[R-G] Journalist Recounts His Experiences With Taliban in Afghanistan

Anthony Fenton fentona at shaw.ca
Wed Oct 15 10:29:56 MDT 2008


http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/asia/afghanistan/july-dec08/rosen_10-14.html

Journalist Recounts His Experiences With Taliban in Afghanistan

Taliban fighters. Photo Credit: Nir RosenWhen journalist Nir Rosen  
traveled to Afghanistan last summer, his plan was to travel with a  
group of Taliban fighters for 10 days and report on their activity.  
Instead, he was detained by a rival Taliban commander and accused of  
being a spy. Rosen describes his experiences to Robert Zeliger of the  
NewsHour with Jim Lehrer.

ROBERT ZELIGER, NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Nir Rosen is an author and  
journalist and a fellow at the NYU Center on Law and Security. He  
recently returned from Afghanistan where he wrote about the Taliban  
for Rolling Stone Magazine. Nir, thanks for joining us.

Taliban fighters. Photo Credit: Nir RosenNIR ROSEN, a fellow at the  
NYU Center on Law and Security as well as the New America Foundation:  
Thanks for having me.

ROBERT ZELIGER: After spending time with these guys, what did you  
learn? What are they like?

NIR ROSEN: Well the whole trip was very revealing. Just getting there  
itself was a shock. We drove down the famous Kabul to Kandahar Highway  
which continues all around the country. It's called the Ring Road. It  
was a hallmark of the American reconstruction effort. And it's  
completely and utterly destroyed. It no longer exists. It's a series  
of potholes going all the way down -- I'm sorry, they're actually  
craters from, immense craters, not potholes -- and as a result of  
roadside bombs which were so successful in Iraq. And these roadside  
bombs are generally attacking convoys, logistical convoys that go to  
supply coalition NATO bases. And the entire road is littered on both  
sides with the charred smoldering carcasses of all these trucks and  
within like half an hour of leaving Kabul we were actually in the  
middle of a war.

The Taliban were fighting with the Americans a few hundred meters away  
from us. And the road was closed and we had to wait for the fighting  
to end. I had been picked up by two Taliban commanders. They drove up  
to Kabul, picked me up and drove me down to Ghazni province which is  
about 120 miles south.

ROBERT ZELIGER: And who are these Taliban commanders? Can you describe  
who your guides were?

NIR ROSEN: One of them was an experienced Mujahid, he fought the  
Soviets in the ‘80s and then had grown disenchanted with the  
Mujahideen who had began to fight each other following Soviet  
withdrawal. And eventually joined the Taliban out of frustration with  
the war lords who were terrorizing the Afghans and now continues to  
fight on behalf of the Taliban against the Americans.

And the other guy was a little more senior and he was also a liaison  
with the Taliban Minister of Defense. The Taliban actually has  
ministers and governors for each province. They have on paper at least  
a well established structure. Although I was to learn that in reality  
of course it falls victim to Afghanistan which is much more vociferous  
and bitter rivalries divide different groups just as they did the  
various Mujahideen parties in the ‘80s.

Inside the car. Photo Credit: Nir RosenBoth these commanders drove me  
down to Ghazni to the Andar District which is one of the hottest  
districts in terms of action these days. And there we entered various  
villages which were entirely under the control of the Taliban. In fact  
most of Ghazni Province is basically under their control even in,  
during the day they have checkpoints with the Taliban where they stop  
vehicles, take people out of them, kill them if they feel they have a  
good reason to, attack police and army checkpoints regularly.

  And we went on various patrols with the Taliban during the day. They  
go around with RPGs, rocket grenade launchers, machine guns, really  
not a care in the world as if there's no Americans in the country at  
all. They feel very confident. They adjudicate disputes between  
farmers, they hold trials and execute alleged spies, conduct  
operations against so-called collaborators with the occupation,  
whether they're police or army or government workers.

ROBERT ZELIGER: How did you arrange to . . .

NIR ROSEN: I was lucky. I have a friend who's, who I trust, who has a  
very good reputation throughout Afghanistan, due in part to his fight  
against the Soviets in the ‘80s. He explained to this one Taliban  
commander what I wanted to do. That guy requested permission from the  
Taliban Minister of Defense called Mullah Boradar. Mullah Boradar  
approved and that was it. We went down and they were going to show me  
around, take me on operations and give me about a 10 day view of their  
life.

ROBERT ZELIGER: And it didn't last long because you got into some  
trouble at one point right with, you were detained by a Taliban  
leader. Who was he and what did he want?

NIR ROSEN: It turned out that my commander that was sort of protecting  
me, taking me around had clashed with this rival commander called Dr.  
Khalil. My commander had killed 11 Pakistanis and two Arabs under the  
command of the other guy and because they had wanted to close down a  
girl's school which already is indicative of some pragmatism.

So there was a contest of authority as well between these two guys and  
as bad blood resulting from killing of the foreign fighters and upon  
hearing that there was a foreign journalist in the area, this  
commander was slightly more senior in the district, basically ordered  
me detained and put on trial for being a spy. It was never clear if he  
actually believed I was a spy or just wanted to hold onto me for the  
ransom.

