[R-G] West key irritant in Georgia conflict
Anthony Fenton
fentona at shaw.ca
Sat Aug 9 10:15:30 MDT 2008
West key irritant in Georgia conflict
Russian support of South Ossetia's wish to unite with northern
brethren has triggered latest violence
David Marples
The Edmonton Journal
http://www.canada.com/components/print.aspx?id=227207c9-22bf-4210-8fd0-61232a906028&sponsor=
Saturday, August 09, 2008
On Friday, Georgia launched an attack on its autonomous republic of
South Ossetia in an apparent bid to remove a separatist government and
reincorporate the region into Georgia. Russia responded with air
strikes and reportedly casualties within the main South Ossetian city
of Tskhinvali have been heavy. How did this crisis develop and what
are the possible solutions to it?
South Ossetia is a small mountainous region occupied mainly by
Ossetians (about 65 per cent) and Georgians (about 30 per cent). To
the north lies North Ossetia, an autonomous republic within the
Russian Federation. Many South Ossetians wish to reunite with their
northern compatriots. In 1992, they held a referendum in support of
independence, which was supported by a large majority. However, the
international community did not recognize the results.
In 2003, after what was termed the "Rose Revolution," Mikheil
Saakashvili was elected Georgian president and took office in January
2004. He made it clear his priorities were NATO and EU membership as
well as renewed negotiations with de facto independent regimes in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He received encouragement from the United
States, which recognizes the territorial integrity of Georgia, as well
as from NATO, which has indicated that Georgia will soon be accepted
as a member.
These developments incensed Russia, which regards the area as a vital
part of its sphere of interest. After the 1992 conflict, Russia sent
several hundred peacekeepers into South Ossetia. It also offered
Russian passports to ethnic Ossetians for their own protection, and
about half of South Ossetian residents are now officially Russian
citizens. Georgia claims that Russian planes have frequently violated
Ossetian airspace and that Russia's goal is the outright incorporation
of South Ossetia and its reunion with the northern territory.
In 2006, South Ossetia once again held a referendum, which again voted
overwhelmingly for independence. Although international observers were
present to monitor the vote, and it was reported that 99 per cent of
South Ossetians supported the motion, Georgians were disenfranchised.
Therefore, the UN and EU did not recognize it as valid. The Western
powers also maintained that any referendum required the consent of the
Georgian government in Tblisi, the rightful ruler of the territory.
Today there are effectively two governments in South Ossetia: an
unrecognized de facto separatist government based in Tskhinvali under
Eduard Kokoiti, 44, a former wrestling champion, and an alternative
pro-Georgian Provisional Government of South Ossetia that is led by
Ossetian Dmitri Sanakoev, aged 39, formerly an officer in the Soviet
army. Sanakoev was inaugurated as "president" in a village several
kilometers to the north-east of Tskhinvali on Dec. 1, 2006.
Koikoiti wishes to unite the two Ossetias under the umbrella of
Russia. Sanakoev's government derives from another 2006 referendum
held among the Georgian and Ossetian population, organized by the
"Salvation Union of South Ossetia." He has received encouragement from
the U.S. and has presented a speech in Brussels to EU and Georgian
parliamentary officials. However, his election according to most
accounts was not democratic, and he enjoyed a near total monopoly of
the Georgian media. Moreover, it seems inconceivable that a lasting
solution to the Ossetian question can be found without reflecting the
wishes of the titular population.
Although South Ossetia has a population of only about 70,000 and few
major resources--it is mainly mountainous--the conflict that broke out
on Aug. 8 could develop into a major international problem. Georgia's
sudden assault on Tskhinvali represents an attempt to resolve an
intractable issue by force. Russia, in turn, responded with air
strikes on the grounds that several of its peacekeepers died during
the invasion.
In the earlier 1991-92 conflict there were many examples of "ethnic
cleansing." Thousands of Ossetians fled into Russia, and over 20,000
Georgians moved into Georgia proper. Though the two peoples have also
enjoyed long periods of peaceful cohabitation and have intermarried
extensively, there is a danger that ethnic conflict could now develop
in full. Moreover, the Russian Caucasus is already volatile because of
the continuing war in Chechnya as well as violence in Daghestan and
Ingushetia.
Neither the Western nor Russian attitudes to the issue seem
particularly helpful. The West was quick to recognize Kosovo,
essentially a second Albanian state in Europe that declared unilateral
independence, but seems reticent about South Ossetia, which has
expressed a similar wish. Some analysts perceive the conflict as
originating with and exacerbated by Russia, and there are numerous
citations of Russian violations of Georgian airspace. The circulation
of the Russian ruble in South Ossetia is perceived as a symbol of
Russia's intentions.
However, there should be some room for manoeuvring between the major
powers if they wish to resolve the dispute peacefully. Russia is
unwilling to become involved in a major military conflict despite its
support for South Ossetian separatism. Georgia cannot continue to
occupy a region that has expressed a clear desire for independence.
Though Russia responded with unwarranted violence, it is the West and
its new ally Georgia that needs to find a compromise solution.
Georgia's territorial integrity--notwithstanding Russian pressure--is
no longer viable within its current territory, if indeed it ever was.
Saakashvili bears responsibility for the sudden invasion, carried out
at a time when world leaders are focused on the Olympic Games in
Beijing. Georgian control over its wayward province cannot be
established without bloodshed.
David Marples is professor of history at the University of Alberta and
director of the Stasiuk Program on Contemporary Ukraine at the
Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies.
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