[R-G] Yes, it's that 'q' word again

[Anthony Fenton]

Latest 'Iraq Study Group' report:
http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2008/iraq_surge.pdf

Yes, it's that 'q' word again
By Jim Lobe
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JD08Ak01.html

WASHINGTON - Despite a reduction in violence over the past 15 months,  
"The US risks getting bogged down in Iraq for a long time to come,  
with serious consequences for its interests in other parts of the  
world," according to a new assessment by the same group of experts who  
advised the bipartisan blue-ribbon Iraq Study Group (ISG) in 2006.

The assessment, which was released on the eve of a critical  
congressional testimony this week by Washington's ambassador and chief  
military officer in Iraq, concludes that the decline in violence has  
resulted in very little progress toward achieving national  
reconciliation and that gains in security remain "fragile and  
dependent on the presence of US forces".

"Political progress is so slow, halting and superficial, and social  
and political fragmentation so pronounced that the US is no closer to  
being able to leave Iraq than it was a year ago," according to the  
report released by the US Institute of Peace (USIP) and entitled "Iraq  
After the Surge: Options and Questions".

"Lasting political development could take five to 10 years of full,  
unconditional US commitment to Iraq," it concluded, noting that such a  
commitment already "carries a massive cost, both human and financial,  
in addition to the global interests the US is sacrificing to its  
commitment in Iraq. Even if progress in Iraq continues, the results  
may not be worth the cost," it warned.

The report, which lays out three possible options for US policy in  
Iraq over the next year or so, comes just two days before ambassador  
Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus are to ask that Washington  
suspend its current drawdown of US "surge" forces in Iraq at the  
anticipated 140,000-troop level by the end of July to ensure that  
security gains achieved over the past year can be sustained. At the  
height of the "surge" several months ago, Washington had about 170,000  
troops in Iraq.

That recommendation, which appears to enjoy the backing of US  
President George W Bush, is likely to be hotly disputed by Democrats  
in Congress who favor continuing to withdraw combat troops at the rate  
of about 5,000 a month through the end of the year - a position  
privately shared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who have fretted  
publicly that maintaining high levels of deployment in Iraq is taking  
an unsustainable toll on both the morale of US ground forces and on  
their readiness to deal with other potential military crises.

The new USIP report, which represents the views of scores of military  
and regional experts who advised the bipartisan, Congressionally  
appointed Iraq Study Group (ISG) two years ago, will almost certainly  
give the dissenters ammunition in their questioning of Crocker and  
Petraeus.

The ISG, which was co-chaired by former secretary of state James Baker  
and former Democratic Representative Lee Hamilton, had called in  
December 2006 for withdrawing all US combat troops by April 2008,  
leaving the remaining troops - about 80,000 - to focus on training and  
equipping Iraqi security forces, conducting operations against al- 
Qaeda in Iraq, and protecting US civilian personnel.

Bush, however, rejected that recommendation and opted instead for a  
"surge" strategy that increased US troop strength by about 30,000 in  
hopes that the additional forces would substantially reduce sectarian  
violence in and around Baghdad and encourage Iraq's warring political  
and religious factions to make the compromises necessary for national  
reconciliation.

While the strategy has made major advances on the security front,  
progress toward reconciliation has been largely consisted of "tactical  
horse-trading" designed above all to satisfy minimum US "benchmarks" -  
such as revenue sharing and a reform of the de-Ba'athification laws -  
to ensure Washington's continued support, according to the report.

"[T]hough positive as far as it goes, [it] has not alleviated the  
underlying causes of political instability in Iraq or facilitated the  
emergence of a truly national polity," the report concluded, noting as  
well that "much of [the] success [of the current strategy] is due to  
factors that are outside US control and therefore subject to change."

Among those factors are a ceasefire by the Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi  
Army and the willingness of former Sunni insurgents "stridently  
opposed to the [Shi'ite-led] Iraqi government" to cooperate with US  
forces against al-Qaeda in Iraq.

The report suggests two possible alternatives to the current policy of  
an "unconditional" US commitment to Iraq.

The first, an echo of the 2006 ISG report, calls for a "reduced,  
conditional commitment" that would tie future US support for the  
government in Baghdad to a few minimal goals - creating a mechanism  
for oil revenue sharing, holding provincial elections to formalize a  
decentralized power structure, and professionalizing a non-sectarian  
army to "guard the state and police factional violence".

If Baghdad failed to make meaningful progress toward these goals by  
the end of this year, then the US would withdraw its forces according  
to its own timetable. If it did make such progress, Washington would  
still reduce its forces and focus on training and equipping the Iraqi  
army and helping it prevent factional violence.

A second option would be an "unconditional, near-total reduction of  
the US military commitment" coupled with "an enhanced security  
presence in the region, an invigorated diplomatic effort [directed  
primarily at Iran and Saudi Arabia], and continuing political support  
for the Iraqi government".

Each of these options, including the current strategy of unconditional  
commitment, carries different risks and possible benefits for US  
interests in Iraq, the region and beyond, according to the report,  
which identifies five "paramount interests" affected by US policy in  
Iraq.

They include: preventing Iraq from becoming a haven or platform for  
international terrorists; restoring US credibility, prestige and  
capacity to act worldwide; improving regional stability; limiting and  
redirecting Iranian influence; and maintaining an independent Iraq as  
a single state.

The report addresses the possible impact of each of the three  
scenarios on the five interests. Maintaining the current strategy, it  
concludes would have a "major negative impact" on Washington's  
capacity to act worldwide; a reduced, conditional commitment would, on  
the other hand, have a "positive" impact on that capacity, while an  
unconditional, near-total reduction of commitment would have a mixed  
impact by, on the one hand freeing up US military capacity, while, on  
the other, risking the "perception of US defeat".

(Inter Press Service)