But it took about 24 hours for my various contacts to be able to reach  
just about every Taliban commander they could think of and finally the  
Taliban Minister of Defense and only he was able to secure my release.  
The Taliban governor for the province actually tried and failed. So it  
was one look into the various rivalries that divide the movement. And  
what I also got to see was just some of the daily life, what these  
guys do when they come home. The commander I was with sat down and  
watched Indian soap opera.

ROBERT ZELIGER: And also Iranian, you said Iranian pop music.

Living quarters. Photo Credit: Nir RosenNIR ROSEN: Yeah. Iranian pop  
music both of which the Taliban would have severely punished in the  
‘90s certainly. This guy was a commander so he obviously knew that but  
he didn't seem to care at all. And there was very little separating  
him from your average Pashtun from the region. I think he could have  
almost just as likely joined the police or the army. In fact very  
little often separates tribes or villages who join the police or those  
who join the Taliban could be just an insult over a contract. It could  
result from the governor favoring one tribe over another, but I also  
found that these guys, many of them could, seemed like they could be  
brought into the system, into the process. They seemed willing to  
negotiate with the army and the police once the foreigners left, that  
was one of their requirements. When the foreigners leave they said  
they wouldn't have a reason to fight anymore.

ROBERT ZELIGER: What can you say about in terms of how much the  
Taliban has evolved since they were driven from power in 2001? I mean  
at one point you mentioned their attitude towards women seems to have  
changed a bit. Several commanders have told you that they thought  
women could have jobs and go to school. Now is that a major shift on  
their part?

NIR ROSEN: Acknowledging that women can work even be, even serve in  
the government and go to school is definitely a step forward. Because  
throughout Afghanistan the plight of women is just absolutely horrible  
and it's not like it's unique to the Taliban. They were also more, I  
would say the Taliban are becoming more of a Pashtun nationalist  
movement in the sense of Pashtun alienation. The Taliban are seizing  
upon that and in some way becoming less of purely Afghan or Islamist  
movement. And perhaps that's also a good thing in a sense that they're  
appealing to local grievances.

There is a danger, of course, that they're becoming more linked to, to  
global jihadist movements. They definitely resent foreigners which  
includes foreign fighters, it includes Pakistan, and the Arabs who  
join them, Pakistanis who join them. It was clear that the guys I was  
with disapproved of suicide bombings which are common tactic of the  
Taliban. And one of them actually complained that the Taliban are  
killing too many civilians. So these aren't exactly huge steps forward  
but they are a sign of an increased pragmatism.

So there are signs that perhaps could be taken advantage of. However,  
I doubt that the Americans have the elegance and the subtlety to be  
able to that. Moreover, I think the Taliban are so confident because  
they really are at this point becoming more and more victorious. They  
might see little reason to negotiate. Once you leave Kabul, you're  
entering Taliban territory. They're taking more and more land  
approaching Kabul in attacks in and around Kabul Province are more and  
more brazen. They've shut down the main roads leaving Kabul. And it  
really seems irreversible.

ROBERT ZELIGER: I know you've written a lot about insurgents in Iraq  
and also militants in Lebanon as well. Taliban you wrote about in this  
article seem to be very in certain instances disorganized and there's  
a lot of internal fighting. Are there similarities to these other  
groups that you've written about?

Taliban fighter. Photo Credit: Nir RosenNIR ROSEN: Certainly in Iraq I  
think we saw much more internal fighting and eventually of course that  
resulted in the Sunni militias expelling al Qaeda, but I think we see  
throughout the history of various insurgent movements and anti- 
colonist movements that they often kill more of their own than they do  
of the purported enemy. So I think that this is not unusual. In fact,  
we could expect that the more successful the Taliban become the more  
divisions we'll see. The more small groups will emerge and the less  
control Mullah Omar and Pakistan will actually have over the Taliban.

ROBERT ZELIGER: And finally just explain what happened in your case,  
how you actually were able to eventually get away or how you . . .

NIR ROSEN: Well it's a, I've been in trouble before but usually I can  
understand what's going on. I can speak Arabic. In this case it was a  
little more difficult and it was very remote. The Taliban also shut  
down the cell phone towers at night. So it was, there was no way for  
me to communicate with the two contacts I had in Kabul to try to help  
me. But they managed to make enough phone calls to Taliban leaders in  
Pakistan and Kandahar and United Arab Emirates really anybody they  
could think of to put pressure on this one commander to let me go. And  
indeed in the end it took the Taliban Minister of Defense to call him  
up and threaten him until he changed his attitude and became much more  
friendly.

In fact, he himself drove me to the border of the district. He showed  
me, "This is where my control ends, and the government control  
begins." Pointed to the nearby American base. Really felt very  
confident this is his territory and the Americans conduct divisional  
operations and air strikes, but didn't seem to affect them at all.

ROBERT ZELIGER: The article is called, "How We Lost the War We Won"  
and is in the current issue of Rolling Stone Magazine. Nir Rosen,  
thank you very much.

NIR ROSEN: Thank you.


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