[R-G] M K Bhadrakumar on India's Alliance with the USA/Israel

[Yoshie Furuhashi]

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India seeks 'velvet divorce' from Iran
By M K Bhadrakumar

Amid the rubble of the Middle East policy of the George W Bush-Ehud
Olmert duo, there has been a true success story. The United States and
Israel have largely succeeded in snatching India from the "other" side
of the Middle Eastern geopolitical divide. This became evident more
than once in the past week.

On October 26, US forces based in Iraq attacked the Syrian border
village of Sukkaryiah. The attack triggered outrage regionally. Even
the Arab League, which has an ambivalent attitude toward Damascus,
felt compelled to condemn Washington. But Delhi looked away. Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad, who paid a five-day visit to India in June
- the first visit by a Syrian head of state in more than three decades
- must be bemused why Delhi didn't say at least what was so patently
obvious, namely, it is wrong to violate the territorial integrity of a
sovereign country.

Only in June had an Indian spokesman claimed that Assad's visit
"further consolidated the excellent relations that exist between India
and Syria and identified new areas of bilateral cooperation".

This dichotomy in India's diplomacy with regard to the Muslim Middle
East - excellent photo opportunities not quite translating as official
policy and ultimately degenerating as publicity exercises in the
competitive environment of Indian politics - was again on display
during the weekend visit to Tehran by Indian External Affairs Minister
Pranab Mukherjee, from October 31 to November 2.

Kashmir issue in focus

Mukherjee's visit was badly timed. Only a few weeks had passed since
Delhi hosted two visits by the Israeli and US army chiefs, Avi Mizrahi
and George Casey, to the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir in a clear
policy departure from past practice. The visits marked a quantum leap
in US-Israel-India security cooperation. It provoked some sharp
comments in the official Iranian media - about Delhi opening the door
to Israeli and US involvement in the "Kashmir problem" against the
backdrop of the Islamic militancy in the adjoining Pakistani tribal
areas and in Afghanistan.

Just four days before Mukherjee arrived in Tehran, the Tehran Times
newspaper, which is credited with reflecting Iranian thinking,
featured an article roundly condemning the Indian stance on the
Kashmir issue. Titled "The Black Day of Kashmir - 61 years of pain",
the article was ostensibly meant to coincide with the anniversary of
the Indian military intervention in Kashmir on October 27, 1947, which
it called "one of the darkest chapters in the history of South Asia".

The article amounted to an unvarnished endorsement of the Pakistani
point of view. It said, "India continues to defy the world by denying
Kashmiris their inalienable right to determine their destiny ... The
atmosphere of tension in India-Pakistan relations has engendered
instability and insecurity in South Asia. The urgency of the situation
and the need to resolve the dispute as soon as possible cannot be
over-emphasized ... The world's Muslims will always stand by the
Kashmiris until they succeed in their struggle to attain the right to
self-determination."

The lengthy article recalled Iran's "deep-rooted spiritual and
cultural bonds with the people of Kashmir" and went on to fondly
underscore that in Tehran, Kashmir is known as "Little Iran" -
Kashmir-Iran-e-saghir.

Such rhetoric on the eve of a foreign minister-level visit from India
hardly served the purpose of a "curtain-raiser", except to warn Delhi
in advance that it cannot be business as usual in Iran-India relations
and that the chill in bilateral ties and the dissipation of mutual
understanding must not be lightly taken as a mere hiccup.
Simply put, if Delhi's intention was to project a semblance of
normalcy in India's relations with Iran and to create a favorable
impact thereby on Muslim opinion in India, Tehran decided it would not
play ball.

Washington and Tel Aviv must be quietly chuckling. Up until some three
years ago, there was a constant refrain in India-Iran political
exchanges - that their relationship constituted a factor of peace and
stability in the region. But the mantra was completely lacking in the
pronouncements of the two sides during Mukherjee's visit. The two
countries are drifting apart.

Indian naval deployment

Mukherjee candidly admitted that "in this changing context, we need to
look at India-Iran relations afresh". Indeed, that "context" is
dramatically changing. A fortnight before the visit, Delhi deployed
for the first time ever a warship in the Persian Gulf region, which
will operate in close coordination with the Western navies under the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the region.

Mukherjee assertively said in Tehran, "India has a natural and abiding
stake in the safety and security of the sea lanes of communication
from the Malacca Strait to the Persian Gulf."

