[R-G] How the EU helps Israel to strangle Gaza

[Anthony Fenton]

  How the EU helps Israel to strangle Gaza  	

David Morrison, 13 February 2008

http://www.spinwatch.org/content/view/4659/8/

Since 23 January 2008, we have witnessed the extraordinary spectacle  
of a mass breakout by Palestinians from their Gaza prison, a breakout  
made possible by Hamas blowing up stretches of the Israeli-built  
border wall between Gaza and Egypt, near Rafah, and bulldozing other  
stretches of it.

The breakout was a reaction to IsraelÕs strangulation of Gaza, which  
had intensified in the preceding weeks with IsraelÕs closure of the  
crossings between Israel and Gaza to the passage of people and goods,  
on a more or less permanent basis.

But how can Israel strangle Gaza when there is supposed to be an  
international crossing between Gaza and Egypt, a crossing which is  
not controlled by Israelis?
Certainly, that was the promise held out in the comprehensive  
Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) [1], signed more than two  
years ago, on 15 November 2005, by Israel and the Palestinian  
Authority (PA).  The first of the six components of this Agreement  
was that there would be a crossing between Gaza and Egypt at Rafah,  
controlled by the PA and Egypt, on terms set out in the Agreed  
Principles for Rafah Crossing Point (APRC) that formed part of the  
Agreement.  At the time, this was hailed as an historic step on the  
road to a Palestinian state Ð for the first time, it was said,  
Palestinians would have access to the outside world free from Israeli  
control.

How come then that Israel is still able to strangle Gaza?  The answer  
is that, thanks to the good offices of the EU, which has a role in  
managing the Rafah crossing under the Agreement, Israel has always  
had a veto on the opening of the crossing.  As we will see, in  
practice, whenever Israel doesnÕt want the crossing open, the EU  
doesnÕt open it.

The crossing was open almost every day from 25 November 2005 to 24  
June 2006, though not for 24 hours a day as intended (see, for  
example, [2]).  However, after 24 June 2006, when an Israeli soldier  
was captured by Palestinians, the EU has, at IsraelÕs insistence,  
prevented it opening regularly and has kept it closed completely  
since 9 June 2007, after Hamas took control of Gaza.

Another point: the Agreement doesnÕt provide for commercial traffic  
into Gaza from Egypt via the Rafah crossing, because Israel doesnÕt  
trust Egypt and the PA to prevent the importation of arms.   
Theoretically, it did provide for commercial traffic out of Gaza into  
Egypt, but this has never occurred in practice.

Quartet: midwife of AMA
The so-called Middle East Quartet (the US, the EU, Russia and the UN)  
was the midwife of the Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA).  In  
April 2005, the former head of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, was  
appointed Quartet envoy with special responsibility for making  
arrangements for Gaza in the event of Israeli ÒdisengagementÓ, which  
took place a few months later in August 2005.  The AMA was largely  
his work, but Condoleeza Rice (US Secretary of State) and Javier  
Solana (EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security  
Policy) were present to announce it publicly in Jerusalem on 15  
November 2005.

Rice said that the Agreement as a whole Òis intended to give the  
Palestinian people freedom to move, to trade, to live ordinary  
livesÓ [3].  Of its arrangements for a crossing into Egypt, she said:

ÒFirst, for the first time since 1967, Palestinians will gain control  
over entry and exit from their territory. This will be through an  
international crossing at Rafah, whose target opening date is  
November 25th.Ó

Solana said of these arrangements:

ÒThis is the first time that a border is opened and not controlled by  
the Israelis. É So as you can imagine, this is a very important step  
that is the first time that takes place.Ó

One could be forgiven for thinking that the US and the EU had made  
arrangements for a border crossing between Gaza and Egypt that was  
Ònot controlled by the IsraelisÓ and that from now on Gaza couldnÕt  
be strangled by Israel.

