[R-G] Brazilian military’s experience comes full circle in Haiti

[Anthony Fenton]

Brazilian military’s experience comes full circle in Haiti
By Kevin Pina
http://haitiaction.net/News/HIP/2_20_8/2_20_8.html

“Institutional memory is a collective of facts, concepts, experiences  
and know-how held by a group of people. As it transcends the  
individual, it requires the ongoing transmission of these memories  
between members of this group.” - Wikipedia.com

US Marines, Canadian Special Forces and troops of the French Foreign  
Legion were authorized by the UN Security Council to 'stabilize'  
Haiti following the ouster of president Jean-Bertrand Aristide on  
February 29, 2004. In June 2004, the United Nations sent the  
militaries of Brazil, Argentina and Chile to take control of Haiti  
with the objective of creating conditions for new elections. The  
Brazilian armed forces were given overall control of the military  
component of the UN operation.

On February 19, 2008, Brazilian military forces stormed the  
neighborhood of Village de Dieu on the outskirts of the capital of  
Port-au-Prince. Their troops entered with weapons drawn and began a  
massive sweep with UN police in tow that ended with the arrest of  
dozens of young men in the area. Residents claim this military  
incursion was executed without a single warrant being presented from  
Haiti’s courts or just cause. Residents of poor communities  
throughout Haiti say that terrifying raids led by Brazilian forces  
have been common occurrences since they arrived in 2004. For the  
families of those arrested and left traumatized by these incursions,  
it raises serious questions about the role Brazilian forces have  
played in Haiti.

For an answer we have to look at the reporting of Pedro Dantas of the  
Brazilian daily Estadão de Hoje. Dantes wrote, "Army sources  
confirmed that techniques employed in the occupation of the Morro da  
Providéncia favela [slum] are the ones Brazilian soldiers use in the  
United Nations peacekeeping mission in Haiti." 1 Raúl Zibechi, a  
member of the editorial board of Montevideo's weekly Brecha, would  
later conclude, “This admission by Brazilian armed forces largely  
explains the interest of Lula da Silva's government in keeping that  
country's troops on the Caribbean island: to test, in the poor  
neighborhoods of Haiti's capital, Port-au-Prince, containment  
strategies designed for application in the slums of Rio de Janeiro,  
São Paulo, and other large cities.” 2 Zibechi’s article does not  
fully explain, however, that the process began with the Brazilian  
military applying brutal tactics from their own historical  
experiences in the slums of Haiti upon their arrival in 2004.

The learning curve of the Brazilian military for controlling poor  
urban populations was only accelerated by their experiences in Haiti.  
The military and police apparatus in Brazil already had a long  
history of using violence and terror towards solving the complex  
social challenges of the slums, known as favelas, in their own  
country. According to Brazilian anthropologist Alba Zaluar in April  
2004, "Their approach is one of relentless confrontation with the  
poor communities. This military posture dates back to Brazil's  
dictatorship and will never win the loyalty of the favela against its  
own kind." 3 To fully understand the importance of this statement it  
is necessary to briefly touch upon the historical role of Brazil‘s  
military and police forces.

The 1964 military coup in Brazil, against the government of João  
Goulart, ushered in an unprecedented period of slaughter and torture  
committed by the Brazilian military and police. Not unlike the coup  
that ousted Jean-Bertrand Aristide from Haiti in 2004, it enjoyed the  
backing of the U.S. government. According to declassified documents,  
President Lyndon Johnson was being briefed by phone at his Texas  
ranch, as the Brazilian military mobilized against Goulart. Johnson  
stated, "I'd put everybody that had any imagination or ingenuity... 
[CIA Director John] McCone...[Secretary of Defense Robert] McNamara"  
on making sure the coup went forward.” 4

Following the coup, Brazil’s military and police helped to export  
torture techniques used against political dissidents. In their  
groundbreaking book, The Washington Connection and Third World  
Fascism, Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman write, “From Brazil, and  
with continuing U.S. assistance, torture spread throughout much of  
Latin America in the 1960's and early 1970's, with Brazil serving as  
a torture-aid subcontractor.” 5

It is for this reason the Brazilian military shares the dubious  
distinction of being one of the western hemisphere’s greatest human  
rights violators in modern history. Perhaps it is no accident they  
share this distinction with their counterparts appointed by the  
United Nations to oversee military operations in Haiti, namely the  
militaries of Argentina and Chile.

It is exactly this history of repression and ‘military posture’ Alba  
Zaluar was referring to when she addressed military and police  
tactics for controlling the poor in the favelas of contemporary  
Brazil. It is this same approach of ‘relentless confrontation with  
the poor communities’ Zaluar described that have also come to define  
Brazilian military tactics in Haiti.

