[R-G] French shifting strategic policy
Anthony Fenton
fentona at shaw.ca
Tue Jun 17 11:53:12 MDT 2008
French shifting strategic policy
By Steven Erlanger and Katrin Bennhold
Monday, June 16, 2008
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/06/16/europe/paris.php
PARIS: In its first new national strategic policy in 14 years, France
has decided that its security is best guaranteed within Europe and the
NATO alliance, marking a significant shift away from French
exceptionalism.
The new military and security strategy, which President Nicolas
Sarkozy will present in public Tuesday after months of internal
debate, calls for a smaller, more mobile army, with savings spent on
better intelligence and modern equipment.
Building a credible European defense is a French priority, the
strategy says. But French plans were damaged by the Irish rejection of
a new set of rules for the 27-nation European Union that would have
made it easier for members to cooperate on defense.
In fact, publication of the French white paper was delayed until after
the Irish referendum last week on the so-called Lisbon Treaty, to
avoid providing the neutral Irish with another reason to vote no.
The new defense doctrine seeks to prepare France and Europe for a post-
Soviet world in which conventional military threats are downgraded
compared to a multitude of complex, globalized risks, ranging from
epidemics to terrorism and cyberwar.
Jobs in defense will be cut, with estimates of 54,000 over the next
six to seven years out of a current total of some 330,000. Most of the
reductions will come from the standing army and its noncombatant
support services, with the intention of reversing the current 60-40
ratio of support to combat personnel.
The cuts are politically sensitive, given local and political
interests, but a reduction in personnel is the only way to provide
more financial room for maneuver for acquisitions and training
intended to create a more modern army, where threats are more likely
to come from terrorism, cyberwarfare or missile attack than from a
traditional invasion.
The plan foresees raising the budget for military acquisition, for
example, by more than 16 percent, without immediately raising defense
spending, and spending twice as much on space, with the intention of
creating a space-based early warning system against missile attack. A
decision to build another aircraft carrier will be postponed and
spending on intelligence, which is to be reorganized under a single
chief, is expected to double.
France's defense budget is about $57.3 billion a year. The plan
foresees an increase of one percent over the rate of inflation
beginning in 2012. France currently spends about 2.3 percent of its
gross domestic product on defense; that will drop to 2 percent over
the next 12 years.
The plan also sets a new requirement of at least 30,000 French
soldiers able to be deployed in combat within six months, with 5,000
soldiers on permanent operational alert, part of the larger goal of
helping to make a European defense capability both credible and
functional. Europe's goal, far from being realized, is to have 60,000
soldiers able to be deployed.
Addressing force reductions, Defense Minister Hervé Morin wrote in the
newspaper Le Monde on Monday: "To get going, to adapt, that's the
price to pay; it's the price to pay for the defense personnel who have
the feeling of having already given a lot compared to other
administrations. But it's the price to pay to stay credible."
If France and Europe are capable of acting on their own, a senior
French official said, the United States will take them more seriously.
A copy of the plan was provided in a briefing by senior French
officials who would not allow their names to be used before Sarkozy's
speech.
The officials emphasized that France's operational needs had changed
since the last such white paper, in 1994, and that France would
concentrate less on bilateral military actions in Africa, for
instance, than in joint operations with the European Union, NATO or
regional groups like the Organization of African Unity.
Asked if this finally meant the end of French colonialism, one
official said: "It's the end of decolonization."
Sarkozy created political waves here when he announced that France
would reintegrate into the military wing of NATO, so long as there was
"parallel progress" in developing a European defense and security
policy that could carry out European Union missions outside the
American-led NATO alliance.
It was a rejection not only of an older Gaullism but also of the
generally anti-interventionist and anti-Bush policies of the
opposition Socialist Party.
In 1966, angry with American and British domination of NATO, President
Charles de Gaulle said that the world situation "stripped of
justification" French military integration in NATO and he ordered all
foreign forces out of France. Today, with the Soviet Union gone and
the European Union more fully established, Sarkozy has decided that
France is best served by participating fully with Washington and NATO,
in part because the vast majority of members of the European Union are
also members of NATO.
"Today there's no longer a raison d'être" to remain outside NATO, an
official said. "It's not just about integrating France into NATO, but
NATO into Europe."
The alliance had changed considerably with new members in the last
decade, the official said, and new peace-keeping missions in places
like Afghanistan and Kosovo.
"We see the trans-Atlantic relationship as a key to European security
and French security," he said, emphasizing that the EU and NATO are
now seen as "complementary," not as rivals.
Still, officials made it clear that France would preserve its
independent nuclear deterrent outside any alliance structure and that
France would not allow its troops to serve permanently under any
foreign officer, even in peacetime.
The Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty will create significant
difficulties for France, which takes over the revolving presidency of
the EU on July 1 and wants to reintegrate into NATO next year. In the
Lisbon Treaty itself is a tool known as "permanent structured
cooperation," which would lay down binding commitments for EU members
willing to contribute to Europe's defense.
"It's delicate to go full speed to implement it now since we don't
know if the Lisbon Treaty will ever exist," said Justin Vaisse, a
former adviser to the French Foreign Ministry and a senior fellow at
the Brookings Institution in Washington. The prospect that the Irish
may be asked to vote again on the treaty means that France's whole
presidency "is somehow under the spell of a possible new vote," he said.
The New York Times
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