[R-G] US, Saudi Arabia revive Taliban's comeback

Anthony Fenton fentona at shaw.ca
Tue Oct 7 17:10:43 MDT 2008


US, Saudi Arabia revive Taliban's comeback
M K Bhadrakumar
http://in.rediff.com/news/2008/oct/07guest.htm

October 07, 2008

CNN broke the story in a London [Images] datelined report on Monday  
quoting authoritative sources that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia  
hosted high-level talks in Mecca between the Afghan government and the  
Taliban [Images].

The reported intra-Afghan talks under the mediation of Saudi Arabia in  
Mecca on September 24-27 focuses attention to the hidden aspects of  
the "war on terror" in Afghanistan -- the geopolitics of the region.

Saudi mediation in the intra-Afghan talks will prove controversial,  
which is why protagonists have difficulty even acknowledging it. There  
is disquiet in Kabul that media reports may undercut the credibility  
of the political edifice housing Hamid Karzai [Images], which could  
prove lethal as Afghanistan lurches toward presidential election in  
2009.

According to the colourful former Taliban ambassador to Pakistan and a  
Guantanamo Bay detainee, Abdul Salam Zaeef, who actually sat in on the  
iftar in Mecca, it was a mere "guest celebration". But, then, Saudi  
Arabia is a leader of the Sunni Muslim world. It was one of the  
handful of countries to have recognised the Taliban regime.

King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia hosted the iftar which was attended by  
Taliban representatives, Afghan government officials and a  
representative of the powerful Mujahideen [Images] leader Gulbuddin  
Hekmatyar.

As CNN put it, quoting sources, the meal in Mecca took two years of  
"intense behind-the scenes negotiations" to come to fruition and the  
"US-and Europe-friendly Saudi Arabia's involvement has been propelled  
by a mounting death toll among coalition troops amid a worsening  
violence that has also claimed many civilian casualties".

There has been a spate of statements in recent days underscoring the  
futility of the war. Karzai himself has invited Taliban leader Mullah  
Omar to step forward as a presidential hopeful in the election next  
year. Britain's military commander in Afghanistan, Brigadier-General  
Mark Carleton-Smith told the Sunday Times newspaper that the war  
cannot be won. The British ambassador in Kabul, Sir Sherard Cowper- 
Coles, has been quoted as saying the war strategy was "doomed to  
fail". To say the least, the timing of these statements is significant.

Clearly, inter-Afghan peace talks have finally begun. Several factors  
have contributed. One, the seven-year war is in a stalemate and time  
favours the Taliban. Two, the US is increasingly focused on the  
bailout of its economy, which leaves little scope both in terms of  
time and resources for Washington to indulge in the extravaganza of  
open-ended wars in faraway badlands.

Three, the US is having a hard time persuading its allies to provide  
troops for the war effort and even faithful allies appear uneasy about  
the US's war strategy. Four, Karzai's popular support is fast  
declining. Five, the Taliban has gained habitation and name on the  
Afghan landscape.

Six, the regional climate -- growing instability in Pakistan, tensions  
in US-Russia relations, NATO's role, Iran's new assertiveness  
including possible future support of the Afghan resistance, etc -- is  
steadily worsening.

All in all, a need arises for the US to calibrate the geopolitical  
alignments and shore up its political and strategic assets created  
during 2001-2008.

Against such a complex backdrop, Washington turned to its old ally in  
the Hindu Kush -- Saudi Arabia. The US and Saudi Arabia go a long way  
in nurturing the al Qaeda and the Taliban in their infancy in the late  
1980s up to the mid-1990s.

Washington has no real choice. The Saudis undoubtedly know how to  
engage the Taliban. They can almost do what Pakistan, which had  
similar skills, was capable of doing until it began losing its grip  
and its self-confidence.

Of course, Washington is also unsure to what degree Islamabad [Images]  
can be trusted with the central role. While President Asif Zardari is  
a predictable figure, far too many imponderables remain in the post- 
Pervez Musharraf power structure.