EU Third Party
In practice, however, the Rafah crossing has been controlled by the  
Israelis.  Even though Israel has no personnel, military or  
otherwise, physically present at the crossing, it has been able to  
close the crossing at will, just as it can close the four crossings  
(Karni, Erez, Sufa and Kerem Shalom) between Gaza and Israel itself,  
where it has military personnel physically present.

This has come about because, under the Agreed Principles for Rafah  
Crossing Point (APRC), a Third Party must have personnel present at  
the Rafah crossing before it is allowed to open.  The Third Party is  
the EU Ð and the EU has always refused to man the crossing when  
Israel didnÕt want the crossing open.

The EU personnel have the following duties at the crossing:

ÒThe 3rd party will have the authority to ensure that the PA complies  
with all applicable rules and regulations concerning the Rafah  
crossing point and the terms of this agreement. In case of non- 
compliance, the 3rd party has the authority to order the re- 
examination and reassessment of any passenger, luggage, vehicle or  
goods. While the request is being processed, the person, luggage,  
vehicle or cargo in question will not be allowed to leave the  
premises of the Rafah crossing point.Ó [1]

For this purpose, the EU established the grandly titled EU Border  
Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point, or EU BAM Rafah (see  
its website here [4]).  This is a force of less than a hundred,  
mostly policemen, which is based in Ashkelon in Israel.

In addition to these EU monitors, who are physically present at the  
crossing, Israeli security forces are able monitor activity at the  
crossing remotely, via CCTV and other data links from the crossing,  
and can make a record of the individuals crossing.  The Israeli  
monitors are based in Israel at the Kerem Shalom crossing with Gaza,  
where a Òliaison officeÓ is located (for liaison between Israel and  
the PA).  One of the duties of the EU, as the Third Party to the  
APRC, is to ÒleadÓ this office:

ÒA liaison office, led by the 3rd party, will receive real-time video  
and data feed of the activities at Rafah and will meet regularly to  
review implementation of this agreement, resolve any disputes arising  
from this agreement, and perform other tasks specified in this  
agreement.Ó [1]

Israeli veto
Ridiculous as it may seem, the EU takes the view that the opening of  
the crossing may be disputed by Israeli representatives in the  
Liaison Office and that, if Israel refuses to agree to the opening of  
the crossing, the EU doesnÕt send its monitors to the crossing, as  
required for its opening under the terms of the APRC.  In practice,  
therefore, Israel has a veto over the opening of the crossing, which,  
according to Rice and Solana, is Ònot controlled by the IsraelisÓ.

Lest you think that this is the stuff of my imagination, I invite you  
to go the FAQ section of the EU BAM website.  There, the answer given  
to the question: ÒWhat is our capacity in order to reopen the border?  
[sic]Ó is:

ÒAccording to the agreements EUBAM has no executive power. EUBAM  
mandate is to lead the Liaison Office and actively monitor, verify  
and evaluate PA performance with regard to the implementation of the  
Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing Point [APRC]. EUBAM does  
therefore not have the authority to open the crossing without the  
agreement and cooperation of both parties. [my emphasis] What we can  
do, however, is to mediate between them and we have worked very hard  
to try and get RCP [Rafah Crossing Point] open for as many days as  
possible since the 25th of June 2006.Ó [5]

That is as plain as a pikestaff: in the opinion of the EU, the APRC  
gives Israel a veto on whether the crossing should open.  There is  
absolutely nothing in the APRC to warrant such an interpretation Ð  
and it is in flat contradiction to the words of Rice and Solana that  
the crossing would Ònot be controlled by IsraelisÓ.

