[R-G] Turkey's AKP Faces Closure

[Yoshie Furuhashi]

Noah Feldman wrote in February that "In Turkey, starting with the
head-scarf amendment -- a case study of religious freedom against
coercive secularism -- is perfectly fine," but it was a mistake on the
part of the AKP to think that the party could win more freedom for its
Muslim base to practice their religion without insisting, at the same
time, on other rights and freedoms of liberal democracy (such as
workers' freedom of assembly) -- all the while pushing for more
economic freedom for the bourgeoisie.  But the closure will also be a
setback for the rest of Turkey, as it once again narrows the scope of
democracy by making the largest political party disappear judicially.
-- Yoshie

<http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2373137>
TURKEY'S AKP FINALLY BEGINS TO PREPARE FOR THE INEVITABLE
By Gareth Jenkins
Tuesday, June 10, 2008

Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has finally begun
to prepare for what now appears to be its almost inevitable closure by
the country's Constitutional Court, according to reports in the
Turkish media.

On March 14 Public Prosecutor Abdurrahman Yalcinkaya applied to the
Constitutional Court for the closure of the AKP on the grounds that it
had become a focus for activities designed to undermine the principle
of secularism, which is enshrined in the country's constitution as one
of the unchangeable defining characteristics of the Turkish Republic
(see EDM, March 17). The alleged anti-secular activities listed in
Yalcinkaya's indictment included two constitutional amendments passed
by the AKP on February 9 to try to create the legal framework for
lifting the headscarf ban in Turkish universities. On June 5 the
Constitutional Court annulled the amendments on the grounds that they
were a violation of secularism (see EDM, June 6). As a result, it is
now difficult to see how the court can do anything but rule in
Yalcinkaya's favor when it issues a decision on his application for
the AKP's closure later this year.

When Yalcinkaya first issued his indictment, AKP officials, led by
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, refused to contemplate
preparations for the formation of a new party, arguing that it would
be a public admission of defeat. To Erdogan, who prides himself on his
political machismo, such an attitude probably appeared to make sense.
The AKP failed, however, to develop a coherent strategy to counter the
closure case or simply to ignore it and concentrate on the country's
many problems, not least the growing signs of an economic slowdown.
The AKP thus became reactive rather than pro-active, focusing
primarily on protesting its innocence, thereby effectively handing the
initiative to the Constitutional Court.

Frustration among AKP members over the party's inertia in the face of
its apparently impending closure has been exacerbated by Erdogan's
management style. Like most Turkish political parties, the AKP is
poorly institutionalized and almost all power inside the party is
concentrated in the hands of the leader, who not only approves all the
party's candidates for parliamentary elections but effectively also
chooses the delegates to the party congresses, which elect the party
leader. Decisions in the AKP are made by Erdogan himself in
consultation with a coterie of trusted advisors in a process that is
usually as opaque to the majority of AKP members of parliament as it
is to the rest of the country.

The lack of communication between Erdogan and the rest of the party
was clearly demonstrated in the wake of the Constitutional Court's
ruling of June 5. On June 7 Koksal Toptan, the AKP speaker of
parliament, announced that one solution to the current standoff
between the AKP and the judiciary would be a completely new
constitution and a second chamber, or Senate, in addition to the
current unicameral parliament (Radikal, Hurriyet, Yeni Safak,
Milliyet, Cumhuriyet, June 8). The announcement took the members of
the AKP by surprise, forcing senior officials to note that Toptan was
just expressing a personal opinion.

On June 9 Ahmet Iyimaya, an AKP member of parliament for Ankara and
chair of the Parliamentary Justice Committee, held a press conference
to propose giving parliament the authority to veto any decision by the
Constitutional Court (Hurriyet, Radikal, Zaman, Vatan, June 10). Once
again, the announcement took the rest of the AKP by surprise.
Government Spokesperson Cemil Cicek subsequently issued a statement
distancing the AKP from what he described as Iyimaya's personal
opinion and reassuring the public that the government had no such
plans (Hurriyet, Radikal, Zaman, Vatan, June 10).

On June 10, writing in the liberal daily Radikal, Murat Yetkin, who is
one of the most reliable journalists in Turkey, quoted unnamed AKP
officials as admitting that they had now begun making plans for the
creation of a new political party to replace the AKP if, as expected,
it is eventually closed. They said that they had yet to decide on a
name for the new party but had already begun to draw up a list of
possible candidates to oversee its regional organization (Radikal,
June 10).

There was no indication, however, as to whether there had been any
discussions about the possible composition of the new party's
leadership. Yalcinkaya's indictment calls for 71 current and former
members of the AKP, including Erdogan, to be banned from membership in
any political party for five years. As the result of a loophole in
Turkish law, Erdogan would still be able to run for parliament as an
independent and, if asked to form a government by President Abdullah
Gul, could even once again become prime minister. But if he is banned
from being a member of any political party, Erdogan would not able to
lead the successor party to the AKP.

