[R-G] White guys with guns: Canada's military in Afghanistan

[Anthony Fenton]

White guys with guns: Canada's military in Afghanistan
by Dave Markland
	
October 15, 2007

http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=49&ItemID=14037

The current incarnation of the Canadian military mission in  
Afghanistan began in February of 2006, and followed earlier military  
commitments beginning in the fall of 2001. Now operating mainly under  
NATO command as part of the International Security Assistance Force  
(ISAF), the array of Canadian Forces' roles has several notable  
aspects, some of which overlap: about 1200 troops make up the  
Canadian battle group headquartered at Kandahar Airfield, along with  
several hundred support personnel; over 100 soldiers comprise the  
bulk of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) based out Camp  
Nathan Smith in Kandahar City; the Operational Mentoring and Liaison  
Team (“omelette”), which embeds with and trains Afghan troops; and  
the Strategic Advisory Team (SAT) which is embedded with various  
Afghan government ministries in Kabul. In total, some 2500 personnel  
make up the conventional forces deployed in Afghanistan.  
Additionally, an unknown number of JTF-2 special forces work  
alongside special forces from the US and other countries as part of  
Operation Enduring Freedom. Very little is known about their role.

With a few exceptions, media coverage of the mission has been  
generally sympathetic to the claims and actions of Canadian military  
officials. It is the purpose of this essay to shed light on the less- 
reported aspects of the mission, about which our military and  
government officials rarely speak.

The spectacle at Kandahar Air Field (KAF) seems reminiscent of the  
bar scene in Star Wars. An enormous, Russian-built complex, KAF sits  
on the edge of the vast desert in southern Afghanistan which  
straddles the border with Pakistan amidst Pashtun territory.  
Journalists describe a steady of flow of soldiers from several  
countries, many of whom are off-limits to reporters. American and  
Canadian special forces, for instance, cannot be interviewed or even  
mentioned by the press. And those troops may not be the only ones  
keeping a low profile, as "a senior British officer said there last  
autumn that he was convinced the Taliban had many spies on the base".

Apart from the multinational tutoring in special ops and media  
relations, there may be other important skills being disseminated at  
KAF. A Norwegian newspaper caused a stir early this year when it  
reported on sworn testimony by several US interrogators who had  
worked at the base and described some of the goings-on, including the  
widespread use of torture.

But what about off-base, where the mission actually takes place,  
among the Afghan population? There, NATO forces are engaged in what  
military strategists term the "inkspot strategy" of counter- 
insurgency. Essentially this means that NATO ground troops, with air  
support, clear a given area of armed insurgents and hand over control  
of the territory to Afghan National Army (ANA) troops who in turn  
hand off the area to Afghan National Police (ANP) units. Then,  
development projects are launched with the intention of strengthening  
the population's allegiance to the national government.

The mission of the Canadian Forces is of a type which is wholly new  
to them, and seriously at odds with what many feel is the traditional  
role of our forces - i.e. peacekeeping. A Globe and Mail editorial  
marks the shift: the "new era of peacemaking", we are told, demands  
"pitched battles over a few metres of road". Others are not so quick  
to put on kid gloves when describing the mission. Scott Taylor,  
editor of Canadian military magazine Esprit de Corps, skips the  
linguistic niceties and describes Canadian troops in Afghanistan  
simply as "occupying forces".

How do soldiers themselves view their task? "Hours of boredom and  
then an intense moment of adrenaline," says one 25-year-old Canadian  
Forces gunner. "One fellow compares the subliminally percussive  
sensation to sex", relates a Toronto Star reporter. Another soldier  
reports vengeance and geopolitics as his motivator: "I have  
absolutely no problem killing them," asserts a battle group sergeant.  
"They started this on September 11. We're just bringing the fight  
back to them".

Indeed, many soldiers have taken up their tasks with gusto. Others,  
meanwhile, have been disappointed when the fight wasn't as hot as  
they expected. Shortly after arrival in Kandahar, members of the Van  
Doos regiment "étaient un peu frustrés de participer à une mission de  
reconstruction et auraient préféré combattre à leur arrivée en  
Afghanistan." ("were a little frustrated to be taking part in a  
reconstruction mission and would have preferred to fight upon their  
arrival in Afghanistan").

If all this Rambo-style readiness sounds to some like an echo of  
American military bravado, there may be good reason for it. Working  
in close quarters with their US counterparts seems to have caused a  
certain mindset to rub off on Canadian officers, exemplified by NATO  
spokesman James Appathurai. "NATO forces have the right and the  
responsibility to protect their mission," asserts the former employee  
of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. "That includes the right --  
and indeed, if the commander deems it necessary -- the responsibility  
to take pre-emptive action".

