[R-G] Bhutto's Bloody Return
Yoshie Furuhashi
critical.montages at gmail.com
Sat Oct 20 16:21:08 MDT 2007
<http://www.counterpunch.org/tariq10202007.html>
October 20 / 21, 2007
Bhutto's Bloody Return
A Massacre Foretold
By TARIQ ALI
The massacre in Karachi had been widely predicted. Benazir Bhutto
herself has stated that she was aware of the dangers. The government
pleaded with her to delay her return. Jihadi leaders, angered by her
slavish support of US foreign policy, had publicly threatened to kill
her. She survived but a few hundred people have been killed without
reason.Her husband, who decided not to accompany her, has accused
Pakistani intelligence of complicity in the attacks. Benazir Bhutto
herself has preferred to attack the followers of a dead military
dictator.
Once it had become obvious that something was being planned, she would
have been better advised to make a quiet return, but she insisted on a
show of strength. The planning had been going on for over a month. The
130,000 people who were brought to welcome her in trucks and buses
from allover the province(how many of them were paid is still not
clear). In addition there were 20,000 police and paramilitary
personnel for her protection. All to no avail. It ended in a
bloodbath, remind us once again of the volatile nature of politics in
Pakistan.
More trouble lies ahead. Benazir may be the preferred politician of
Washington and the EU, but the Supreme Court is considering five
separate petitions to reject the Ordnance that pardons corrupt
politicians. Were the court to accept these petitions, Ms Bhutto would
have to serve time in prison. This would not displease the government.
They would pretend to bow before the dictates of justice.
The tragedy of Pakistan is that the People's Party of Bhutto and its
rivals offer no real alternatives to the policies currently being
pursued. The State Department notion of Bhutto perched on Musharraf's
shoulder parrotting pro-Washington homilies was always ridiculous. Now
there are doubts as to whether she will even reach the General's
shoulder.
Tariq Ali's new book, Pirates of the Caribbean: Axis of Hope, is
published by Verso. He can be reached at: tariq.ali3 at btinternet.com
<http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/tariq_ali/2007/08/sinking_together.html>
Sinking together?
Tariq Ali
August 30, 2007 4:33 PM
For a politician whose sycophantic colleagues boast that she is closer
to the pulse of the people than any of her rivals, Benazir Bhutto's
decision to do a deal with Pakistan's uniformed president indicates
the exact opposite. She is sadly out of touch. General Musharraf is
now deeply unpopular here. It is not often that one can actually
observe power draining away from a political leader. And the lifeline
being thrown to him in the shape of an over-blown Benazir might sink
together with him.
An indication that she was not completely unaware of this came a few
days ago when she declared that her decision was "approved" by the
"international community" always a code-word for Washington) and the
Pakistan army (well, yes). In short, Pakistani public opinion was
irrelevant.
The mood among sections of the street - I am currently in Lahore - is
summed up in a cruel taunt: "People's Party de ballay, ballay / ade
kanjar, ade dallay" (Marvel at the People Party / half-whore and
half-pimp). This is slightly unfair and could apply to all the Muslim
Leagues as well. The fact is that people are disgusted with politics
and see politicians as crooks out to make money and feed the greed of
the networks they patronise and which double up as useful vote banks.
But it should be acknowledged that Benazir Bhutto's approach is not
the result of a sudden illumination. There is a twisted continuity
here. When the general seized power in 1999 and toppled the Sharif
brothers (then Benazir's detested rivals), she welcomed the coup and
nurtured hopes of a ministerial post. When no invitations were
forthcoming, she would turn up at the desk of a junior in the South
Asian section of the State Department, pleading for a job. Instead the
military charged her and her husband with graft and corruption. The
evidence was overwhelming. She decided to stay in exile.
In March this year, Musharraf's decision to sack Iftikhar Hussein
Chaudhry, the turbulent chief justice of the Supreme Court, backfired
unexpectedly and sensationally. Tens of thousands of lawyers protested
and took to the streets, demanding his immediate reinstatement.
Political and social activists of almost every political hue joined
them and a country usually depicted abroad as a den of bearded
extremists on the verge of seizing power was suddenly witnessing an
amazing constitutional struggle that had nothing to do with religion.
Even the cynics were moved to see lawyers insisting on a rigid
separation of powers.
The use of force by Musharraf's supporters in Karachi who opened fire
and killed peaceful demonstrators created a further backlash against
the regime. The Supreme Court voted unanimously to re-instate their
chief. The general was becoming increasingly isolated.
The politicians who surrounded him pleaded for a state of emergency or
even a new declaration of martial law, but according to many sources
here in Pakistan the joint chiefs said that the military was too
over-committed on the western frontier to police the rest of the
country, which was a nice way of saying "No". With this route blocked,
Washington now insisted on a deal with Ms Bhutto. The inner
preoccupation to which she was a prey (power at any cost and the
withdrawal of corruption charges) prevented her, I think, from having
complete control of herself.
The Bush administration, which has brokered this deal, is basically
ignorant of Pakistani politics. To isolate the Sharif brothers instead
of including them in the "secular package" will drive them in the
other direction. Nawaz Sharif is posing as a man of principle,
forgetting how under his watch Muslim League thugs raided the Supreme
Court and journalists were harassed and locked up. Memories are always
short here and the fact the Sharif refused to negotiate with Musharraf
has made him more popular in the country.
The notion that Bhutto can succeed in dealing with the Taliban more
effectively than the general is risible, as Kamran Nazeer has already
pointed out on Cif. Every time innocents are killed in bombing raids
in Afghanistan or Pakistan increases support for the Taliban
increases. Militants now control or dominate Tank, parts of Swat,
North and South Waziristan, Dir, and Kohat inside Pakistan. The
solution is political, not military. Killing more people will not help
and there have been cases of soldiers refusing to fire on
fellow-Muslims and junior officers taking early retirement after a
tour of the duty on the Pak-Afghan border.
Pakistan being Pakistan, many observers are convinced that even if the
deal is consummated it will be of short duration.
--
Yoshie
<http://montages.blogspot.com/>
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