[R-G] Final Text of Iraq Pact Reveals a U.S. Debacle

[Anthony Fenton]

POLITICS:  Final Text of Iraq Pact Reveals a U.S. Debacle
Analysis by Gareth Porter*
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=44394

WASHINGTON, Oct 22 (IPS) - The final draft of the U.S.-Iraq Status of  
Forces agreement on the U.S. military presence represents an even more  
crushing defeat for the policy of the George W. Bush administration  
than previously thought, the final text reveals.

The final draft, dated Oct. 13, not only imposes unambiguous deadlines  
for withdrawal of U.S. combat troops by 2011 but makes it extremely  
unlikely that a U.S. non-combat presence will be allowed to remain in  
Iraq for training and support purposes beyond the 2011 deadline for  
withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces.

Furthermore, Shiite opposition to the pact as a violation of Iraqi  
sovereignty makes the prospects for passage of even this agreement by  
the Iraqi parliament doubtful. Pro-government Shiite parties, the top  
Shiite clerical body in the country, and a powerful movement led by  
nationalist cleric Moqtada al-Sadr that recently mobilised hundreds of  
thousands of demonstrators in protest against the pact, are all  
calling for its defeat.

At an Iraqi cabinet meeting Tuesday, ministers raised objections to  
the final draft, and a government spokesman said that the agreement  
would not submit it to the parliament in its current form. But  
Secretary of Defence Robert Gates told three news agencies Tuesday  
that the door was "pretty far closed" on further negotiations.

In the absence of an agreement approved by the Iraqi parliament, U.S.  
troops in Iraq will probably be confined to their bases once the  
United Nations mandate expires Dec. 31.

The clearest sign of the dramatically reduced U.S. negotiating power  
in the final draft is the willingness of the United States to give up  
extraterritorial jurisdiction over U.S. contractors and their  
employees and over U.S. troops in the case of "major and intentional  
crimes" that occur outside bases and while off duty. The United States  
has never allowed a foreign country to have jurisdiction over its  
troops in any previous status of forces agreement.

But even that concession is not enough to satisfy anti-occupation  
sentiments across all Shiite political parties. Sunni politicians hold  
less decisive views on the pact, and Kurds are supportive.

Bush administration policymakers did not imagine when the negotiations  
began formally last March that its bargaining position on the issue of  
the U.S. military presence could have turned out to be so weak in  
relation with its own "client" regime in Baghdad.

They were confident of being able to legitimise a U.S. presence in  
Iraq for decades after the fighting had ended, just as they did in  
South Korea. Secretary of Defence Robert Gates had declared in June  
2007 that U.S. troops would be in Iraq "for a protracted period of  
time".

The secret U.S. draft handed to Iraqi officials Mar. 7 put no limit on  
either the number of U.S. troops in Iraq or the duration of their  
presence or their activities. It would have authorised U.S. forces to  
"conduct military operations in Iraq and to detain certain individuals  
when necessary for imperative reasons of security", according to an  
Apr. 8 article in The Guardian quoting from a leaked copy of the draft.

When Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki demanded a timetable for complete  
U.S. withdrawal in early July, the White House insisted that it would  
not accept such a timetable and that any decision on withdrawal "will  
be conditions based". It was even hoping to avoid a requirement for  
complete withdrawal in the agreement, as reflected in false claims to  
media Jul. 17 that Bush and Maliki had agreed on the objective of  
"further reduction of U.S. combat forces from Iraq" rather than  
complete withdrawal.

By early August, however, Bush had already reduced its negotiating  
aims. The U.S. draft dated Aug. 6, which was translated and posted on  
the internet by Iraqi activist Raed Jarrar, demanded the inclusion of  
either "targeted times" or "time targets" to refer to the dates for  
withdrawal of U.S. forces from all cities, town and villages and for  
complete combat troop withdrawal from Iraq, suggesting that they were  
not deadlines.

When Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Baghdad Aug. 21, the  
United States accepted for the first time a firm date of 2011 for  
complete withdrawal, giving up the demand for ambiguous such terms.  
However, the Aug. 6 draft included a provision that the U.S. could ask  
Iraq to "extend" the date for complete withdrawal of combat troops,  
based on mutual review of "progress" in achieving the withdrawal.

Because it had not yet been removed from the text, U.S. officials  
continued to claim to reporters that the date was "conditions-based",  
as Karen DeYoung reported in the Washington Post Aug. 22.

The administration also continued to hope for approval of a residual  
force. U.S. officials told DeYoung the deal would leave "tens of  
thousands of U.S. troops inside Iraq in supporting roles...for an  
unspecified time". That hope was based on a paragraph of the Aug. 6  
draft providing that the Iraqi government could request such a force,  
with the joint committee for operations and coordination determining  
the "tasks and level of the troops..."

But the Oct. 13 final draft, a translation of which was posted by Raed  
Jarrar on his website Oct. 20, reveals that the Bush administration  
has been forced to give up its aims of softening the deadline for  
withdrawal and of a residual non-combat force in the country. Unlike  
the Aug. 6 draft, the final text treats any extension of that date as  
a modification of the agreement, which could be done only "in  
accordance to constitutional procedures in both countries".

That is an obvious reference to approval by the Iraqi parliament.

Given the present level of opposition to the agreement within the  
Shiite community, that provision offers scant hope of a residual U.S.  
non-combat force in Iraq after 2011.

Another signal of Iraqi intentions is a provision of the final draft  
limiting the duration of the agreement to three years -- a date  
coinciding with the deadline for complete withdrawal from Iraq. The  
date can be extended only by a decision made by the "constitutional  
procedures in both countries".

The final draft confirms the language of the Aug. 6 draft requiring  
that all U.S. military operations be subject to the approval of the  
Iraqi government and coordinated with Iraqi authorities through a  
joint U.S.-Iraqi committee.

The negotiating text had already established by Aug. 6 that U.S.  
troops could not detain anyone in the country without a "warrant  
issued by the specialised Iraqi authorities in accordance with Iraqi  
law" and required that the detainees be turned over to Iraqi  
authorities within 24 hours. The Oct. 13 "final draft" goes even  
further, requiring that any detention by the United States, apart from  
its own personnel, must be "based on an Iraqi decision".

The collapse of the Bush administration's ambitious plan for a long- 
term U.S. presence in Iraq highlights the degree of unreality that has  
prevailed among top U.S. officials in both Washington and Baghdad on  
Iraqi politics. They continued to see the Maliki regime as a client  
which would cooperate with U.S. aims even after it was clear that  
Maliki's agenda was sharply at odds with that of the United States.

They also refused to take seriously the opposition to such a presence  
even among the Shiite clerics who had tolerated it in order to obtain  
Shiite control over state power.

*Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist  
specialising in U.S. national security policy. The paperback edition  
of his latest book, "Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the  
Road to War in Vietnam", was published in 2006.