The M777 - 'Take that house out'

One of the key tools in Canada's version of "peacemaking", the  
British-made M777 Howitzer gun, which can shoot 6 inch-diameter  
bullets a distance of 30km (22 miles), has reportedly been dubbed the  
“Desert dragon” by insurgent fighters. Acquired by the Canadian  
Forces in the fall of 2005, the weapon has gained a devoted fan base  
among military brass. "When the infantry, for example, come up  
against a couple of houses where they would suffer casualties going  
in and clearing that house of the enemy, even though they would win,  
it's sort of nice to be able to stand back and turn to the tanker and  
say, 'Take that house out.'" So explained retired Major-General Lewis  
MacKenzie, who has been doing near full-time public relations for the  
war. Afghan bystanders, ceaselessly endangered by NATO operations,  
might disagree with MacKenzie that the experience is "sort of nice".

Getting into the spirit of things, the Globe and Mail's Gloria  
Galloway extols the benefits of the M777: "They are a good  
negotiation tool; in trying to persuade Afghans not to help the  
Taliban, Canadians can demonstrate the consequences of bad behaviour  
by radioing to a launcher many kilometres away, and suddenly the  
Afghan farmer is left with a large hole in his field and a new  
appreciation of NATO firepower". Galloway seems to be using the word  
"negotiation" in a technical sense; others less skilled in journalism  
or public relations might use words like "extortion" or "coercion".

Foreign troops mentor from a distance

The use of the long-distance "negotiating tool", combined with "close  
air support" (CAS), underlines the sometimes cautious, circumspect  
nature of NATO's presence in southern Afghanistan. Indeed, various  
media have reported on the hide-and-seek nature of counter-insurgency  
in Afghanistan. "The U.S. and NATO forces only venture out to conduct  
special operations. Routine patrolling and intelligence gathering is  
the responsibility of the nascent Afghan National Army," writes John  
Cherian. Further, he asserts that "loyalty of the Afghan Security  
Forces cannot be taken for granted... For instance, General Bismillah  
Khan, Chief of Staff of the Afghan National Army, is a former warlord".

Writing from Helmand province, the Globe and Mail's Graeme Smith  
remarks that "British troops were effectively under siege at their  
patrol base in Sangin [Helmand province] last year". And this fact  
isn't winning many friends for the foreign forces: "Those foreign  
[expletive deleted] say there is security - it’s a lie," charged one  
Afghan army commander. "They don’t risk their asses out here. There  
are Taleban right in the district centre, but the British and the  
Americans stay in their holes".

While Canadian soldiers appear to have been spared such disparaging  
accusations, it is worth noting the disproportionate share of risk  
alloted to Afghan forces. Afghan army and police officers  
accompanying NATO troops sustain about 90% of the total combat injuries.

Mercenaries

So what is an occupying army, huddled behind the wire, supposed to  
do? Well, if you are NATO then you go ahead and pay some trustworthy  
locals to fight for you. That is, you hire mercenaries. Under the  
headline, "British hire anti-Taliban mercenaries", the Times of  
London reports on "newly formed tribal police who will be recruited  
by paying a higher rate than the Taliban."

Canadian forces, too, are getting in on the action. "For five years  
Col. Toorjan, a turbaned, tough-as-nails, 33-year-old soldier, has  
been working alongside U.S. and Canadian forces in Afghanistan as a  
paid mercenary commander," reports Canada's National Post. "Today,  
his militia force of 60 Afghan fighters guards Camp Nathan Smith, the  
Canadian provincial reconstruction team site (PRT) in Kandahar, and  
guides Canadian soldiers on their patrols outside the base." Toorjan  
and his armed men "wield significant influence in Kandahar's complex  
security web", making him a treasured ally, though before 9/11 he was  
"in effect a warlord", said the second-in-command of Canada's  
Provincial Reconstruction Team.

The use of mercenaries, it should be noted, runs counter to the  
International Convention on Mercenaries (1989). Canada, however,  
along with the USA, the UK and many others, is not a signatory to  
that treaty.

Air strikes

The use of mercenaries isn't the only indication that NATO/US troops  
are ill-equipped for this war. The reliance on air power, which has  
been a vital part of this confrontation since the US-led assault  
began in October of 2001, has brought wide-spread condemnation for  
the risk to civilians which it entails. Thousands of civilians have  
perished under US and NATO bombs since 2001, prompting numerous calls  
by Afghan President Karzai for more caution on the part of western  
forces.

