[R-G] The Taliban's shadow hangs over NATO

Mon Apr 7 10:22:28 MDT 2008

Central Asia
Apr 8, 2008
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/JD08Ag01.html	
The Taliban's shadow hangs over NATO
By M K Bhadrakumar

It may seem the outcome of the summit meeting of the North Atlantic  
Treaty Organization (NATO) at Bucharest, Romania from April 2-4 and  
the weekend meet between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US  
President George W Bush at the Black Sea resort of Sochi has gone in  
favor of Washington. At least, media commentators in Moscow assess  
Russia "lost" the NATO summit.

An element of anxiety surely crept in. The Bucharest summit and the  
Sochi meet are watershed events. US-Russia relations have reached a  
crossroads. A new long-term confrontation may ensue, or the path opens  
to partnership relations. The US delegation conceded nothing to  
Moscow. The George W Bush administration carried a tough brief -  
"there's no trade-off, period", Bush said as he headed for Bucharest.  
On the one hand, the Bush administration wants to create a legacy by  
transforming NATO as the dominating political-military force in Europe  
under American leadership. On the other hand, it wants this achieved  
without a breach with either its allies or Russia.

There were only two ways such balancing could be achieved: one, by  
pushing for a large-scale breakthrough, and, two, through a strategic  
compromise with Russia. Washington opted for the first. But it's a  
tough call. In the process, it failed to secure a NATO Membership  
Action Plan for Ukraine and Georgia. But it extracted a pledge from  
NATO allies that the matter will be taken up again in December.

Moscow anticipated this outcome. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said,  
"This will not be unanswered. But we will respond in a pragmatic way,  
not like little school boys who were hurt and fled their classroom  
slamming the door to cry in the corner." He hinted the issue is far  
from over. "We are prepared for various scenarios," he added.

Again, American diplomacy appears to have scored a tangible success in  
getting NATO to agree to look at a "bolt-on system" connected to the  
planned US missile defense shield in Poland and the Czech Republic.  
The summit decided to task NATO to develop options for a comprehensive  
missile defense architecture to extend coverage to all ally territory  
and populations not otherwise covered by the US system. The findings  
will come up for review at the alliance's 2009 summit. The NATO  
leaders realized the "substantial contribution that the US system can  
provide".

On the face of it, the European anti-ballistic missile system has  
turned from an American project into a NATO project. This, in turn,  
will undermine Russia's ability to oppose it, because it may now have  
to deal with the Western community in the form of NATO. Indeed, Moscow  
faces a hard choice - either settle with Bush in the remaining months  
of his presidency or prepare to face the brunt of Senator John McCain  
(who has emerged as the front runner in the US presidential election).  
The Democrats are no better, either. Richard Holbrooke, who advises  
Hillary Clinton, or Zbigniew Brzezinski, who seems to guide the Barack  
Obama team from the backstage, share McCain's outlook with regard to  
"revanchist Russia".

An unnamed Kremlin source admitted at Sochi that Putin and Bush failed  
to overcome differences over the missile defense system. Putin himself  
acknowledged at the joint press conference with Bush at Sochi on  
Sunday: "I won't hide the fact that one of the most difficult issues  
was and remains the American missile defense system in Europe ... I  
want to be understood correctly: there has been no change in our  
fundamental attitude to the American plans." Significantly, Bush's  
response contained no promises of a rethink, no assurances of an  
accommodation.

So, is it a new cold war? Putin says "no". He expresses cautious  
optimism that an agreement on missile defense is still possible. He  
insists, "There was some positive progress. Our concerns were heard by  
the American side." He believes Bush is "seriously and sincerely"  
seeking to resolve the problem and "we fully support this attitude".

Where is the catch? Are we missing something? The answer may be found  
in the coming months in the tangled mountains in faraway Afghanistan.  
Unnoticed by the security officers clearing the homeless people and  
stray dogs around the palatial venue of the summit in the Romanian  
parliament building, downtown Bucharest had a visitor with brooding  
eyes and unkempt beard who lingered in the shadows all through and  
watched the proceedings - the Taliban.

Once the theatrics surrounding NATO expansion and the US missile  
defense wear out and a reality check inevitably follows, the  
existential question will stare all in the face - the alliance's  
faltering operations in Afghanistan.

Russia offered a rope at Bucharest, which the alliance grasped, while  
Washington pretended it didn't quite see that happening. The  
significance of the agreement reached in Bucharest on Friday is yet to  
sink in. The agreement concerns transit of NATO's food and non- 
military cargo and "some types of non-lethal military equipment"  
across Russia to Afghanistan.

NATO supplies will be transported thousands of kilometers across  
Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Even though the letters regarding  
the transit were exchanged between Lavrov and NATO secretary general  
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the ceremony in Bucharest, Russia has treated  
this as a matter concerning the Collective Security Treaty  
Organization (CSTO). The topic figured at the informal meeting of CSTO  
foreign ministers held in Moscow on March 28 "because transit to  
Afghanistan simply for objective geographical reasons also calls for  
appropriate arrangements with many countries which are members of  
CSTO", to quote Lavrov. CSTO comprises Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,  
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

In the ultimate analysis, therefore, Russia has acted in consultation  
with and on behalf of the CSTO partners. This has implications, no  
matter CSTO's standing in NATO eyes. Moscow made no bones about the  
fact that sheer pragmatism had guided its decision. Lavrov said, "If  
we pretend to be offended and block this transit, the efficiency of  
the combat against terrorism, which is not very good as it is, will  
worsen dramatically; and the only result will be that in the absence  
of a restraining factor, all these drug traffickers and terrorists  
will feel freer in planning their actions in Central Asia and  
Russia ... Russia's pragmatism and interests prompt us to support the  
activities of those who are trying to deal with the terrorists in  
Afghanistan."

