are cou=
nterproductive in our struggle against the forces of radical religious extr=
emism. For example, U.S. strikes from unmanned Predator Drones and other ai=
rcraft produced 64 percent of all civilian deaths caused by the U.S., NATO,=
 and Afghan forces in 2008. Just this week, U.S. air strikes took another 1=
00 lives, according to Afghan officials on the ground. If it is our goal to=
 strengthen the average Afghan or Pakistani citizen and to weaken the radic=
als that threaten stability in the region, bombing villages is clearly coun=
terproductive. For every family broken apart by an incident of =E2=80=98col=
lateral damage,=E2=80=99 seeds of hate and enmity are sown against our nati=
on. =E2=80=A6=20

"Should we support this measure, we risk dooming our nation to a fate simil=
ar to Sisyphus and his boulder: to being trapped in a stalemate of unending=
 frustration and misery, as our mistakes inevitably lead us to the same fai=
led outcomes. Let us step back; let us remember the mistakes and heartbreak=
 of our recent misadventures in the streets of Fallujah and Baghdad. If we =
honor the ties that bind us to one another, we cannot in good faith send ou=
r fellow citizens on this errand of folly. It is still not too late to turn=
 away from this path."=20