[R-G] U.S. Considers New Covert Push Within Pakistan

[Yoshie Furuhashi]

No wonder that the New York Times no longer wants to say much about
human rights violations in Iran and would rather talk about the
elegance of Islamically correct fashion there (Nazila Fathi,
"Designer's Rainbow Brightens Iranian Women's Look," 2 January 2008,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/02/world/middleeast/02designer.html?>)
instead.  The political unconscious of Democratic Iowa caucus voters,
especially of Independent PMC ones, is in tune with the changing focus
of the empire: Obama, alone among all presidential candidates,
emphasized early on the readiness to move more aggressively into
Pakistan (a nuclear armed state whose population is more than twice
that of Iran), as Doug Ireland reminds us ("Obama casse la baraque,"
Bakchich, 4 January 2008,
<http://www.bakchich.info/article2274.html>).  This, too, will blow
back against the empire.  -- Yoshie

<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/06/washington/06terror.html>
January 6, 2008
U.S. Considers New Covert Push Within Pakistan
By STEVEN LEE MYERS, DAVID E. SANGER and ERIC SCHMITT

This article is by Steven Lee Myers, David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt.

WASHINGTON — President Bush's senior national security advisers are
debating whether to expand the authority of the Central Intelligence
Agency and the military to conduct far more aggressive covert
operations in the tribal areas of Pakistan.

The debate is a response to intelligence reports that Al Qaeda and the
Taliban are intensifying efforts there to destabilize the Pakistani
government, several senior administration officials said.

Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and a
number of President Bush's top national security advisers met Friday
at the White House to discuss the proposal, which is part of a broad
reassessment of American strategy after the assassination 10 days ago
of the Pakistani opposition leader Benazir Bhutto. There was also talk
of how to handle the period from now to the Feb. 18 elections, and the
aftermath of those elections.

Several of the participants in the meeting argued that the threat to
the government of President Pervez Musharraf was now so grave that
both Mr. Musharraf and Pakistan's new military leadership were likely
to give the United States more latitude, officials said. But no
decisions were made, said the officials, who declined to speak for
attribution because of the highly delicate nature of the discussions.

Many of the specific options under discussion are unclear and highly
classified. Officials said that the options would probably involve the
C.I.A. working with the military's Special Operations forces.

The Bush administration has not formally presented any new proposals
to Mr. Musharraf, who gave up his military role last month, or to his
successor as the army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, who the White
House thinks will be more sympathetic to the American position than
Mr. Musharraf. Early in his career, General Kayani was an aide to Ms.
Bhutto while she was prime minister and later led the Pakistani
intelligence service.

But at the White House and the Pentagon, officials see an opportunity
in the changing power structure for the Americans to advocate for the
expanded authority in Pakistan, a nuclear-armed country. "After years
of focusing on Afghanistan, we think the extremists now see a chance
for the big prize — creating chaos in Pakistan itself," one senior
official said.

The new options for expanded covert operations include loosening
restrictions on the C.I.A. to strike selected targets in Pakistan, in
some cases using intelligence provided by Pakistani sources, officials
said. Most counterterrorism operations in Pakistan have been conducted
by the C.I.A.; in Afghanistan, where military operations are under
way, including some with NATO forces, the military can take the lead.

The legal status would not change if the administration decided to act
more aggressively. However, if the C.I.A. were given broader
authority, it could call for help from the military or deputize some
forces of the Special Operations Command to act under the authority of
the agency.

The United States now has about 50 soldiers in Pakistan. Any expanded
operations using C.I.A. operatives or Special Operations forces, like
the Navy Seals, would be small and tailored to specific missions,
military officials said.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, who was on vacation last week and
did not attend the White House meeting, said in late December that "Al
Qaeda right now seems to have turned its face toward Pakistan and
attacks on the Pakistani government and Pakistani people."

In the past, the administration has largely stayed out of the tribal
areas, in part for fear that exposure of any American-led operations
there would so embarrass the Musharraf government that it could
further empower his critics, who have declared he was too close to
Washington.

Even now, officials say, some American diplomats and military
officials, as well as outside experts, argue that American-led
military operations on the Pakistani side of the border with
Afghanistan could result in a tremendous backlash and ultimately do
more harm than good. That is particularly true, they say, if Americans
were captured or killed in the territory.

In part, the White House discussions may be driven by a desire for
another effort to capture or kill Osama bin Laden and his deputy,
Ayman al-Zawahri. Currently, C.I.A. operatives and Special Operations
forces have limited authority to conduct counterterrorism missions in
Pakistan based on specific intelligence about the whereabouts of those
two men, who have eluded the Bush administration for more than six
years, or of other members of their terrorist organization, Al Qaeda,
hiding in or near the tribal areas.