In early December 2005, Amnesty International (AI) would accuse  
Brazilian security forces of human rights violations in the favelas.  
The report called Brazil: 'They come in Shooting': Policing socially  
excluded communities pointed to the following as an example, "The  
violence was highlighted by an incident in March [2005], in which 29  
people were shot dead by a "death squad" -- believed to consist of  
members of Rio de Janeiro's military police force -- in the Baixada  
Fluminense District of the city; it was the worst massacre in the  
city's history, but not a new or isolated phenomenon." 6

The AI report went further and described police tactics that closely  
resembled the practices of the Haitian National Police and the  
Brazilian troops sent to support them following Aristide’s ouster.  
The report continued, “Yet, when the police do intervene, it is often  
by mounting "invasions" – violent mass raids using no warrants or, on  
rare occasions, collective warrants that label the entire community  
as criminal. Human rights violations and corruption on the part of  
the police are rife in the favelas. The majority of the victims of  
police violence are poor, black or mixed race youths and the  
experience of many favela residents is that the police are corrupt,  
brutal and to be feared.” Although the residents of poor communities  
like Bel Air, Cite Soleil and Village de Dieu are exclusively black,  
what remains is an apt description of what transpired in Haiti  
between 2004-2006. The Haitian police would mount brutal raids inside  
the poor communities still demonstrating for Aristide while the  
Brazilian military would encircle them with a dragnet resulting in  
arbitrary searches and mass extra-judicial detentions. 7

On July 6, 2005, less than two months after Zaluar gave her interview  
to the Guardian and four months after the massacre in Baixada  
Fluminense, the Brazilian military would authorize and lead a deadly  
military assault against the Haitian slum of Cite Soleil. Not so  
coincidentally, the neighborhood served as launching site for massive  
demonstrations demanding the return of ousted president Aristide and  
yet another was being planned for his upcoming birthday celebration  
nine days later on July 15.

According to documents released under the Freedom of Information Act,  
the UN attack on the crumbling civilian neighborhood was intense,  
prolonged, and carried out with heavy artillery and weaponry that  
Brazilian military officials knew would cause extensive collateral  
damage and the death of innocent victims. Residents and human rights  
groups accused the Brazilians of leading a massacre by UN forces that  
resulted in the deaths of at least 26 unarmed people with scores more  
wounded. 8 According to a UN ‘After Action’ report, “[The] firefight  
lasted over seven hours during which time [UN] forces expended over  
22,000 rounds of ammunition... [An official] with MINUSTAH  
acknowledged that, given the flimsy construction of homes in Cite  
Soleil and the large quantity of ammunition expended, it is likely  
that rounds penetrated many buildings, striking unintended targets." 9

The ‘unintended’ targets included an unarmed woman and her two young  
boys shot at point blank range by UN forces. Fredi Romelus gave video  
testimony describing how UN forces threw a smoke bomb into his house  
forcing him to flee. 10 Thinking his wife and children were following  
him out, he turned back to see soldiers with blue helmets fire into  
the doorway of his house with automatic weapons. After the soldiers  
left he returned to find his wife Sonia lying dead in a pool of blood  
clutching the corpse of their one year-old son Nelson Romelus. Their  
four year-old son Stanley lie nearby having been felled by a single  
high-powered gunshot wound to the head. 11

Five months after the Brazilian led assault on Cite Soleil, an  
investigation by the BBC would conclude, “Hundreds, possibly  
thousands of people are shot by police every year in Brazil.” 12 In  
November 2006 the BBC would also give a description of a favela known  
as Heliopolis in Sao Paulo that uncannily mirrored press descriptions  
of Cite Soleil. The BBC would report, “Controlled by drug-traffickers  
and scarred by gun crime, it remains a no-go area for most of this  
city's residents.” 13 Earlier that same year a reporter for The  
Dallas Morning News would describe Cite Soleil as “a no-go zone even  
for police, and young men armed with automatic rifles zip around its  
avenues and back streets in stolen SUVs.” 14

Despite the comparison these two press reports may invite, the  
situation in these two countries couldn’t have been more different.  
The greatest similarity between the favelas in Brazil and what has  
transpired in the slums of Haiti’s capital since February 2004 has  
been the brutal tactics and shoot first policies employed by  
Brazilian security forces. Perhaps another similarity is that like  
Brazilian authorities, the UN did not hesitate in allowing the  
Brazilian military to green light a military solution by playing the  
age-old game of demonizing entire communities as criminal or  
supporters of criminal elements. 15 While the press widely covered  
complaints made by the UN and Haiti's Chamber of Commerce of bandits,  
gangsters and drug dealers controlling Cite Soleil, next to nothing  
was mentioned of the frequent demonstrations mounted for Aristide’s  
return. Even less was mentioned of the police opening fire on  
thousands of unarmed demonstrators. What the UN ultimately portrayed  
as criminal activities in the Haitian slums was in reality widespread  
political resistance that had formed to the ousting of Aristide.

