[R-G] AFGHANISTAN: More, But of What

[Anthony Fenton]

AFGHANISTAN:  More, But of What
Analysis by Claudia Ciobanu
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=41857

BUCHAREST, Apr 4 (IPS) - At the Bucharest summit, NATO adopted an  
undisclosed "comprehensive" security strategy in Afghanistan, which  
combines military with civilian efforts. The publicised discussions on  
Afghanistan, however, were focused on the numbers of troops.

"I am very grateful to the international community," said Afghan  
President Hamid Karzai Apr. 2, during a conference organised by the  
German Marshall Fund on the sidelines of the North Atlantic Treaty  
Organisation (NATO) summit in Bucharest. "We are very thankful. Give  
us more."

"We are not failing, we are succeeding in Afghanistan," said NATO  
Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the meeting, when  
confronted with numbers illustrating the increase of violence in  
Afghanistan in 2007.

But the officials' declaration of optimism is put into perspective by  
the mere fact that one of their most important missions at the summit  
in Bucharest was to sign a new document outlining a change of strategy  
for security in Afghanistan.

The Afghanistan Compact, approved in January 2006 and drafted in 2005,  
introduced a "comprehensive approach" to security in place of a  
military-centred approach deemed unsuccessful. The "comprehensive  
approach" means not only fighting "enemies" but also training and  
subsequently relying more on Afghan security forces and leaders,  
rebuilding the infrastructure and the economy, and involving  
neighbours of Afghanistan in peace- building.

At the Bucharest summit, leaders from NATO, the United Nations (UN),  
the European Union (EU), the World Bank, and donor countries committed  
to a long-term "comprehensive political-military plan" for Afghanistan.

The text of this document was kept confidential, but its principles  
were made public as a "strategic vision" which includes an effort to  
give a more central role in peace-building to the Afghan government  
and other international organisations besides NATO. The "vision"  
document also states the goal of having an 80,000 strong Afghan army  
by 2010.

But with the details undisclosed, it remains unclear whether NATO will  
actually be able to pull off a change of strategy.

"NATO is a military alliance. It has no economic or political capacity  
to speak of," Barnett Rubin from New York University, author of a  
widely read blog on Afghanistan told IPS. "Therefore, NATO is not the  
right organisation to pull this off. The emphasis on NATO reinforces  
the emphasis on the military aspect of the struggle, which U.S.  
commanders estimate is about 20 percent of the whole."

Indeed, negotiations right before and during the NATO summit were  
centred on the number of supplementary troops that each contributor  
country would send to Afghanistan. Additionally, efforts were made to  
persuade countries to give up "caveats" on their contingents (specific  
restrictions on where divisions can be sent and what operations they  
can engage in).

Before the summit, 47,000 troops from 39 countries were serving in  
Afghanistan, and it was announced that between 6,000 and 10,000 more  
were needed. In spite of the triumphal announcement by French  
President Nicolas Sarkozy that his country would increase its presence  
in Afghanistan by 1,000, an intervention by the French parliament  
reduced the number to 700. Other countries, such as the UK, Poland,  
Belgium and Romania, also revealed increases in their contributions.

"But numbers are not what really counts," says Dr. Ana Pejcinova, a  
development worker who recently returned from Helmand province in  
southern Afghanistan. "Posing the issue in terms of numbers is  
actually misdirecting attention away from the root of the problem and  
its potential solution. The latter seems to be not in hard power but  
in, plain and simple, economy -- that is, livelihoods, poverty,  
'having something to lose'. Afghans have very little to lose, if any.

"NATO may not be able at all to offer the solution to ending the  
insurgency: it's a military alliance, while the solution might be in  
economy and politics," Pejcinova told IPS, supporting Rubin's views.  
"The discrepancy between funds invested into the international  
military forces and funds invested into development of the country  
should shame the West."

A recent report by a group of non-governmental organisations active in  
Afghanistan showed that, out of 25 billion dollars granted for the  
reconstruction of the country, only 15 billion have been spent, and 40  
percent of this amount returned to the donors through salaries and  
profits of companies.

While NATO has started to acknowledge that peace in Afghanistan  
depends on a combination of military action and aid for development,  
and is asking for the help of other organisations for the latter, Ana  
Pejcinova warns that the alliance might be at fault also in its  
military approach.

According to the "strategic vision" document, NATO is fighting against  
"extremists and terrorists such as the Taleban or al-Quaeda." But  
Pejcinova says it is necessary to look behind the "extremism" tag.  
"The massive rise in attacks is mainly due not to the Taleban, but to  
numerous armed groups whose recruits have lost everything -- land,  
assets, families, and so on -- many from U.S. indiscriminate bombing  
campaigns.

"The Western conventional armies are facing unconventional, and what  
is turning into a popular armed movement in Afghanistan. Although  
every tactical battle is won by conventional hard power, the strategic  
goals are actually undermined by each tactical victory: winning  
(militarily) over locals only recruits more locals to join or support  
the insurgency."

All this points to one recommendation: much more funds and emphasis on  
the economy, complemented by a military component that needs to be  
more focused and restrained.

In his blog, Barnett Rubin points to specific non-military measures as  
central to peace in Afghanistan. "The rise in price of wheat and other  
commodities presents an opportunity for investing in other cash crops  
(than poppy and cannabis) and their marketing in Afghanistan. For all  
the rhetoric about how the drug economy is supporting insurgency and  
terrorism, where is the programme to seize this market opportunity?

"And for all the talk of the importance of Afghanistan to global  
security, where is the programme to assure Afghans of an affordable  
supply of basic food? This would do at least as much good as more NATO  
troops, and with less risk of collateral damage." (END/2008)