But Delhi didn't consult Tehran beforehand. Delhi instead approached
Oman for assistance in berthing facilities for its warship. Tehran,
meanwhile, views the Western naval deployments in the Persian Gulf
with alarm. Last week, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister Manuchehr
Mohammadi criticized the expansion of NATO to the east and called on
regional governments to "distance themselves from competitive and
hostile policies".

Tehran would have most certainly noted Delhi's decision to host a
large-scale naval exercise with the US along India's western coast in
late October in which the nuclear-powered American aircraft carrier
Ronald Reagan and US nuclear submarines and frigates participated.
Iran has since announced the opening of a new naval base in the
southern port of Jask in the eastern part of the Strait of Hormuz.
According to the chief of the Iranian navy, Admiral Habibollah Sayari,
"With this new naval base, a new line of defense was created in the
Persian Gulf. If necessary, we can prevent any enemy from entering the
Persian Gulf's strategic area."

Sayari announced that Iran proposed to build yet another naval base to
establish "an impenetrable line of defense at the entrance to the Sea
of Oman". He added, "If the enemy goes insane, we will drown them at
the bottom of the Indian Ocean and the Sea of Oman before they reach
the Strait of Hormuz and the entrance to the Persian Gulf." Curiously,
the Iranian announcement coincided with the consultations of Indian
National Security Advisor M K Narayanan in Oman regrading an Indian
proposal that the sultanate provide berthing facilities for the Indian
warship deployed in the region.

Though Mukherjee's visit to Tehran ended on Sunday, it has not yet
been revealed whether President Mahmud Ahmadinejad received him. A
call on the Iranian president - and, perhaps Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei - was customary for visiting Indian foreign ministers in the
halcyon days of the India-Iran strategic partnership. In another sign
of the change in the Iranian mood, Tehran "downgraded" the Joint
Economic Commission with India. Mottaki is no longer its co-chairman,
as is the practice with Iran's other major interlocutors and partner
countries.

Thus, a series of icebergs has been lately slicing through the hull of
the Titanic that used to be the grand old India-Iran "strategic
partnership". A disaster was waiting to happen ever since India voted
against Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency three years ago
following US President George W Bush's entreaties with Indian Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh.

Pipedream of energy cooperation

At the root of it lies unprecedented US-Israeli interference in
India's Iran policy. Such interference is nothing new since the early
1990s, when Delhi established diplomatic relations with Israel. Delhi
skillfully navigated the relationship with Iran, despite the robust
growth of ties with Israel on a parallel track.

However, things began changing three to four years ago as Indian
foreign policy in the region began getting more "security-centric" and
Israel was elevated as a pivotal relationship. Today, in the
Iranian perception, Delhi's avowal that it is capable of buttressing
the India-Iran relationship from the predatorial skill of US and
Israeli diplomacy lacks credibility.

Tehran used to respect India's perceived political will to retain its
autonomy of action and thinking on regional issues. That confidence
seems to have evaporated. Mottaki forcefully pleaded with Mukherjee
that the two countries should focus on a relationship that served
their "real interests" rather than fall into the "conspiracies of
foreign powers" which hatch "mischief aimed at sowing discord" in
Iran-India relations.

The litmus test is the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project. It is
obvious that Delhi is dragging its feet on the project, despite its
great potential to boost India's energy security - all because of US
and Israeli pressure. Tehran finds itself in a dilemma. No doubt it is
keen to partner with India in the project, but Tehran realizes that
political will is lacking in Delhi.

At the same time, Tehran cannot cut out India altogether as it
estimates it is only logical that some day soon, under a different
leadership in Delhi, India will revert to this project in its
compelling self-interest. The Iranian frustration showed when Oil
Minister Gholamhossein Nozari told the media soon after Mukherjee
concluded his visit, "Considering that we have lost many opportunities
in the 'peace pipeline' project due to India's procrastination, we
have told that country to engage more actively."

The US$7.5 billion, 2,700-kilometer pipeline has been in discussion
for almost two decades. The pipeline is to begin from Iran's
Assalouyeh energy zone in the south and stretch over 1,100 kilometers
through Iran. In Pakistan it is to pass through Balochistan and Sindh
before linking up Rajasthan and Gujarat in western India.

Strategy toward Afghanistan

Again, the geopolitics of the region dictate that Delhi and Tehran
explore the frontiers of a common strategy towards Afghanistan at a
time when the Taliban's resurgence is apparent and its induction by
the US into a coalition government in Kabul in the not-too-distant
future appears highly probable. Mukherjee could have conceivably
utilized the visit for such purpose.