There are several precedents in Turkey for prominent politicians
attempting to control parties of which they were not members through a
proxy, normally a close associate whom they ensured would be elected
to head the party. But such parties have never been as successful as
when the politicians in question have been the de jure as well as the
de facto leaders. The confusion in the AKP since the case for its
closure was filed has already demonstrated one of the drawbacks of
Erdogan's authoritarian management style. If the successor party to
the AKP ever comes under pressure, maintaining internal cohesion is
likely to be even more of a challenge if Erdogan is attempting to run
the party apparatus from outside through a proxy.

<http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/30893/erdogans_akp_leads_all_in_turkey>
Angus Reid Global Monitor : Polls & Research
Erdogan's AKP Leads All in Turkey
June 09, 2008

Abstract: (Angus Reid Global Monitor) - Turkey's Justice and
Development Party (AKP) remains the dominant political force in the
country, according to a poll by A&G Research. 39.7 per cent of
respondents would vote for the governing party in the next legislative
election.

(Angus Reid Global Monitor) - Turkey's Justice and Development Party
(AKP) remains the dominant political force in the country, according
to a poll by A&G Research. 39.7 per cent of respondents would vote for
the governing party in the next legislative election.

The Republican People's Party (CHP) is second with 19.4 per cent,
followed by the National Action Party (MHP) with 17.1 per cent.

Turkish voters renewed the Great National Assembly in July 2007. Final
results gave the AKP 46.6 per cent of the vote and 341 seats in the
legislature. Parties require at least 10 per cent of the vote to earn
seats under the country's proportional representation system. Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, a member of the AKP, has served as prime minister
since March 2003.

In March, Abdurrahman Yalcinkaya, Turkey's chief prosecutor of the
Court of Appeals, filed a lawsuit in the country's Constitution Court
demanding the closure of the AKP for allegedly jeopardizing Turkey's
secularist nature by trying to implement Islamic rule. The case was
brought to the Court after lawmakers approved a constitutional
amendment to lift a ban on university students wearing the Muslim
headscarf, viewed by secularists as a symbol of political Islam.

Erdogan has denied the accusations, saying that his party—which does
have Islamist roots—is not trying to instate Islamic rule in the
country. The AKP submitted its defence to the court on Apr. 30.

On Jun. 5, the Constitutional Court ruled against the government's
proposed constitutional amendment to allow the use of the Muslim
headscarf in universities. AKP legislators had tried to allow the
garments as a matter of personal and religious freedom, but the court
considered this to be against the country's secularist mandate.

Senior AKP lawmaker Bekir Bozdag declared: "The Constitutional Court
has overstepped its power and interfered in democracy. However, this
verdict is binding and will be obeyed."

Polling Data

What party would you support in the next parliamentary election?

Justice and Development Party (AKP)
39.7%

Republican People's Party (CHP)
19.4%

National Action Party (MHP)
17.1%

Source: A&G Research
Methodology: Interviews with 2,386 Turk adults in 33 provinces,
conducted on May 24 and May 25, 2008. No margin of error was provided.

Cf.
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_general_election%2C_2007>

<http://bosphoruswatch.blogspot.com/2008/06/turkey-political-poll.html>
8.6.08
Turkey Political Poll

A political poll commissioned by the Swiss bank Credit Suisse depicts
a discernible level of fallout from the tumult, which has surrounded
Turkey's governing AK Party. According to the poll conducted by A&G
Research, support for the AKP has fallen to 39.7% from a mid-summer
2007 election result of 47%.

If there is indeed truth to the findings of this poll, their most
significant message is not that the AKP is losing support among the
Turkish public, but rather which political group is benefiting from
this slide. Turkey's right-wing nationalist MHP has apparently
improved its standing by three percentage points to 17.1%. Also of
note, Turkey's mainstream secular party, the CHP, continues to lose
ground.

As this Bosphorus Watch post from several months ago demonstrates,
there is little surprise that Turkey is experiencing a shift toward
the right and nationalism. In addition to the link between an economic
downturn and nationalism, it is equally significant that the CHP has
been unable fill the small void left by the AKP. The secularist
party's failure to generate traction among Turkish voters is most
likely due to its particularly stale vision. There is little about the
CHP that is fresh or that represents a radical departure other than
its steady dose of reactionary squabbling with the AKP. In this
respect, the sacking the CHP's long-time leader, Deniz Baykal, would
be a good first step toward creating momentum for the secularist
cause.

<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=107053>
Economic growth to hit speed bump
Thursday, June 12, 2008

<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/turkey/9163597.asp?gid=231&sz=62582>
Turkish PM's Alevi advisor resigns

Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan's advisor and AKP MP Reha
Camuroglu, who was also the architect of the AKP's policy towards
Turkey's Alevi community, resigned from his post. Camuroglu, himself
an Alevi, said the AKP did not keep the promises it made to Alevis.

Turkish PM's Alevi advisor resigns

The AKP started an a new policy towards Alevis in Turkey after July 22
elections, stepping in to meet the expectations of the Alevi
community.

Alevis are the second largest religious community in Turkey, although
there is no official statistics available. The Alevis' interpretation
of Islam differs from Sunnis, such as they pray in assembly houses
(cemevi), not in mosques.