In fact, the EU goes further and interprets the APRC to mean that  
Israeli representatives donÕt even have to go the Liaison Office to  
prevent the crossing opening.  The EU interpretation of the APRC is  
that, if Israel isnÕt represented in the Liaison Office, then the  
crossing cannot open.  That is clear from the answer to another FAQ:  
ÒWhy the liaison office is based at Kerem Shalom? [sic]Ó, which is:

ÒThe Liaison Office is at Kerem Shalom because that was agreed  
between the parties prior to the initial deployment of EUBAM. As the  
Liaison Office can only operate with the presence of both Parties and  
EUBAM, it makes no difference where it is, as either party could  
effectively close the crossing just by refusing to deploy their  
Liaison Officers in the Liaison Office.Ó [5]

So, Israeli liaison personnel have merely to stay in their beds in  
order to keep the crossing closed, the crossing which according to  
Rice and Solana is Ònot controlled by the IsraelisÓ.

To reach the Rafah crossing from their base in Israel, the EU  
monitors have to pass through the Israeli-controlled Kerem Shalom  
crossing into Gaza, so Israel could, if it wished, physically prevent  
them taking up their station at Rafah.  It has been reported that  
Israel has used this to prevent the opening of the Rafah crossing.   
However, it is clear from the foregoing that Israel has never needed  
to block the monitors physically, since it has been the unwavering  
policy of the EU never to attempt to open the Rafah crossing if  
Israel says it doesnÕt want it open.

(The EU BAM website says that the original plan was for the EU  
monitors to be based inside Gaza at Rafah itself Ð and a base was  
almost complete in March 2006 Ð but the plan was abandoned because of  
the Òpolitical and security situationÓ [5].  The EU monitors could  
have been based in Egypt, making it impossible for Israel to prevent  
them travelling to the crossing.).

EU statements
For a few weeks after 25 June 2006, when the Rafah crossing ceased  
opening on a regular basis, EU BAM press statements paint a picture  
of it trying hard to persuade Israel to allow the crossing to be  
opened occasionally for humanitarian purposes.

For example, a statement on 6 July 2006 [6] announces that the  
crossing will be open that day to enable 250 people waiting on the  
Egyptian side to cross Ð the border had been closed from 25 June  
2006.  It describes this as an ÒEU BAM initiative, with the agreement  
of the Israeli Government and the cooperation of the Egyptian and  
Palestinian authoritiesÓ.

But the Israeli Government must have withdrawn its permission,  
because the next press statement on 15 July 2006 [7] reports that the  
previous evening Òtwo breaches were blown in the border wall not far  
from Rafah Crossing PointÓ and Òhundreds of people crossed from Egypt  
into the Gaza Strip, and many also crossed from the Gaza Strip into  
EgyptÓ. The statement continued:

ÒThe Rafah Border Crossing has been closed since 25th June, despite  
EUBAM efforts to open it for at least the hundreds of passengers  
stuck in the Egyptian side of the terminal whose humanitarian  
situation has caused concern.  Until the incident yesterday these  
people had been in the terminal for 19 days. During the period since  
25th June both EUBAM monitors and the PA officials who run RCP have  
been on permanent standby and ready to open the crossing at short  
notice.Ó

According to a press statement on 14 December 2006 [8], after the  
crossing opened that day, Òthe Government of Israel had requested  
that the crossing be closed due to the expected arrival of Prime  
Minister Haniyeh, who was reportedly carrying a large sum of moneyÓ.   
However, in a stout display of resistance to Israel, Òthe Head of  
Mission, decided to merely suspend operations in order to clarify the  
situationÓ.  The press statement explained that Òthis decision was  
made after consultations with Brussels, the Palestinian Authority and  
the Government of IsraelÓ.

Doubtless, the EU High Representative, Javier Solana, was party to  
this decision to Òsuspend operationsÓ at the crossing at the request  
of Israel, the crossing which he said is Ònot controlled by IsraelisÓ.

