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role in regional security looks more credible today than at any time
in the post-Soviet era. As influential Moscow commentator Vyacheslav
Nikonov, president of the Politika Foundation, wrote in Izvestia
newspaper recently, "The strengthening of ties with Russia today
appears much more logical and natural than it did in the 1990s when,
on the contrary, the Western economies were growing, while ours was
steadily declining. The growing energy crisis also works in favor of
integration."

Russia as a status quo power also holds attraction for local
governments in Central Asia. Most important, there is profound
disquiet in Central Asian capitals regarding the Afghan crisis - the
US strategy in Afghanistan and NATO's grit to win the war.

Until last year, Russia and the Central Asian states counted on the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) playing a role in stabilizing
the Afghan situation. But then they began sensing that China was
following a complex policy within the SCO by exploiting it to develop
its bilateral links with Central Asian countries and for penetrating
deep into the energy sector, but all the while applying the brakes on
Russian attempts to augment the grouping's profile as a security
organization. (The SCO comprises China, Russia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.)

China has virtually put its foot down on a Russian proposal regarding
close CSTO-SCO ties. China disfavors SCO-CSTO military exercises. In
sum, Beijing seems anxious not to create misgivings in Washington.
(The CSTO consists of of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.)

This is not to say that China is indifferent to the stability of
Afghanistan. Far from it. China's preference is to keep its options
open rather than be tied down by the SCO or overtly identifying with
Russian interests. After all, China has huge stakes in Afghanistan.
Beijing perceives advantages in directly cooperating with the US (and
NATO) rather than from within the SCO. Conceivably, Beijing might not
be altogether averse to the idea of sending peacekeeping troops to
Afghanistan at a later stage, provided a suitable United Nations
mission could be structured.

That is to say, an important phase of the SCO's evolution as a
security organization lies ahead when Russia assumes its chairmanship
in 2008-2009, following the SCO summit meeting scheduled to be held at
Dushanbe (Tajikistan) in August. From all appearances, there has been
some serious rethink in Moscow as well during recent months regarding
the SCO's potential to play an influential role in Afghanistan, given
China's manifestly lukewarm attitude. The Russian thinking also seems
to have veered around to abandoning hopes of working within the
framework of CSTO or SCO but instead to concentrate on a bilateral
Russian-Afghan track.

Afghanistan also does not want to cooperate with either the CSTO or
the SCO. During his visit to Moscow on May 25-26, Afghan Foreign
Minister Dadfar Spanta made it clear that Afghanistan would not be
seeking observer status with the SCO. He let it be known in no
uncertain terms that Russia is a low priority for Kabul in its foreign
policy - as compared to, say, China. All in all, therefore, Moscow
would realize that a long journey lies ahead in cultivating influence
in Kabul, which it must undertake all by itself.
Moscow appreciates that the present regime in Kabul of President Hamid
Karzai is unabashedly pro-American and is a participant in the US's
regional strategy that passes as "Great Central Asia Partnership for
Afghanistan and Neighboring Countries", which actually aims at
undercutting Russian influence in Central Asia.

Thus, the weekend's announcement in Moscow far from heralds a joint
US-Russian effort to stabilize the Afghan situation. In fact, there is
hardly any scope for a common US-Russian regional agenda. As Nikonov
put it, "We [Russia] and the Western countries have diametrically
opposite definitions of success in our policy toward the CIS
[Commonwealth of Independent States] countries. For Russia, success
lies in strengthening of integration ties, rapprochement with its
neighbors and a strengthening of cooperation. For the West, on the
contrary, success means a distancing of these countries from Russia, a
reorientation to external centers of power aimed at preventing 'a
rebirth of the Russian empire'. When political goals are so
diametrically opposed, it is impossible to speak of a common agenda."

M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign
Service for over 29 years, with postings including India's ambassador
to Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and to Turkey (1998-2001).