[R-G] The 'known unknowns' of the Mugniyah killing

[Anthony Fenton]

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JB20Ak01.html
COMMENT
The 'known unknowns' of the Mugniyah killing
By Ramzy Baroud

We know well who killed top Hezbollah commander Imad Mugniyah on  
February 12 in Damascus.

Although in the US media only journalists like Seymour Hersh have the  
nerve to point out the obvious, the Israeli media has not shied away  
from evidence of Israeli intelligence's involvement in this well- 
calculated assassination.

The major Israeli daily newspaper Maariv shared the views of many  
others when it concluded that: "Officially, Israel yesterday denied  
responsibility for the killing. But experts say the brilliant  
execution of the attack was characteristic of the Mossad."

The Financial Times reported on the "triumphant mood" of the Israeli  
press which hailed "the demise of one the country's most feared  
adversaries" and quoted an Israeli paper stating "the account is  
settled".

The Financial Times also quoted a most telling analysis offered by  
one Israeli commentator: "Mugniyah's assassination is perhaps the  
hardest blow Hezbollah has taken to this day. Not just because of his  
operational abilities, his close ties to the Iranians, and the series  
of successful terror attacks that he carried out. But because he was  
a symbol, a legend, a myth."

Donald Rumsfeld is no longer in public eye but his "wisdom" lives on.  
"We also know there are known unknowns," he once told perplexed  
reporters. Precisely, the "known unknown" in this case is that the  
Israeli Mossad killed Mugniyah, and killed him for specific political  
reasons at a well-chosen time and place that would make perfect sense  
from the Israeli government's point of view.

Let's first look at the timing.

President George W Bush's second term in office will expire in one  
year. For the president who has unconditionally rubber-stamped  
Israeli policies, one year is not enough to set long-term goals, but  
it's enough to ignite chaos.

"If you want chaos, then we welcome chaos. If you want war, then we  
welcome war. We have no problem with weapons or with rockets which we  
will launch on you." These were the words of Lebanon's MP Walid  
Jumblatt of the ruling March 14 Coalition, directed at the Hezbollah- 
led opposition a few days prior to the third anniversary of Rafiq  
Hariri's assassination. Considering the military strength of  
Hezbollah within Lebanon, it isn't difficult to guess where the MP's  
rockets would come from.

Indeed, the internal disunity and open hostility - notwithstanding  
the political impasse over the future of the country's parliamentary  
and governmental organization - all point at the readiness of Lebanon  
to descend into chaos. This is good news for Israel and the Bush  
administration. A civil war could achieve what Israel's botched,  
illegal war of 2006 could not.

The 34-day war, celebrated by Hezbollah as a victory, was a massive  
setback to Israel's regional designs and to those who wanted  
Hezbollah removed from the country's political equation. The war  
backfired, achieving the exact opposite: Hezbollah emerged  
triumphant. More recently, Israel's own investigation into the war  
admitted, if somewhat circuitously, Israel's defeat.

The Winograd Commission's report indicted the army, and largely  
absolved Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. It described the war's failure  
as a "serious missed opportunity". The report didn't chastise the  
war, but decried its lack of effectiveness and poor execution.

How could Olmert correct the mistakes of the war without waging  
another? And what better timing for war than a moment when Hezbollah  
and its rivals in Lebanon are engaged in one of their own?

But the assassination of a high-profile person like Mugniyah was not  
merely an opportunity to boast over a classic Mossad operation. It  
was a major ingredient in a larger scheme, the end result of which  
may be war with both Lebanon and Syria - with the hope of getting  
Iran involved.

Israel didn't hide its disappointment over the US's National  
Intelligence Estimate, which concluded that Iran is no longer in the  
nuclear weapons manufacturing business. It simply meant that the US  
will not attack Iran at this time. But for Israel, "absence of  
evidence is not the evidence of absence" - another Rumsfeld quote.  
Fearing that unchecked Iran could dominate the region, Israel, with  
Bush's green light, is now ready for escalation.

Israeli officials and pundits - and their friends in the US  
government and media - are building a case for a confrontation with  
Iran. On a recent trip to Germany, after talks with Chancellor Angela  
Merkel in Berlin, Olmert was "sure" of Iran developing nuclear  
weapons. "The Iranians are moving forward with their plans to create  
a capacity for non-conventional weapons," he told reporters.

Israel, however, is neither capable, nor willing to face Iran in a  
conventional war.

But going after Hezbollah as they have done unsuccessfully in the  
past could be disastrous. Thus there is a need for a new tactic. Last  
September, Israel experimented, once again, with the idea of bombing  
Syria. US media parroted ridiculous claims that the bombings targeted  
"secret" Syrian nuclear facilities, courtesy of North Korea. What  
Israel wants is an easy victory over Syria, which will block Iranian  
military supplies to Hezbollah, and deny Palestinian opposition  
parties a save heaven in Damascus, the last Arab capital willing to  
provide them with a political platform. Facing an internal challenge  
at home and without Iran's help, Hezbollah cannot withstand a fight  
on two fronts.

For Israel's scheme to succeed, the internal conflict in Lebanon must  
escalate and internal cohesion must not be achieved, a mission  
entrusted to the "mysterious" car bombings that have been blamed  
squarely on Syria and its Lebanese allies.

By gloating, yet without revealing much about the assassination of  
Mugniyah, Israeli commentators might have lost sight of the great  
gamble of their government. Hezbollah's response, articulated by  
their leader Hassan Nasrallah, was a vow for an "open" war. The group  
will most likely avoid border clashes, and take the war against  
Israel to the international arena, just as Israel has. And like  
Israel, it may gloat in private but officially refrain from  
sponsoring whatever operations are carried out.

The course of future events is now more predictable, although whether  
such tit-for-tat behavior will work in Israel's favor remains in the  
realm of "unknown unknowns". Maybe Rumsfeld had it right after all.

Ramzy Baroud (www.ramzybaroud.net) is an author and editor of  
PalestineChronicle.com. His work has been published in many  
newspapers and journals worldwide. His latest book is The Second  
Palestinian Intifada: A Chronicle of a People's Struggle (Pluto  
Press, London). (Copyright Ramzy Baroud)