Arguably, the Saudis too would have their own sub-plots in the Hindu  
Kush but, on balance, Washington has to pitch for a mediator whom the  
Taliban leadership and the Mujahideen leaders would respect. Also, the  
Saudis can easily bankroll a peace process.

Afghanistan has always been in the cockpit of great power rivalry. The  
backdrop of the US-Russia [Images] tensions is of great significance.  
Washington will be relieved if the Russia-NATO cooperation over  
Afghanistan altogether cases. There is simply no other way that NATO  
can cast Russia as an adversary. But Russia is not obliging.

The main challenge for NATO is that its dependence on Moscow [Images]  
for logistical support in the Afghan war cannot be terminated so long  
as there is uncertainty about the supply routes via Pakistan. Here the  
Saudis can be of help. Their involvement in the Afghan peace process  
will discourage the Taliban from seriously disrupting the Pakistani  
supply routes.

 From the US perspective, the immediate political advantage of the  
Saudi involvement will be two-fold: its impact on Pakistani public  
opinion and, secondly, in countering the expanding Iranian influence  
within Afghanistan.

The Saudi role would hopefully temper the stridency of 'anti- 
Americanism' in Pakistan, given their influence on the Islamic parties  
in Pakistan, especially the Jamaat-i-Islami.

Interestingly, CNN has quoted Saudi sources to the effect that  
"perceived Iranian expansionism is one of Saudi Arabia's biggest  
concerns" in Afghanistan, which motivates them to mediate a peace  
process involving the Taliban currently.

Indeed, one of the attractions underlying the US-Saudi sponsorship of  
the Taliban in the early and mid-1990s was the movement's manifestly  
anti-Shia stance and its infinite potential to be pitted against Iran  
on the geopolitical chessboard.

Given the ebb and flow of the US-Saudi-Pakistani role in promoting the  
Taliban in the 'nineties, Teheran and Moscow are bound to sit up and  
take note of the current trends.

Prima facie, Teheran or Moscow cannot take exception to the Saudi role  
as that will run against the grain of their relations with relations  
with Riyadh at the bilateral level. Teheran, in particular, will be  
careful not to play into the hands of the US to turn Afghanistan into  
yet another turf of Sunni-Shia (Iran-Saudi) antipathy like Lebanon or  
Iraq.

But Iran and Russia will be deeply concerned about the US's strategic  
designs. What will perturb the two countries most will be that the US  
strategy, as it is unfolding, is only to make the war "cost-effective"  
so that NATO's permanent presence in Afghanistan is not jeopardised.

Apart from the cost-effective methods that ensure the war doesn't tax  
the US financially, the new head of the US Central Command, General  
David Petraeus, also seeks to make the war more "efficient".

The strategy demands co-opting the Taliban and setting Pashtun  
mercenaries to fight the "war on terrorism" so that Western casualties  
are minimal and Western public opinion doesn't inflame.

Actually, the Saudi involvement is a gamble by the Bush  
administration. In immediate terms, the Taliban violence against the  
Western troops may seem to diminish, which would give an impression  
that Afghanistan is finally coming right for the US. But it will not  
remain so for long.

The Saudis with all their petrodollars cannot bridge the hopelessly  
ruptured Afghan divides. At the very least, much time is needed.  
Meanwhile, Saudi involvement will almost certainly be resented by  
several Afghan groups, which viscerally oppose the Taliban.

Things could come to a boil in 2009, which is an election year in  
Afghanistan. But, then, that is not the problem of the present US  
administration.

Political events are seldom what they seem. A peace process predicated  
on return of the Taliban to power in one form or another may suit well  
the US at this juncture. But it is bound to be seriously challenged by  
Iran, Russia and the Central Asian states.

The debris could only be in the nature of more bloodshed and a  
radicalisation of the Afghan scene. That cannot be conducive to  
regional stability.

M K Bhadrakumar is a former Indian ambassador



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