Alevis demand equal treatment with Sunnism and to be recognized as a
unique faith allowing free religious expression.

Erdogan, who gave place to some Alevi MPs in his party in the
elections, wanted Camuroglu to prepare a democratization package
including the rights of Alevi community.

Within the party's new policy toward the Alevis, the AKP decided to
take some tangible steps, including to form an institution attached to
the Prime Ministry, to represent Alevism, and to open more places of
worship.

However the AKP has shelved its initiatives regarding the issue, not
implementing its decisions.

"Mr. President, we wanted the discrimination against Alevis to end.
Did it? Can I ask; how many Alevis have high level positions in the
bureaucracy or are among the governors? Is there just one Alevi
governor? Is that enough? What about the police commissioners? And
during the AKP's six-year rule; how many Alevi investors have won
tenders? Maybe there are none," Camuroglu wrote the resignation letter
submitted to Erdogan.

Photo: Hasan Tufekci

<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/08/opinion/08feldman.html>
February 8, 2008
Op-Ed Contributor
Veiled Democracy?
By NOAH FELDMAN

Cambridge, Mass.

THE West doesn't know quite what to think of Turkey's Islamic-oriented
ruling party: does it envision a liberal, European future for Turkey
or an Islamist one? A vote this week on the seemingly minor issue of
whether head scarves should be allowed at universities will help us
begin to answer that question.

The ban on women covering their heads on campus has long been a thorn
in the side of the Justice and Development Party. The rule has the
perverse effect of keeping devoutly religious women out of higher
education. A few years ago, while on a trip to lecture about Islam, I
met a daughter of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan — not in
Istanbul, but at Indiana University, which she was attending at least
in part so she could cover her head while getting an education.

The ban — a relic of the aggressive secularism enforced by modern
Turkey's founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk — can be repealed only by a
constitutional amendment. Such an amendment was just one of dozens of
changes that the Justice and Development Party was expected to propose
a few weeks ago as part of a comprehensive overhaul of Turkey's
state-centered, ethnically narrow Constitution.

The description of the package of draft amendments that was leaked to
the press would put Turkey on a decidedly liberal constitutional
course. Reports said that it would vest sovereignty in the people, not
the state, and acknowledge that the category "Turkish" in reality
encompasses people of all ethnicities — implicitly including Kurds,
whose separate identity has long been suppressed. The new Constitution
would give parents increased control over their children's education,
allowing them to opt out of state-mandated religious instruction. In
this context, lifting the head-scarf ban could be seen as just another
step toward the religious liberty that liberal, Western states claim
to prize.

But before the amendment package could be formally introduced, a
minority secularist party, the Nationalist Movement Party, introduced
an amendment limited to ending the head-scarf ban. Support from that
party essentially guarantees passage for any initiative the government
favors — and, indeed, it passed a preliminary vote on Thursday and is
likely to get final approval tomorrow. Apparently, Prime Minister
Erdogan felt he could not turn down the opportunity to get the head
scarf ban revoked.

Unfortunately, the passage of the head-scarf amendment casts doubt on
whether the rest of the constitutional package will be introduced at
all. Some hard-liners within the ruling party seem to be questioning
whether it is worth the fight over liberal constitutional ideals if
the gains to religion like lifting the head scarf ban can be achieved
other ways. They have a point: the party must always be careful about
provoking the military, which sees itself not only as the protector of
secularism but of traditional Turkish nationalism, and is wary of any
major liberalizing changes.

The issue raises a big question about Mr. Erdogan: is he dedicated to
his party's plans for comprehensive constitutional reform, or is he
simply serving the interests of religion? The latter would be a grave
error — if Turkey is to continue its integration into European and
Western civilization, it needs to show that liberal values and Islam
are not only compatible but complementary. The audience for this
message includes Europe, which for historical reasons is skeptical —
perhaps too skeptical — about bringing a non-Christian nation into the
orbit of the European Union.

Yet there is a more important audience: the Muslim world at large. The
rising global Islamist movement is embroiled in its own epochal debate
about whether an authentically Islamic government can and must respect
individual freedoms and the equality of all citizens. The best
possible refutation of the claim that Islam and democracy are
incompatible would be to point to an existing government where liberal
and Islamic values work together.

In Turkey, starting with the head-scarf amendment — a case study of
religious freedom against coercive secularism — is perfectly fine.
Liberalism, after all, has its roots in the desire to protect
Christian religious liberty. But the historical staying power of
liberal democracy has come from expanding citizenship and extending
constitutional protections to minority groups and others vulnerable to
government coercion. Turkey has the chance to blaze that trail in the
Muslim world — it's up to Mr. Erdogan to keep moving ahead.

Noah Feldman, a contributing writer for The Times Magazine, is a
professor at Harvard Law School and a fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations.

<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JF10Ak03.html>
Alarm spreads over Turkey's troubles
By M K Bhadrakumar
-- 
Yoshie
<http://montages.blogspot.com/>