But there is more to Moscow's "pragmatism". The Russian ambassador in  
Kabul, Zamir Kabulov, told Vremya Novostei, "The longer NATO remains  
in Afghanistan, the worse it will be for them. But it would be  
incorrect to imagine Russia wants NATO out of Afghanistan as soon as  
possible, at any cost. We will not let them out of Afghanistan until  
they solve the problems they have created - international terrorism,  
unchecked increase in drug trafficking - and build a strong state  
there, and rebuild the economy."

That is to say, Russia will provide all logistical support to NATO so  
that the alliance can focus attention on bleeding itself white in  
Afghanistan. An engrossing equation is developing that may determine  
the alchemy of Russia's relations with NATO for years to come. Whether  
Washington acknowledges it or not, the transit agreement gives Russia  
a role in the NATO operations in Afghanistan. The criticality of this  
role will only increase as NATO's heavy dependence - 70% plus as of  
now - on transit through Pakistani territory becomes more and more  
unsustainable.

Russian and NATO intelligence cannot be unaware that the Taliban have  
begun targeting Torkham, the strategic check post on the Afghanistan- 
Pakistan border, which is also the main gateway for supply convoys for  
the alliance's forces. On March 20, a convoy of 40 oil tankers  
supplying NATO forces was destroyed in a series of explosions in a  
parking lot at Torkham. No doubt, the Taliban have identified NATO's  
supply and logistics systems as its Achilles' heel. Meanwhile, the  
willingness of the democratically elected government in Pakistan to  
continue as an ally in the "war on terror" itself remains to be seen.

What all this adds up to is that the Bush administration's  
triumphalism over the NATO Bucharest summit is going to be short- 
lived. How NATO is going to be able to extricate itself from the  
colossal muddle in Afghanistan is a wide open question. Attacks on  
NATO troops are now taking place at the rate of 500 per month. With  
all the heavyweight punches at the Bucharest summit, Washington failed  
to get any significant numbers of additional troops from its NATO  
allies.

The commitment by France, Britain, Poland, Spain, Romania and others  
add up to 2,000 to 2,500 troops, according to the White House, but the  
commanders in Afghanistan say they could use in immediate terms as  
many as two or three brigades, equal to some 10,000 troops. The US  
will have to make up the shortfall.

The US spokesman put on a brave face, claiming that "regardless of the  
situation in Iraq", Washington is committed to Afghanistan for the  
long haul. But then there is yet another side to it - the financial  
drain. The operations currently cost the American taxpayer US$100  
million per day, which works out to $36 billion annually. The US is  
nowhere near the end of the tunnel after having spent $127 billion in  
the war in Afghanistan since 2001.

Above all, the political chessboard is dramatically shifting. The  
proposal made by Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov at Bucharest for  
the resuscitation of the "six plus two" contact group underscored  
this. Ironically, "six plus two" was created in the 1997-2001 period  
under the United Nations auspices for promoting reconciliation between  
the Taliban and the Northern Alliance groups. It comprised China,  
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Pakistan and the US and  
Russia.

Karimov suggested an expanded format of "six plus two", including  
NATO, should work on a potential roadmap leading to peace in  
Afghanistan. Curiously, even as he was addressing the NATO leaders in  
Bucharest, a spokesman of the erstwhile Northern Alliance revealed in  
Kabul that they had already commenced secret talks with the Taliban.  
"We are both Muslims, we are both Afghans, and we are both  
dissatisfied with the [Kabul] government's performance," he reportedly  
claimed. He implied NATO is the outside party.

Karimov's proposal will be attractive to many NATO member countries,  
which remain skeptical about the US's so-called "comprehensive  
strategy" in the war and are inclined to exploring an exit strategy.  
(Der Spiegel reported that a German paper outlining an "exit strategy"  
figured in closed-door discussions at Bucharest.) At any rate,  
Washington will be irritated that the Uzbek proposal implicitly seeks  
a voice for Central Asian countries (and Russia and China) in NATO's  
war in Afghanistan.

To be sure, Moscow is keenly taking note. Russian Deputy Foreign  
Minister Alexander Grushko told Interfax news agency in Moscow last  
week that Russia would be willing to deepen cooperation with NATO over  
Afghanistan, but this would not happen "if each other's lawful  
security interests are not taken into account". He added in good  
measure, "There is no trade-off and there cannot be one."

Russia's transit deal might appear to involve only NATO's food and non- 
military supplies. But then, as the soldier in George Bernard Shaw's  
play Arms and the Man would say, chocolates are more important than  
ammunition. Grushko is justified to anticipate NATO's European members  
- and even Washington - will eventually appreciate Russia' s goodwill.  
Until that happens, Moscow wouldn't conclude who lost and who won at  
the summit in Bucharest.

M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign  
Service for over 29 years, with postings including India's ambassador  
to Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and to Turkey (1998-2001).