[R-G] Adviser: Surge not answer in Afghanistan

[Anthony Fenton]

Adviser: Surge not answer in Afghanistan
http://www.armytimes.com/news/2008/02/Army_vickers_080209w/
By Sean D. Naylor - snaylor at militarytimes.com
Posted : Saturday Feb 9, 2008 6:47:02 EST

The senior civilian adviser to the defense secretary on special  
operations says the key to success in Iraq and Afghanistan is through  
“the indirect approach” — working “by, with and through” host-nation  
forces — rather than “surges” of U.S. troops.

“Insurgencies have to be won by local capacity,” Mike Vickers, the  
assistant secretary of defense for special operations/low intensity  
conflict and interdependent capabilities, told a group of defense  
reporters in Washington on Feb. 6.

Because “it typically takes a decade or more” to achieve victory in a  
counterinsurgency, Vickers said, “a key measure of success” for the  
“supporting country” — in this case, the U.S. — is whether domestic  
political support for the mission can be sustained for such an  
extended period.

“Over the longer haul, I still believe that the indirect approach …  
irrespective of force levels, is the way we will ultimately succeed  
[in Iraq],” he said, in answer to a question on reports that he had  
initially counseled against last year’s “surge” of U.S. forces into  
Iraq.

“When you have a country coming apart at the seams as we went through  
in 2006, then the temporary effect that can be provided by the direct  
application of our forces can be very, very important in that  
particular circumstance … That doesn’t mean that’s the approach you  
want to follow for the next 10 years.”

The Afghanistan Planning Group — a group of experts brought together  
by the American Enterprise Institute, the same conservative think  
tank behind the Iraq “surge” — is pushing a plan to significantly  
increase the size of the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan over  
the next two years, to coincide with any drawdown of U.S. forces.

Without addressing the AEI plan directly, Vickers nevertheless seemed  
to pour cold water on the idea. “I don’t think the answer to  
Afghanistan is taking forces from Iraq and putting them in  
Afghanistan,” he said.

He acknowledged that “the insurgency has certainly picked up in  
Afghanistan the past couple of years, and the link with narcotics is  
a major challenge,” but added that he is “still very optimistic about  
the long haul in Afghanistan.”

However, Vickers appeared sympathetic to one AEI recommendation: to  
grow the Afghan National Army more quickly than called for under  
current plans.

“One of the critical issues going forward is the capacity and  
capability of [the] Afghan national security forces,” he said. “The  
size of the Afghan national security forces is something that needs  
to be looked at, as well, for longer- term success. I think that will  
be the decisive element in the long run.”

Vickers served as a Special Forces noncommissioned officer and  
officer before becoming a Central Intelligence Agency operative. He  
was one of the key players in the CIA’s successful covert action  
program to help the Afghan mujahedeen drive the Soviets out of  
Afghanistan. He said that now, as then, the Afghans are willing to  
fight but want the Americans to provide the means.

“The Afghans themselves will tell you, they want and expect to win  
this war with assistance, [but] they want to do the fighting  
themselves,” he said. “Substantial foreign assistance and continued  
engagement is critical, but I think in the long run it will be the  
Afghans that do it with our support.”

Therefore, Vickers said, it was essential that the U.S. not repeat  
the mistake it made in the 1990s when it turned its attention away  
from Afghanistan after Soviet forces had left the country.

He was less sanguine about Afghanistan’s southeastern neighbor. “The  
situation in Pakistan is very worrisome,” he said. “It’s getting  
worse in Pakistan.”

The Pashtun tribal belt along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border has  
become a safe haven for al-Qaida’s senior leadership, according to  
Vickers.

“Al-Qaida’s goals remain to catalyze a global Islamic insurgency  
against the West and to carry out spectacular attacks against the  
West and the United States in particular,” he said. “And there really  
has been no diminishment in those goals … But in the past year-and-a- 
half or so, there has been an improvement in their capacity to do so  
as they’ve enjoyed greater sanctuary in western Pakistan.”

The Pakistani government — “a vital partner in the war on terror” —  
has “been more effective than any other government I can think of in  
terms of dealing with al-Qaida in the settled areas of Pakistan,”  
Vickers said, alluding to the capture of the alleged planner of the  
Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and other al-Qaida  
figures. But, Vickers added, the Pakistanis “have been less effective  
in the tribal areas of western Pakistan, and that’s a problem we face  
right now.”

While the U.S. already has a “fairly limited” special operations  
presence in Pakistan, Vickers said, plans call for establishing a  
broader training program for Pakistan’s Frontier Corps, the  
paramilitary force that patrols the tribal areas.

“The Frontier Corps is a very important instrument because it’s  
largely Pashtun-based,” he said. The U.S. program to train the corps  
“is just getting started with training facility selection,” he said,  
adding that it was a five-year effort “to expand their capabilities  
in a number of areas, as well as the number of units they actually  
have.”

In a brief interview after his meeting with the reporters, Vickers  
said no decision has been made about which U.S. forces would train  
the Frontier Corps. He said it could be regular forces or special  
operations forces, or a mix of those, but the decision was up to  
leaders at U.S. Central Command.

The Frontier Corps training mission is part of a larger program that  
the U.S. Embassy in the Pakistani capital of Islamabad is heading up  
that also includes about $150 million per year from the U.S. Agency  
for International Development “to help develop the tribal areas,”  
Vickers said, adding that the Pakistan government is committing $1  
billion or more to the project.

Vickers stressed that training and other forms of security assistance  
could include Pakistan’s regular army and other forces.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates said the U.S. was willing to conduct  
“joint operations” with Pakistani forces if the Pakistani government  
gave its consent. Vickers was asked whether having U.S. troops  
operating alongside their Pakistani counterparts in the tribal areas  
was advisable.

“I wouldn’t want to speculate on operations, but ‘joint operations’  
can mean a lot of things,” he said. Asked whether U.S. participation  
in such “joint operations” might consist of providing intelligence,  
surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, Vickers replied: “Could  
be. It could be others, as well.”