No subject

ses Party of the Philippines.=20


Lessons to Continue and Renew the Struggle for Tamil Self-determination in =
Sri Lanka=20



By Reihana Mohideen=20



=E2=80=9CTo save the lives of our people is the need of the hour. Mindful o=
f this, we have already announced to the world our position to silence our =
guns to save our people," said Selvarasa Pathmanathan, the head of LTTE=E2=
=80=99s International Diplomatic Relations on May 17, thus flagging the mil=
itary defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. While the military de=
feat of the LTTE does not necessarily mean its demise, and it most certainl=
y does not represent the end of the struggle for Tamil self-determination i=
n Sri Lanka, nevertheless it is a major setback to the struggle for a Tamil=
 Eelam.=20



And while calls for a political settlement of the conflict must be supporte=
d, the possibility of a genuine political settlement, i.e. peace with justi=
ce, is probably far less likely today than when the Tigers were still a pow=
erful military force willing to negotiate a political settlement. The Tiger=
s are in a far weaker position to negotiate a political settlement for a li=
berated Tamil homeland today, than they have been in previous years.=20



At the same time, the Sinhalese government victory is a veritable double-ed=
ged sword. The Tamil struggle will rise again and it could take more desper=
ate forms. The fact that the Sinhalese army feels compelled to hold Tamil y=
outh prisoners in military camps, and according to defence ministry spokesp=
erson Lakshman Hullugalle, even up to two years if necessary, is an acknowl=
edgement of this possibility.=20



The defeat of the Tigers, one of the most powerful Liberation armies in the=
 world which controlled Northern and Eastern parts of Sri Lanka, does come =
as a shock. How was the Sinhalese government able to defeat a disciplined a=
rmed force, with substantial support amongst the Tamil population? While in=
ternational intervention, such as military support to the Sinhala governmen=
t by imperialist countries such as the UK and Israel are factors that weigh=
ed against the Tigers, the strategy of the LTTE itself needs to come under =
scrutiny, particularly by those very Tamil youth who will continue the stru=
ggle for Tamil self-determination.=20



While the LTTE has carried out a heroic struggle for the self-determination=
 of the Tamil people of Sri Lanka, one of the main limitations of the LTTE =
was that it primarily pursued a military strategy and not a political strat=
egy based on mobilising the Tamil masses and building solidarity amongst th=
e Sinhalese and Muslim populations in the rest of the island. The militaris=
ation of the struggle by the LTTE also resulted in human rights violations =
of Tamils by the LTTE in Tiger controlled areas. The centralised and hierar=
chical military structures, and the refusal to accommodate different politi=
cal views and currents which exist (until today) within the movement for Ta=
mil self-determination, all contributed to weakening the Tamil liberation s=
truggle.=20




As Australian socialist and solidarity activist for Tamil self-determinatio=
n Chris Slee, writing in Green Left Weekly points out, the military strateg=
y pursued by the LTTE also led to the alienation of potential allies. The L=
TTE was unable to build strong alliances with any sections of the Sinhala a=
nd Muslim populations. As Slee notes, =E2=80=9CThe Tigers sometimes disrega=
rded the need to win support among Sinhalese workers, peasants and students=
 in southern Sri Lanka for the right of Tamils to national self-determinati=
on. This also applied to the Tamil-speaking Muslims of eastern Sri Lanka. T=
he absence of a mass anti-war movement in southern Sri Lanka is a key obsta=
cle to the success of the Tamil self-determination struggle. The LTTE has b=
een willing to negotiate with Sinhalese political leaders whenever they sho=
wed any signs of wanting to reach a peaceful solution. But the LTTE has not=
 made a serious effort to get its message directly to the Sinhalese masses,=
 bypassing the politicians whose promises of peace have been deceptive.=E2=
=80=9D=20





While the lack of a strong anti-war movement in southern Sri Lanka primaril=
y reflects the weakness and political limitations of the Sri Lankan left, t=
he military strategy of the LTTE and the tactics which flowed from this, su=
ch as the bombing campaigns in the South which killed civilians, have also =
alienated the Sri Lankan masses from supporting the Tamil struggle for self=
-determination.=20





While our main focus has to be building the international solidarity campai=
gn to free the Tamil population imprisoned in the Sinhala army camps, for t=
he withdrawal of the Sinhala army from Tamil territory and putting pressure=
 on the Sinhala government for a political settlement to the Tamil question=
, the left especially in Sri Lanka and within the Tamil population, has the=
 responsibility to provide a critical framework to develop a political stra=
tegy to continue and renew the Tamil struggle for self-determination. This =
does not mean relinquishing support of the right of Tamil people under occu=
pation to take up arms against an occupying Sinhala army. In the current si=
tuation, however, emphasis on political struggles and campaigns is clearly =
to the advantage of the Tamil fighters and peoples, and this will also be t=
he case in the mid-term.