A second military assault led by the Brazilians would be launched  
against Cite Soleil on December 22, 2006. An initial tally of the  
carnage following the raid was taken by the rights organization  
Bureau des Avocats Internationaux. In it they listed 29 people killed  
and 33 wounded by UN forces that day. 16 The victims included 24 year- 
old Lelene Mertina who was six months pregnant when a UN bullet  
ripped through her abdomen instantly killing her unborn fetus. There  
was also the testimony of a 16 year-old boy named Jonel Bonhomme who  
was shot in the back. As he lay dying he described in detail how the  
UN opened fire on unarmed civilians on his block. All told, video and  
photographic documentation as well as eyewitness testimony painted a  
picture all too similar to the events of July 6, 2005. 17

The UN now stands accused by residents of Cite Soleil of having  
committed two massacres in their community under the leadership of  
Brazilian military forces in Haiti. To those familiar with the  
history of the Brazilian military this may come as no surprise. What  
is surprising is the degree to which critical thinkers have been  
influenced by a Brazilian military now being recast as UN  
‘peacekeepers’ in Haiti. It may serve as good public relations but  
provides no comfort for residents of poor communities in Haiti who  
continue to be terrorized by military raids. For them there is little  
doubt the Brazilian military relies upon the same impulses that  
earned it a reputation for brutality and human rights abuses in its  
own country. And while there can be no doubt that the experiences of  
the Brazilian military in Haitian slums have informed their  
operations in the favelas, their penchant for relying upon brute  
strength and superior firepower, to solve social problems, was formed  
long before they came to Haiti.



Notes

1. Pedro Dantas, (Estadão de Hoje -São Paulo) "Exército admite uso de  
tática do Haiti em favela do Rio,", 15 Dec. 2007. http:// 
www.estado.com.br
2. Raúl Zibechi, (Programa de las Américas) “La militarización de las  
periferias urbanas”, 21 de enero de 2008. http://www.ircamericas.org/ 
esp/4906
www.estado.com.br
Dantes original quote cited by Zibechi was:
3. Gareth Chetwynd, The Guardian, “Deadly setback for a model  
favela”, Saturday April 17 2004. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/ 
apr/17/brazil.garethchetwynd
4. The National Security Archive, “BRAZIL MARKS 40th ANNIVERSARY OF  
MILITARY COUP - DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS SHED LIGHT ON U.S. ROLE”,
March 31 2004. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB118/index.htm
5. Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, “The Washington Connection and  
Third World Fascism”, South End Press 1979. See page pg. 48.
6. Amnesty International, "They come in shooting": Policing socially  
excluded communities”, AI Index: AMR 19/025/2005 2 December 2005
Note: Recent versions of this report have been reduced to a Facts and  
Figures page. The full report can still be found at: http:// 
asiapacific.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR190252005?open&of=ENG-BRA
7. Haiti Information Project, “Haiti’s police ratchet up violence,  
dismiss human rights concerns”, June 6, 2005. http:// 
www.haitiaction.net/News/HIP/6_6_5.html
8. Seth Donnelly interviewed by Amy Goodman, “Eyewitnesses Describe  
Massacre by UN Troops in Haiti”, July 12, 2005. http://www.zmag.org/ 
content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=8286
9. Keith Yearman, Assistant Professor of Geography, College of DuPage,
“The Cite Soleil Massacre Declassification Project”.
http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=8286
http://www.cod.edu/people/faculty/yearman/cite_soleil.htm
10. Shirley Pate, (HCV Analysis), “Video Evidence Released of UN  
Massacre in Haiti”, January 25, 2008
11. Haiti Information Project, “Evidence mounts of a UN massacre in  
Haiti”, July 12, 2005. http://www.haitiaction.net/News/HIP/7_12_5.html
12. Angus Stickler, BBC News, “Brazilian police 'execute thousands'”,  
November 23, 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4463010.stm
13. Steve Kingstone, BBC News, “Brazil police in 'shoot-to-kill'  
claims”, November 17, 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/ 
6157778.stm
14. Reed Lindsay, The Dallas Morning News, “Shattered Haiti awaits  
election”, February 5, 2006. http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/ 
dws/news/world/stories/DN- 
haitielex_05int.ART.State.Edition1.3ec1788.html
15. Haiti Information Project, “UN accommodates human rights abuses  
by police in Haiti”, May 8, 2005. http://www.haitiaction.net/News/HIP/ 
5_8_5/5_8_5.html
16. Haiti Information Project, “The UNspoken truth about gangs in  
Haiti”, February 15, 2007. http://www.haitiaction.net/News/HIP/ 
2_15_7/2_15_7.html
17. Haiti Information Project, “UN in Haiti accused of second  
massacre”, January 21, 2007. http://www.haitiaction.net/News/HIP/ 
1_21_7/1_21_7.html
©2008 Haiti Information Project - All Rights Reserved

Kevin Pina is the founding editor of the Haiti Information Project (HIP)

The Haiti Information Project (HIP) is a non-profit alternative news  
service providing coverage and analysis of breaking developments in  
Haiti. Winner of the CENSORED 2008 REAL NEWS AWARD for Outstanding  
Investigative Journalism