In the current situation, it is largely American aircraft which carry  
out air assaults. (The British, French, Germans and others have also  
committed aircraft, which are largely used in transport or  
surveillance.) Called "close air support" (CAS), these war planes are  
routinely called in by ground forces when they locate insurgent  
fighters. The CAS might deliver bombs, missiles, shells or simply a  
"show of force" to destroy or deter those fighters. But these attacks  
are a blunt instrument, and civilian casualties are a frequent  
consequence. "[P]ushing into insurgent-held territory", writes Terri  
Judd of the Independent, "increases the danger of civilian  
casualties, especially when outnumbered troops call in air strikes".

The results of this type of assault have been a humanitarian and  
public relations disaster for NATO and US forces. “NATO’s tactics are  
increasingly endangering the civilians that they are supposed to be  
protecting, and turning the local population against them,” observed  
Sam Zia-Zarifi, the Afghanistan researcher for Human Rights Watch.  
Yet the foreign forces appear to have expended little effort to  
ameliorate the situation, as the rate of air attacks through the  
summer and into the fall of 2007 demonstrate: Close air support  
missions have been launched at a remarkably steady rate of about 40  
per day.

The sheer danger of these air operations has not been lost on  
international observers on the ground. Human rights expert and UN  
official in Afghanistan Javier Leon Diaz, responding to concerns over  
mounting civilian casualties, expressed his opinion that NATO/US air  
attacks may constitute a "grave breach" of the Geneva Conventions.  
Here, Diaz no doubt refers to Article 51 of the 1977 Protocols, which  
bans "indiscrimate" attacks, defined as attacks which harm civilians  
and/or civilian objects "which would be excessive in relation to the  
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."

Engaging (suspected) Taliban

While western military officials repeatedly affirm their desire to  
protect the Afghan population, at least one account indicates that  
NATO efforts to avoid causing harm to civilians are less than  
vigorous. Canadian military historian Sean Maloney, writing in  
Maclean's magazine, describes a nighttime attack by Canadian Forces  
in Kandahar province: "Canadian artillery thundered to cut off and  
destroy the escaping enemy. Little was left to chance: troops knew  
the enemy had depopulated the area so there was little fear of  
civilian casualties." Note that if Maloney's account is accurate,  
Canadian troops relied on Taliban fighters to ensure the battleground  
was free of civilians.

Armed confrontations aren't the only situations where civilian lives  
are put at risk, for "sometimes all it takes to be labelled a  
terrorist is a smart turban and pocketful of Pakistan cash", remarks  
journalist Richard Foot. Foot writes of witnessing one such incident  
where a suspect was fruitlessly interrogated and finally let go. "For  
two hours, Canadians questioned, cursed at and threatened their  
suspect in search of answers," he writes. "They bound his wrists and  
turned him over to the small unit of Afghan army troops who had  
accompanied the Canadians".

Sometimes Canadian troops go beyond curses and threats, according to  
correspondent Graeme Smith of the Globe and Mail. Smith's April 2007  
dispatches, featuring a series of testimonials by Afghan prisoners,  
sparked what has been called the "torture scandal" by Canadian media;  
the term denotes torture of suspected Taliban by Afghan security  
forces, which caused quite a stir. But none of the barrage of  
commentary which followed from his reports made mention of possible  
abuse by Canadian soldiers. One of Smith's sources makes precisely  
that accusation, however faintly: "Tila Mohammed, 18, said Canadians  
detained him at a farmhouse where he had been living and working as a  
labourer for a wealthy landowner. He claimed the Canadians kicked him  
a little as he was being detained, but added that the troops later  
helped him stay cool in the late summer heat by spraying him with  
water."

A similar lack of outcry greeted a pair of incidents nearly a year  
earlier. Following an August 2006 suicide bombing in Kandahar City  
which killed one Canadian soldier, Afghan journalists "reported being  
fired upon by the Canadians when they tried to capture video and  
pictures at the bombing site", according to the Canadian Press. But  
the attacked journalists were the lucky ones that day, as a young  
Afghan boy was shot dead by jittery Canadian troops who had recently  
begun their mission in the country. However, the deputy commander of  
the Canadian mission assured everyone that the tragic incident was  
not the result of inexperience: "Initial impressions right now are  
the soldiers did what they had to do," commented Col. Fred Lewis.

Dave Markland, a member of the Vancouver Parecon Collective,  
organizes with StopWar.ca and contributes to their blog chronicling  
Canada's war in Afghanistan: www.stopwarblog.blogspot.com