The Iranian side indeed appeared keen for purposeful dialogue on
Afghanistan. But Delhi isn't willing. The priority in the Indian
mindset is to harmonize its regional policies with the US (and Israel)
as regards the "war on terror". That includes Delhi's Afghan policy.

The powerful chairman of Iran's Expediency Council and former
president, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, told Mukherjee, "Resolving the
current crisis in Afghanistan requires extensive cooperation between
Iran, India and Pakistan. This cooperation can bring tranquility to
the region ... The experience of the Soviet Union in this country
[Afghanistan] shows that the path the West is now treading in
Afghanistan will not yield the desired results. The signs that are
currently observed in Afghanistan show that the West is not capable of
resolving the problems of this country."

Mukherjee responded, "No country outside the region can find a
solution to the problems of regional countries and the regional states
themselves should resolve the problems through cooperation with each
other." He added that India, Iran and Pakistan could play "important
roles in regional events" and their cooperation would "help establish
peace and stability" in the region.

The Indian timidity is despite the fact that India and Iran were
staunch allies supporting the anti-Taliban alliance until the US
invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Delhi would be aware that Tehran has
sharply reacted to the current US, British, Saudi and Pakistani
efforts to accommodate the Taliban. Actually, the Indian and Iranian
positions have striking similarity insofar as neither thinks there is
anything conceivable as "good Taliban". Yet, Delhi shies from
coordinating with Tehran lest it tread on US-Israeli sensitivities.

The Obama factor

So far so good. But what happens if a Barack Obama presidency moves
toward normalization of relations with Iran? Indeed, Russia and China
seem to be getting ready for such an eventuality. Iran's admission
into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a full member has
now become a certainty, with both the Russian and Chinese prime
ministers affirming their support of the Iranian candidacy. Iran has
been offered membership of the Black Sea Union. Russia is forming a
gas cartel with Iran. (The SCO comprises China, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.)

Above all, Delhi will face a new situation if Obama revisits the "war
on terror". As well-known Lebanese commentator Rami Khouri
thoughtfully wrote, "US-backed governments in half a dozen countries
are losing their battles and political confrontations with
Islamist-led indigenous oppositions, and have to form national unity
governments or explore other means of power ... The American-Afghan
tentative move to engage the Taliban politically is ... a welcome sign
that Washington is finally learning the value of seeing and resolving
conflicts in their wider local and regional context. We may well see
something similar happen in Iraq, including
American-Iranian-Saudi-Syrian contacts in the near future."

During his visit to Tehran, Mukherjee characterized the Persian Gulf
as India's "proximate neighborhood", but there is no evidence Delhi
has thought through its Middle East policy against the backdrop of
impending shifts and realignments in the geopolitics of the region.
Creative diplomacy lies in keeping all options open at a time of
extreme volatility in regional politics.

On the other hand, it is a measure of the success of the US-Israeli
diplomacy in recent years that Delhi increasingly finds itself at odds
with Tehran's growing ambitions as a regional power, whereas
sufficient elbow room is available for them to co-exist. There is no
real clash of interests between India and Iran. So, ultimately, who is
to blame - Washington, Tel Aviv or New Delhi?

As far as Tehran is concerned, it is countering the US's containment
strategy and India's political support is no more an imperative need
in the denouement of the Iran nuclear file. Moreover, as Iran's
engagement by the West advances, Tehran will have no dearth of
partners for energy cooperation. Least of all, the Gulf Cooperation
Council states themselves are seeking accommodation with Iran and,
arguably, they won't need India as a "balancer". The net result is
that any weakening of India's strong ties with Iran at the present
juncture can only debilitate Delhi's overall foreign policy in the
Persian Gulf region in the critical period that lies ahead.

Delhi may ruffle feathers not only in Tehran but in regional capitals
too - apart from Islamabad - if it presses ahead with the claim to be
the pre-eminent power between the Persian Gulf and the Malacca Strait.

The Persian Gulf is a tough neighborhood and any grandstanding will
not pass unnoticed. With only a fortnight to go for Manmohan to pay
his first-ever visit to Saudi Arabia, Riyadh abruptly sought a
postponement. If there is any political symbolism behind the Saudi
move, it will surely emerge.


Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign
Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri
Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.