[R-G] US creates local militias to fight Taliban
Anthony Fenton
fentona at shaw.ca
Thu Apr 16 15:28:49 MDT 2009
from the April 13, 2009 edition - http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0413/p06s10-wosc.html
Lessons from Iraq? US creates local militias to fight Taliban
With echoes of the Anbar Awakening in Iraq, the US is arming,
training, and paying Afghans to set up village militias.
By Anand Gopal | Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
Maydan Shahr, Afghanistan
At first sight, Muhammad Nasim Gul and his men – in drab, olive-
colored fatigues and baseball caps to match – look like Cuban
guerrillas. They slowly patrol the muddy streets of Wardak Province,
weapons drawn in a constant state of alert.
They stand sentry, night and day, on the watch for intruders and other
enemies. At times they stop to talk to the townsfolk, to see if anyone
has had any trouble recently.
Mr. Gul and his fellow tribesmen are part of an ambitious new American-
backed program that started here two weeks ago to train, uniform, and
arm locals against the Taliban. Officials turned to the idea following
the success of a similar plan in Iraq, known as the Anbar Awakening,
in which Sunni tribes were armed to fight Al Qaeda. They hope the
program, dubbed the "Afghan Public Protection Force," can help stem
the worsening violence here.
"My tribesmen joined this force to protect our village," says Mr. Gul,
a former policeman who is now a commander in the protection force of
the Jalrez district of Wardak, a 30-minute drive from Kabul.
Under the plan, members of each district shura (council) in Wardak
nominate locals for the force who are then trained for three weeks by
Afghans (with the involvement of American advisers). They then return
to their home districts, receiving nearly $125 dollars a month in
salary – more than the typical police income, which is usually less
than $100 a month. If successful in Wardak, officials plan to expand
the program to more than 40 other districts across the south and east.
Afghan and American officials stress that the force is not a tribal
militia. "The shuras [which nominate the force] are not from one or
two tribes, so they will bring people from all the villages," says
Barna Karimi, director-general of the Independent Directorate of Local
Governance, a government body that works with the local shuras.
Pitting one ethnic group against another?
But in practice, the force is shaping up along tribal and ethnic
lines. In Jalrez, one of two districts where the program has started,
only 38 of the 128 members of the force are Pashtuns. The rest belong
to other ethnic minority groups. But the Taliban and its supporters
are almost entirely Pashtun, as is the majority of Jalrez district.
"It is not wise to use members of one ethnicity to combat members of
another ethnicity," says Waliullah Rahmani, a policy analyst with the
Kabul Center for Strategic Studies.
Of the 38 Pashtuns in the Jalrez force, all belong to a single tribe,
the Kharoti. Several locals say that other tribes in the area refused
to join. "We are the only tribe that joined this program," says
commander Gul. "All of the rest of the tribes are angry at us and
think we are helping the infidels."
"Unfortunately, most of the tribes living in these areas are not
supportive of the current government," says Mr. Rahmani, "and they are
not likely to fight against the insurgents."
Critics of the program contend that arming specific tribes is
dangerous in a country with a recent history of civil war.
But government officials defend the composition of the force, saying
it can fight the insurgency only with those who are most willing,
regardless of ethnicity or tribe.
Recruits don't want to fight Taliban
While in Iraq the Sunni tribes were asked to fight against outsiders –
Al Qaeda – in Wardak the majority of insurgents are locals. "People in
my district are pessimistic about the effectiveness of these forces,"
says Roshanak Wardak, a parliamentarian from Saydabad district. "They
say that if they joined, they would end up fighting their own
brothers, because the Taliban in my district are locals; they are not
from Pakistan or Kandahar."
Even those who neither have ties to insurgents nor support them say
they fear reprisals if they join. "The Taliban in Wardak are very
powerful," says one local from Jaghatu district, who asked not to be
named for security reasons. "Even those against the Taliban are scared
to join."
Some say that even if they do join, it might not be for the reasons
that officials envisaged. "I would like to join and defend my
community," says one local from Saydabad district, who also asked not
to be identified, "but only against criminals. I don't want to fight
against the Taliban."
Fazel Qazizai, from Chak district, says, "Most of us just want money
for food and a weapon for security. Just think about it – one
Kalashnikov is $600. Where could I ever get that kind of money? But in
the protection force, we'll get one for free. And we'll get an ID card
so that the police can no longer harass us."
But he adds, "We have no interest in going to war with the Taliban."
Moreover, some critics say the influx of weapons can exacerbate
longstanding tribal and political rivalries. In Chak district, for
example, residents say the main group promoting the protection force
is Ittehad-e-Islami, a pro-government fundamentalist group accused of
human rights violations in the 1990s. (No one from the party was
available for comment.)
The potential for groups or individuals to take advantage of the
protection force worries tribal elders, says Muhammad Hazrat Janaan, a
member of the Wardak provincial government. "They are worried that the
force can actually decrease security unless it's done very, very
carefully."
A history of tribal militias
Although they are controversial, tribal militias and community guards
have a long history in Afghanistan. In parts of some eastern
provinces, a certain type of tribal militia, the arbakai, acts as a
community guard. These arbakai act independently of the government and
is formed fully on the initiative of the tribal members. The Afghan
Public Protection Force is not an arbakai, since the latter is an
indigenous volunteer force under the command of tribal leaders, while
the protection force is created, paid for and controlled by the US and
the Afghan Ministry of Interior.
In some cases, arbakai have successfully kept insurgents out of their
territory. But it might be difficult to replicate such successes. "The
arbakai are limited to the southeastern provinces," says Muhammad
Osman Tariq, with the London-based Crisis States Research Center, who
wrote a recent report on the subject. "The arbakai have existed there
for hundreds of years, independent of the government, and will
continue to exist for years more."
Conditions in provinces like Wardak, which do not have such a strong
tradition of tribal militias, differ greatly from those in the eastern
provinces, Mr. Tariq continues. The arbakai in the east are more
motivated to defend their tribes, since they are created and organized
by the tribes themselves.
Needed: guns, food, motivation
Analysts say that if the Afghan Public Protection Force is to work,
officials will have to learn from past failed attempts at locally
based security initiatives. For example, a previous NATO-backed
initiative to arm locals in the southern provinces, dubbed the Afghan
Auxiliary Police Force, ended in failure after Western countries
deemed the force to be ineffective. Officials at the time said it was
poorly trained and motivated. In some cases, they accused the force of
favoring specific tribes or of engaging in criminal activity. In other
cases, recruits simply absconded with their weapons, never to be seen
again.
Gul, the commander of the Jalrez Public Protection Force, is convinced
that the current plan will work – if his forces are well enough
equipped. "We need more weapons, more clothes, more food. We lack
everything," he says. "We lack everything."
"We are the only tribe that joined the force, so we need to protect
ourselves," he adds. "If the other tribes get their hands on me, they
will kill me."
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