[R-G] The Taliban are ready to directly negotiate with the Afghan government

[Anthony Fenton]

Copyright 2007 NoticiasFinancieras/Groupo de Diarios America
All Rights Reserved
IPS (Latin America)

September 21, 2007 Friday

LENGTH: 873 words

HEADLINE: The Taliban are ready to directly negotiate with the Afghan  
government;
AFGHANISTAN: Taliban Ready for Talks - Agenda Unknown

BYLINE: Lal Aqa Shirin

BODY:


In contrast to Ahmadi's previous statements, he said last week that  
the Taliban have never rejected negotiations with the government.  
Earlier he had insisted that talks would begin only on the condition  
that foreign troops leave Afghanistan.

Taliban agreed to negotiations a day after President Hamid Karzai  
extended an invitation for talks on Sep. 9. Although the positive  
response from the Taliban is welcome, it is important to consider  
what will be on the agenda for discussion and whether the  
negotiations will have the impact everyone is expecting.

Will the negotiations address the larger questions confronting  
Afghanistan or will these be reduced to few local deals in the south?  
Will these talks conclude an establishment of real peace in  
Afghanistan or merely buy time for the belligerents?

These are some of the questions Afghans are asking themselves. They  
are hopeful but they also know that the situation is very complex,  
which will require vision, patience and real leadership from both sides.

Equally important to remember are the interests of the international  
community, in particular the United States which invaded this country  
with a very specific goal in mind: to exact revenge on those who  
perpetrated the Sep. 11 attacks in the U.S. and those who harboured  
them, meaning the Taliban.

Interestingly, despite the invitation to talks, both sides are  
actively engaged in combat. Neither warring side has made any  
suggestion regarding putting a ceasefire in place as a pre-condition  
for negotiations, which is odd.

Although the initial toppling of the Taliban regime and driving out  
the al-Qaeda in end-2001 was welcomed by the Afghan people,  
subsequent military operations against the Taliban and other  
insurgents, with the resultant losses suffered by the civilian  
population caught in the cross fire has angered people and Afghan  
authorities.

It has undermined the credibility of the government and its  
international allies in pursuing their 'war on terror' in Afghanistan.

 From what is known, the government is keenly evaluating the  
Taliban's positive response to Karzai's offer of negotiations. The  
government has also welcomed the Taliban's decision to drop their  
previous pre-condition for foreign troops to leave Afghanistan before  
holding negotiations with the government.

Talking to the Taliban and reaching any deal with them will  
undoubtedly change the face of Afghan politics and may further strain  
relations with the Northern Alliance followers, who helped by U.S.  
money, Special Forces and air power, drove the Taliban from power.

The issue of negotiations with the Taliban is hotly debated in media  
and political circles. Some members of the Mushrano Jirga (Upper  
House of Parliament) have already accepted the principle of  
negotiating with the Taliban and have said that improvement of  
security in Afghanistan is directly linked to Taliban's participation  
in national politics.

A further point to carefully consider relates to who from the Taliban  
ranks will take part in the negotiations. Will the majority of  
Taliban leadership come to the negotiation table or only a few  
disaffected commanders who are unhappy about the Taliban's links to  
al-Qaeda?

The so-called moderate Taliban or new-Taliban represented by their  
former foreign minister Maulawi Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil or their former  
ambassador to Pakistan, Mullah Abdul Salam Zaif, have already warned  
the government and the international community that they must  
negotiate with the Taliban or risk further violence and ascendance of  
hard core Taliban who might refuse to negotiate at all.

But who do they really represent among the Taliban ranks? Do they  
really have any influence with the Taliban leadership that is waging  
the ongoing war? Can they bring them to the negotiation table? Should  
we be taking them seriously? By including people like Mutawakil and  
Zaif, can their participation in national politics weaken the hard  
core Taliban? Or should we be talking to the hard-core Taliban  
instead. Or, should we be doing both?

It is likely that the hard-core Taliban leadership with strong links  
to al-Qaeda will resist talking to the government and its  
international allies. What would be interesting to know is the  
numerical strength of these hard-core elements, how close their links  
are to al-Qaeda and the influence they have over the Taliban's war  
policy.

Only when this information is available can a strategy to influence  
their choices succeed. If it is found that the local commanders  
waging the war are largely acting independently and their agenda is  
not linked to al-Qaeda, the chances for holding negotiations and  
succeeding in them are much greater.

It is quite likely that the U.S. administration has realised the  
limit of its strategy in Afghanistan and is trying to consolidate its  
gains at the 2008 presidential elections, by orchestrating a deal  
between the Afghan government and the Taliban that can be heralded as  
a 'success'.

Such a scenario makes good sense. For example, U.S. strategic  
interests will be guaranteed by ensuring the continuity of a friendly  
Afghan government and its 'war on terror', with a slight modification  
of shifting its war focus from Taliban back to al-Qaeda. © 2007  
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