Restrictions on people
It is clear that, through the good offices of the EU, Israel has a  
veto on when the opening of Rafah crossing.  It is worth noting that,  
in the Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing Point (APRC), Israel  
forced the Palestinian Authority to put restrictions on who is  
allowed to cross when it is open.  Thus the ARPC says:

ÒUse of the Rafah crossing will be restricted to Palestinian ID card  
holders and others by exception in agreed categories with prior  
notification to the GoI [Government of Israel] and approval of senior  
PA leadership.Ó [1]

The PA has to notify Israel 48 hours in advance about the crossing of  
those in the exceptional categories (diplomats, foreign investors,  
foreign representatives of recognized international organizations and  
humanitarian cases) and, although Israel doesnÕt have a veto on an  
individual crossing (except by closing the crossing altogether), the  
PA has to give Israel a reason for overriding any Israeli objection.

In addition, under the APRC, Israel is allowed to request that the PA  
ban nominated Palestinian ID card holders from using the crossing and  
the PA was obliged to consult with Israel, and the EU monitors, in  
the event of it refusing an Israeli request.

Other AMA components
In theory, the Agreement on Movement Access (AMA) was genuinely  
comprehensive.  In addition to the Rafah crossing, it was concerned  
with, in RiceÕs words:

ÒSecond, Israel and the Palestinians will upgrade and expand other  
crossings for people and cargo between Israel, Gaza and the West Bank. É

ÒThird, Palestinians will be able to move between Gaza and the West  
Bank; specifically, bus convoys are to begin about a month from now  
and truck convoys are to start a month after that.

ÒFourth, the parties will reduce obstacles to movement within the  
West Bank. É

ÒFifth, construction of a Palestinian seaport can begin. The Rafah  
model will provide a basis for planned operations.

ÒSixth, the parties agree on the importance of the airport. Israel  
recognizes that the Palestinian Authority will want to resume  
construction on the airport.Ó

Virtually nothing of this has been realised in practice either.  The  
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in the  
Occupied Palestinian Territory compiles fortnightly reports on the  
implementation of the AMA.  Its report for 14-27 November 2007 [2]  
comments as follows on the implementation of points 3 to 6:

· Obstacles to movement in the West Bank number 563, which represents  
an increase of 185 obstacles, or 49.7%, over the baseline figure of  
August 2005.

· Convoys between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank: Truck convoys Ð  
implementation now 22 months overdue (since mid-January 2006); Bus  
convoys Ð implementation now 23 months overdue (since mid-December  
2005).

· Ports: Seaport Ð awaiting GoI assurance of non-interference with  
seaport operation;  Airport Ð awaiting commencement of discussions  
since November 2005.

What now?
If Gaza is to be immune from strangulation by Israel in future, then  
the Israeli veto over the opening of the Rafah crossing will have to  
be ended.  In addition, the crossing must cater for commercial  
traffic into Gaza, which is banned under the present Agreement.

ItÕs difficult to believe that this would ever be acceptable to  
Israel (or the US), since it increases the chances of Hamas and other  
groups importing arms into Gaza.  The difficulty for the US and  
Israel is that the present situation, with a border imperfectly  
policed by Egypt, and liable to be breached in a major way at any  
time, is even more conducive to arms reaching Gaza.

Israel may decide to retake control of the Gaza/Egypt border militarily.



POSTSCRIPT
Since the foregoing was written, EU BAM has amended the FAQ section  
of its website (including the text quoted above from that section).   
But it still maintains that, under the Agreed Principles for Rafah  
Crossing Point (APRC), the crossing cannot be opened without the  
consent of the Israelis, even though, according to Javier Solana, it  
is Ònot controlled by the IsraelisÓ.


References:
[1]  See www.mfa.gov.il
[2]  www.ochaopt.org/documents/AMA_53.pdf
[3]  www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/56890.htm
[4]  www.eubam-rafah.eu/portal/
[5]  www.eubam-rafah.eu/portal/en/node/25
[6]  www.eubam-rafah.eu/portal/en/node/338
[7]  www.eubam-rafah.eu/portal/en/node/339
[8]  www.eubam-rafah.eu/portal/en/node/345