[R-G] Patrick Cockburn: The US can quit Iraq, or it can stay. But it can't do both

[Yoshie Furuhashi]

<http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/patrick-cockburn-the-us-can-quit-iraq-or-it-can-stay-but-it-cant-do-both-1009598.html>
Patrick Cockburn: The US can quit Iraq, or it can stay. But it can't do both
Iraqis have a clear idea who they believe funds their secret police
Tuesday, 11 November 2008

If it ever comes to court it should be one of the more interesting
libel cases of the decade. The Iraqi National Intelligence Service is
threatening to sue Ahmed Chalabi, the Iraqi politician, for asking who
pays for it.

"It is somewhat curious," says Mr Chalabi, "that the intelligence
service of a country which is sovereign – that no one really knows who
is funding it."

In fact there are very few Iraqis who do not believe they have a very
clear idea of who funds Iraq's secret police. Its director is General
Mohammed Abdullah Shahwani, who once led a failed coup against Saddam
Hussein, and was handpicked by the CIA to run the new security
organisation soon after the invasion of 2003. He is believed to have
been answering to them ever since.

The history of the Iraqi intelligence service is important because it
shows the real distribution of power in Iraq rather than the spurious
picture presented by President Bush. It explains why so many Iraqis
are suspicious of the security accord, or Status of Forces Agreement,
that the White House has been pushing the Iraqi prime minister Nouri
al-Malki to sign. It reveals the real political landscape where
President-elect Barack Obama will soon have to find his bearings.

For all Mr Bush's pious declarations about respecting Iraqi
sovereignty, General Shahwani is reported to work primarily for
American intelligence. The intelligence service is "not working for
the Iraqi government – it's working for the CIA," Hadi al-Ameri, a
powerful Shia lawmaker, was quoted as saying three years ago. "I
prefer to call it the American Intelligence of Iraq, not the Iraqi
Intelligence Service."

It seems that not much has changed since then. The intelligence
service does now appear in the Iraqi budget as being in receipt of
$150 million, though this seems somewhat measly given the extent of
its operations, which includes running paramilitary units. One of its
main missions is to spy on Iranians on behalf of the US, employing
much the same cadre of intelligence officers who carried out this task
for Saddam Hussein.

Fear of covert US control is one of the reasons why the Iraqi
government has been so intent on insisting that all US forces be out
of Iraq by the end of 2011. The latest draft of the security accord
has dropped mention of US troops staying behind for training, or
making the US withdrawal conditional on improved security in Iraq
being maintained.

The American position in Iraq has always been undermined by the fear
that, whatever they claimed to be doing in Iraq, their long-term
objective was to rule the country. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein,
one of the world's more disastrous leaders, was generally popular in
Iraq. But the occupation was disliked by the majority of Iraqis from
the beginning.

The result of this is that over the last five and a half years America
has always been politically weak in Iraq. Put simply, it has very few
friends among Iraqis outside Kurdistan. The Shia and Sunni communities
have, for their own ends, made tactical alliances with the occupier,
but never wanted a permanent presence. Once Iraqis and their
neighbours no longer fear that the US intends to rule Iraq directly or
indirectly through local nominees then America's position becomes much
stronger.

This should be good news for Barack Obama. He wants US combat troops
out in 16 months. The Iraqi government largely agrees. But if the
presidential election proved anything it was that neither candidate
knew much about what was happening Iraq.

John McCain claimed absurdly that the US was on the verge of victory,
and during his visits to the Green Zone his staffers annoyed US
embassy officials by requesting them not to wear helmets and body
armour when standing next the candidate. McCain's people feared this
might undermine in the eyes of American television viewers their
candidate's claim that US prospects in Iraq were rosier than had been
reported.

The key to the US conducting an orderly retreat from Iraq is that this
retreat should be real and the US should not try to control essential
Iraqi state institutions like the intelligence service. It is also
crucial that Obama seriously negotiate with the Iranians. So long as
the Iranian leadership thinks that Iraq might be the launching pad for
an attack on Iran it will never be in Iranian interests for Iraq to be
stabilised.

The same is true of Syria. A problem for Obama is that McCain's quite
false claim that America's position in Iraq has become stronger has
been largely accepted by the US media so any compromise with Iran can
be portrayed as a sell-out.