[R-G] Russia's Role in the Iran Crisis

Yoshie Furuhashi critical.montages at gmail.com
Sat Sep 6 03:18:15 MDT 2008


<http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2008/09/06/russias_role_in_the_iran_crisis/>
Russia's role in the Iran crisis

By Ray Takeyh and Nikolas Gvosdev  |  September 6, 2008

IT IS ONE of the rites of passage of the fall - every September, the
Bush administration returns to the United Nation for another sanctions
resolution against Iran. However, this time there is much
consternation in Washington that Russia's invasion of Georgia - and
the subsequent chill that has descended on relations between Russia
and the West - has ended any possibility of cooperation between the
United States and Russia in dealing with Iran's nuclear imbroglio.
Such fears are overblown.

Russia's assault on Georgia may produce no measurable change of its
Iran policy. Indeed, President Dmitry Medvedev of Russia made it clear
that, despite the harsh rhetoric that has been exchanged between
Moscow and Washington, Russia continues to support efforts to prevent
Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.

The primary reason for the continuity is that both Iran and Russia are
essentially satisfied with existing US-European policy of applying
incremental and largely symbolic UN sanctions on Tehran. Moscow feels
that as long as the diplomatic process remains in play, America is in
no position to launch a military strike that could destabilize the
Middle East. At the same time, the theocratic regime has increasingly
adjusted to a sanctions policy whose impact is negated by increasing
oil prices.

Although Tehran would be grateful for a Russian veto of any future
sanctions resolutions, it does seem content with a Russian policy that
waters down UN mandates while deepening its commercial ties with Iran.
On the one hand, Moscow has supported three previous Security Council
injunctions against Iran, yet it has also signed lucrative trade deals
and expanded its diplomatic representation in Iran. The incongruity of
today's situation is that Russia rebukes Iran for its nuclear
infractions while providing technical assistance to the Bushehr plant,
which is a critical component of Iran's atomic industry.

For its part, Russia is happy with the standoff between Iran and the
United States. Not only does it destabilize international oil markets
- keeping prices higher than they ought to be - but Iran's large
natural gas reserves are effectively off-limits for European use,
reinforcing the continent's dependency on Moscow. At the same time, as
Iran strengthens its economic links with key Asian powers, it makes it
more dependent on Russia and China for its critical trade and
investments. Russia can only benefit from Iran's gradual reorientation
toward the East.

All this is not to suggest that Iran has not benefited from the
Russian-Georgian conflagration, but that those advantages have been
subtle. Tehran is using the Georgian crisis as a cautionary lesson to
the Persian Gulf states. From its podiums and platforms, the message
emanating from the Islamic Republic is that the Georgians mistakenly
accepted American pledges of support only to pay a heavy price for
their naiveté. The Gulf sheikdoms who similarly put much stock in US
security assurances would be wise to come to terms with their populous
and powerful Persian neighbor. In a region where America is viewed as
unpredictable and unreliable, this message has a powerful resonance.

The contours of Russia's policy became obvious in the recent meeting
of the Shanghi Cooperation Organization. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
of Iran was unable to persuade Moscow and its partners to extend
security guarantees to Tehran, or to gain Russian support for
switching oil pricing from dollars to euros. Medvedev and his Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov continued to urge Iran to be flexible and
negotiate a restraint on its nuclear activities. Yet, Moscow also
declared support for Iran's nuclear activities that were designed for
peaceful purposes.

Given the fact that technologies employed for civilian use can be the
basis of a military program, it is hard to see the utility of Russia's
latest pronouncement.

What this means?

Russia is not interested in playing an active role in resolving the
Iran crisis on terms America will find acceptable. If the next
president is going to solve the Iranian nuclear conundrum, he must
appreciate that the UN process has reached its limits, and that the
only manner of moving forward is for Washington to engage in direct
negotiations with Tehran.

Ray Takeyh is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Nikolas Gvosdev is a member of the faculty of the US Naval War
College.



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