[R-G] Canada-Russia in context

[Anthony Fenton]

New chill in an old war:  Canada-Russia in context

by Yves Engler

www.rabble.ca/news/new-chill-old-war-canada-russia-context

At the end of February Stephen Harper referred to Russia as  
"aggressive." In a throwback to the Cold War, two weeks ago Defense  
Minister Peter MacKay added that Ottawa will respond to Russian  
flights in the Arctic by flying Canadian fighter jets near Russian  
airspace.

Recent declarations from the Harper government are the latest  
installment in a 90-year-old struggle with Russia that should be  
opposed by most Canadians. Since the end of the Cold War Ottawa has  
actively pushed against Russian influence in Eastern Europe. Federal  
government documents uncovered by Canwest in July 2007 explained that  
Ottawa was trying to be "a visible and effective partner of the United  
States in Russia, Ukraine and zones of instability in Eastern Europe."

During a July 2007 visit to the Ukraine, Foreign Affairs Minister  
Peter MacKay said Canada would help provide a "counterbalance" to  
Russia. "There are outside pressures [on Ukraine], from Russia most  
notably. ... We want to make sure they feel the support that is there  
for them in the international community." As part of Canada's  
"counterbalance" to Russia MacKay announced $16 million in aid to  
support democratic reform in the Ukraine.
Support for the Ukrainian government follows on the heels of Canada's  
role in the western-backed, "colour" revolutions in Eastern Europe,  
which were largely aimed at weakening Russian influence in the region.  
An in-depth Globe and Mail article headlined "Agent Orange: Our secret  
role in Ukraine," detailed some of the ways Canada intervened in the  
2004-2005 Ukranian elections.

"Beginning in January 2004 -- soon after the success of the Rose  
Revolution in Georgia, he [Canadian ambassador to the Ukraine, Andrew  
Robinson] began to organize secret monthly meetings of western  
ambassadors, presiding over what he called 'donor coordination'  
sessions among 20 countries interested in seeing Mr.[presidential  
candidate Viktor] Yushchenko succeed. Eventually, he acted as the  
group's spokesman and became a prominent critic of the Kuchma  
government's heavy handed media control. Canada also invested in a  
controversial exit poll, carried out on election day by Ukraine's  
Razumkov Centre and other groups that contradicted the official  
results showing Mr. Yanukovich [winning]."

The Canadian embassy gave $30,000 US to Pora, a leading civil society  
group active in the Orange Revolution. In total Ottawa spent half a  
million dollars promoting "fair elections" in the Ukraine. The  
ambassador promised the Ukraine's lead electoral commissioner a  
passport (Canadian citizenship) if he did "the right thing." The  
embassy also paid for 500 election observers from Canada, the largest  
official delegation from any country (another 500 Ukranian-Canadians  
came independently). Many of these election observers were far from  
impartial, according to the Globe.

The first Eastern European "colour" revolution took place in Serbia  
just over a year after NATO's 78-day bombing campaign. During NATO's  
illegal bombing of Serbia in 1999, 18 Canadian CF-18 jets dropped 530  
bombs in 682 sorties -- approximately 10 per cent of NATO's air  
operations. "One goal of the war against Yugoslavia," noted Tariq Ali,  
"was to expand NATO to the very frontiers of the former Soviet Union.  
And that is what they did. The actual needs of the populations in that  
region were a secondary matter."
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Bombing Serbia, which deepened Kosovo's separation from that country,  
was the final blow to multiethnic Yugoslavia. The former Yugoslavia's  
division into ethnic states was attractive to NATO because it  
diminished Russian influence in the Mediterranean.

Through its diplomacy and peacekeeping Canada spurred Yugoslavia's  
breakup in the 90s. During the Cold War, however, Ottawa took a  
different tack. At a time when Russia was relatively strong, Canada  
got close to Yugoslavia as a way to pry it away from the Soviet led  
Warsaw Pact.

Established in 1955 the Warsaw Pact was a response to NATO, which some  
believe was a Canadian idea. At the U.N. General Assembly in September  
1947 External Affairs Minister Louis St. Laurent warned the floor that  
if the Security Council's veto crisis was not resolved countries would  
establish a NATO-type organization. Canada, along with Britain and the  
U.S., was part of initial NATO discussions in March 1948 and at the  
start of 2007, well-known military analyst J. L. Granatstein wrote  
that NATO is "the alliance to which Canada had devoted perhaps 90 per  
cent of its military effort since 1949."

Reflected in Ottawa's support for NATO, immediately after World War II  
Canadian officials spouted Cold War hysteria despite reports from our  
ambassador in Moscow that the Soviet elite desired peace with  
Washington and London. Begun during World War II the Canadian  
Psychological Warfare Committee continued to operate throughout the  
Cold War. It beamed Canadian propaganda (through the CBC International  
Service) to the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc countries.  
According to former Canadian ambassador to Czechoslovakia and Poland  
and CBC-IS founder, Jack McCordick, the aim of CBC-IS was "to engage  
in psychological warfare against the communist regimes."

Canada has not only participated in psychological warfare against  
Russia. Six thousand Canadian troops invaded Russia after the  
Bolsheviks rose to power in 1917. The war against the Bolsheviks was  
initially justified as a way to reopen World War I's Eastern Front  
(the Bolsheviks signed a peace treaty with Germany). Canadian troops,  
however, stayed after World War One ended. In fact, 2,700 Canadian  
troops arrived in the eastern city of Vladivostok on January 5, 1919,  
two months after the war's conclusion.

Ninety years ago most working-class Canadian organizations opposed the  
invasion, arguing that Ottawa acted on behalf of the elite.  
Unfortunately, the situation has not changed much. Harper's saber  
rattling does not benefit ordinary Canadians, average Russians or even  
the real victims of Russian policy in places like Chechnya.
Instead, the Harper government's belligerence strengthens the hand of  
those in Russia and around the world who promote a geo-strategic  
worldview where the objective is to maximize state power. In this  
scenario, the interests of common people are set aside in the name of  
the great game.

Yves Engler is the author of the forthcoming The Black Book of  
Canadian Foreign Policy. To help organize a talk as part of a book  
tour in May or June, please e-mail yvesengler[at]hotmail[dot]com.