[R-G] US/AFGHANISTAN: Moving Towards a 'Grand Bargain'

[Anthony Fenton]

US/AFGHANISTAN:  Moving Towards a 'Grand Bargain'
Analysis by Jim Lobe
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=44327

WASHINGTON, Oct 18 (IPS) - Increasingly frustrated by the "downward  
spiral" that the U.S. intelligence community sees in Afghanistan, the  
Pentagon appears to be moving in support of engaging leaders of the  
resurgent Taliban who are prepared to disassociate themselves from al- 
Qaeda.

While the seeds for that strategy are being planted now, the next U.S.  
president -- be it the current front-runner, Democratic Sen. Barack  
Obama, or his Republican rival, Sen. John McCain -- will likely be  
advised by Pentagon chief Robert Gates and the new chief of the U.S.  
Central Command (Centcom), Gen. David Petraeus, to support such an  
effort as the most effective way to stabilise Afghanistan where the  
"global war on terror" first began seven years ago.

They will also likely ask the new president to support a much broader  
regional diplomatic initiative designed to reassure Pakistan about its  
security concerns, especially vis-à-vis its long-time Indian nemesis  
whose influence in Afghanistan has grown substantially since a U.S.- 
orchestrated military campaign ousted the Taliban in late 2001.

As the predominantly Pashtun insurgency has penetrated deeply into  
southern and eastern Pakistan and even into Kabul itself over the past  
two years, regional experts here and overseas have largely concluded  
that the Taliban and its allies cannot be defeated, so long as  
Islamabad provides them with safe haven and other assistance in the  
tribal areas across the border.

What precise quos will have to be exchanged for the necessary quids  
was spelled out in considerable detail in an article entitled "From  
Great Game to Grand Bargain: Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan"  
published this week in the influential 'Foreign Affairs' journal by  
Pakistani analyst Ahmed Rashid and New York University Prof. Barnett  
Rubin, both frequent visitors to Washington whose views about the  
region are highly regarded here.

Rashid was named earlier this week by the 'Washington Post' as one of  
a number of key experts recently consulted by Petraeus and members of  
his new "Joint Strategic Assessment Team" that is being tasked to  
develop a new campaign plan for Afghanistan that is supposed to be  
completed in about 100 days, or shortly after the new president moves  
into the White House.

According to the 'Post', Petraeus has ordered the Team to focused on  
two major themes -- "government-led reconciliation of Taliban  
insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the leveraging of  
diplomatic and economic initiatives with nearby countries that are  
influential in the war." Those are precisely the strategies Rashid and  
Rubin highlighted in their article as critical to achieving their  
"Grand Bargain".

According to a ‘New York Times’ article earlier this month, the draft  
of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) -- a consensus document of  
all 16 U.S. intelligence agencies -- found that the security situation  
in Afghanistan was in a "downward spiral". It cited rampant corruption  
in the government of President Hamid Karzai; the exploding drug trade  
that now accounts for half of the country's economy; and increasingly  
sophisticated attacks by the Taliban that has so far taken the lives  
of more U.S. and NATO troops in 2008 than in any previous year as the  
main causes.

At the same time, the British commander in Afghanistan, Brigadier Mark  
Carleton-Smith, told the ‘Sunday Times' that he did not believe that  
the war in Afghanistan could be won. His comments followed the  
disclosure in leaked diplomatic cable that Britain’s ambassador in  
Kabul, Sir Sherard Cowper-Cowles had told his French counterpart that  
the next U.S. president "must be dissuaded from getting further bogged  
down in Afghanistan."

Both Obama and McCain have called for increases in U.S. and NATO troop  
strength, and President George W. Bush currently intends to send 8,000  
more U.S. troops to join the 34,000 who are already there before he  
leaves office. The NATO commander in Afghanistan, U.S. Gen. David  
McKiernan, who commands a total of nearly 70,000 troops, said last  
week he will need yet another 15,000 more next year.

But while those forces may help keep the lid on, they cannot defeat  
the Taliban, particularly so long as their Pakistani allies provide a  
safe haven, according to Rashid and Rubin, whose article criticises  
the Bush administration’s "war-on-terror" rhetoric that "thwarts sound  
strategic thinking by assimilating opponents into a homogenous  
‘terrorist’ enemy."

"(The) United States must redefine its counterterrorist goals," they  
argue. "It should seek to separate those Islamist movements with local  
or national objectives from those that, like al Qaeda, seek to attack  
the United States or its allies directly – instead of lumping them all  
together." Those willing to sever ties with al Qaeda should be  
engaged, according to the authors.

"...An agreement in principle to prohibit the use of Afghan (or  
Pakistani) territory for international terrorism, plus an agreement  
from the United States and NATO that such a guarantee could be  
sufficient to end their hostile military action, could constitute a  
framework for negotiation. Any agreement in which the Taliban or other  
insurgents disavowed al Qaeda would constitute a strategic defeat for  
al Qaeda," according to the two authors.

At the same time, Washington and its allies should pursue a "high- 
level diplomatic initiative designed to build genuine consensus on the  
goal of achieving Afghan stability by addressing the legitimate  
sources of Pakistan’s insecurity...," they argue.

They call for the UN Security Council to establish of a contact group  
consisting of its five permanent members, and possibly NATO and Saudi  
Arabia, to promote dialogue between India and Pakistan on Afghanistan  
and Kashmir, and between Pakistan and Afghanistan on delineating their  
border with the central aim of "assur(ing) Pakistan that the  
international community is committed to its territorial integrity."  
The group should also provide security assurances to Russia and Iran  
about U.S. NATO intentions and to promote regional economic  
integration and development.

Some of the seeds for a new strategy – particularly efforts at co- 
opting some elements of the insurgency have already been sown. Late  
last month, Saudi King Abdullah reportedly hosted a secret four-day  
exploratory meeting between representatives of the Karzai government  
and former Taliban officials and others with ties to various factions  
in the insurgency.

While Washington reportedly played no role in the talks, and may event  
have been taken somewhat by surprise by their having taken place,  
Gates last week told reporters in Budapest that he would support  
engagement with any insurgent faction that disavows ties to al-Qaeda.  
"There has to be ultimately, and I’ll underscore ultimately,  
reconciliation as part of a political outcome to this. That’s  
ultimately the exit strategy for all of us.’’

Petraeus, whose courtship of former Sunni insurgents in Iraq who broke  
with al-Qaeda there has been hailed as a major contribution to  
reducing the violence there -- if not yet achieving a political  
settlement -- has echoed that view.

"I do think you have to talk to enemies," he told the right-wing  
Heritage Foundation here last week. "Clearly you want to try to  
reconcile with as many as possible.’’

He also told the ‘Post’ editorial board last week that the problem  
also had a strong regional dimension that required the involvement of  
Afghanistan’s neighbours, including India.

As commander of coalition forces in Iraq, Petraeus reportedly promoted  
a similar approach, although the White House reportedly denied him  
permission to visit Damascus and channeled all official contacts with  
Iran through the U.S. ambassador in Baghdad.

(*Jim Lobe's blog on U.S. foreign policy, and particularly the neo- 
conservative influence in the Bush administration, can be read at http://www.ips.org/blog/jimlobe/)

(END/2008)