The C.I.A. has launched missiles from Predator aircraft in the tribal
areas several times, with varying degrees of success. Intelligence
officials said they believed that in January 2006 an airstrike
narrowly missed killing Mr. Zawahri, who had attended a dinner in
Damadola, a Pakistani village. But that apparently was the last real
evidence American officials had about the whereabouts of their chief
targets.

Critics said more direct American military action would be
ineffective, anger the Pakistani Army and increase support for the
militants. "I'm not arguing that you leave Al Qaeda and the Taliban
unmolested, but I'd be very, very cautious about approaches that could
play into hands of enemies and be counterproductive," said Bruce
Hoffman, a terrorism expert at Georgetown University. Some American
diplomats and military officials have also issued strong warnings
against expanded direct American action, officials said.

Hasan Askari Rizvi, a leading Pakistani military and political
analyst, said raids by American troops would prompt a powerful popular
backlash against Mr. Musharraf and the United States.

In the wake of the American invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, many
Pakistanis suspect that the United States is trying to dominate
Pakistan as well, Mr. Rizvi said. Mr. Musharraf — who is already
widely unpopular — would lose even more popular support.

"At the moment when Musharraf is extremely unpopular, he will face
more crisis," Mr. Rizvi said. "This will weaken Musharraf in a
Pakistani context." He said such raids would be seen as an overall
vote of no confidence in the Pakistani military, including General
Kayani.

The meeting on Friday, which was not publicly announced, included
Stephen J. Hadley, Mr. Bush's national security adviser; Adm. Mike
Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and top intelligence
officials.

Spokesmen for the White House, the C.I.A. and the Pentagon declined to
discuss the meeting, citing a policy against doing so. But the session
reflected an urgent concern that a new Qaeda haven was solidifying in
parts of Pakistan and needed to be countered, one official said.

Although some officials and experts have criticized Mr. Musharraf and
questioned his ability to take on extremists, Mr. Bush has remained
steadfast in his support, and it is unlikely any new measures,
including direct American military action inside Pakistan, will be
approved without Mr. Musharraf's consent.

"He understands clearly the risks of dealing with extremists and
terrorists," Mr. Bush said in an interview with Reuters on Thursday.
"After all, they've tried to kill him."

The Pakistan government has identified a militant leader with links to
Al Qaeda, Baitullah Mehsud, who holds sway in tribal areas near the
Afghanistan border, as the chief suspect behind the attack on Ms.
Bhutto. American officials are not certain about Mr. Mehsud's
complicity but say the threat he and other militants pose is a new
focus. He is considered, they said, an "Al Qaeda associate."

In an interview with foreign journalists on Thursday, Mr. Musharraf
warned of the risk any counterterrorism forces — American or Pakistani
— faced in confronting Mr. Mehsud in his native tribal areas.

"He is in South Waziristan agency, and let me tell you, getting him in
that place means battling against thousands of people, hundreds of
people who are his followers, the Mehsud tribe, if you get to him, and
it will mean collateral damage," Mr. Musharraf said.

The weeks before parliamentary elections — which were originally
scheduled for Tuesday — are seen as critical because of threats by
extremists to disrupt the vote. But it seemed unlikely that any
additional American effort would be approved and put in place in that
time frame.

Administration aides said that Pakistani and American officials shared
the concern about a resurgent Qaeda, and that American diplomats and
senior military officers had been working closely with their Pakistani
counterparts to help bolster Pakistan's counterterrorism operations.

Shortly after Ms. Bhutto's assassination, Adm. William J. Fallon, who
oversees American military operations in Southwest Asia, telephoned
his Pakistani counterparts to ensure that counterterrorism and
logistics operations remained on track.

In early December, Adm. Eric T. Olson, the new leader of the Special
Operations Command, paid his second visit to Pakistan in three months
to meet with senior Pakistani officers, including Lt. Gen. Muhammad
Masood Aslam, commander of the military and paramilitary troops in
northwest Pakistan. Admiral Olson also visited the headquarters of the
Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force of about 85,000 members recruited
from border tribes that the United States is planning to help train
and equip.

But the Pakistanis are still years away from fielding an effective
counterinsurgency force. And some American officials, including
Defense Secretary Gates, have said the United States may have to take
direct action against militants in the tribal areas.

American officials said the crisis surrounding Ms. Bhutto's
assassination had not diminished the Pakistani counterterrorism
operations, and there were no signs that Mr. Musharraf had pulled out
any of his 100,000 forces in the tribal areas and brought them to the
cities to help control the urban unrest.

Carlotta Gall contributed reporting from Islamabad, and David Rohde
from New York.

--
Yoshie
<http://montages.blogspot.com/>