[R-G] Fwd: A Report from Caracas: After Referendum Defeat, Chávez Pledges to Continue the Struggle

[Anthony Fenton]

Socialist Voice
Marxist Perspectives for the 21st Century
Number 154, September 7, 2007
Web Edition: www.socialistvoice.ca
After Referendum Defeat,
Chávez Pledges to Continue the Struggle

A Report from Caracas

By John Riddell and Suzanne Weiss

John Riddell and Suzanne Weiss traveled to Venezuela at the end of  
November, as participants in a tour organized by the Australia- 
Venezuela Solidarity Network.

Responding to what he termed a "photo finish" defeat in Venezuela's  
December 2 constitutional referendum, President Hugo Chávez pledged  
to continue the struggle for the measures that were presented to voters.

Announcing the results on national TV, he accepted "the decision made  
by the people" and thanked all voters, both those who voted "yes" and  
those in the "no" camp. But he called for his movement to stay on  
course. "I do not withdraw a single comma from the proposal," he  
added. "The proposal is still on the table."

Chávez also recalled the words he used after the failure of the  
Bolivarian movement's initial bid for power: "As I said on February  
4, 1992, we could not do it – for now.'" On that occasion, the  
Venezuelan masses seized on the words "for now" (por ahora) as a  
commitment to fight on until victory was won.

Chávez closed by saying that a major proposal in the constitutional  
reform project, the expansion of social security to include workers  
in the informal economy and housewives, does not require a  
constitutional amendment and would be carried out as soon as possible.

The right-wing victory in the vote was paper-thin: 51% to 49%. The  
"no" camp increased its vote only marginally (about 2%) from the  
opposition's score in last year's presidential elections. The big  
change was the abstention of more than a third (38%) of those who  
voted for Chávez last year. Unconvinced of the reform proposals but  
unwilling to associate themselves with the opposition, they chose  
this time to stay at home.

Profile of the Reform

Chavez announced plans to reform Venezuela's 1999 constitution  
shortly after his reelection in December 2006, as a way to open the  
road for the country's advance to socialism. On August 15, 2007, he  
proposed amendments to 33 articles of the constitution. This  
triggered an extensive public debate in all parts of the country.

Following this discussion, on November 2, the National Assembly  
adopted a package that included not just Chavez's amendments, but  
others affecting another 36 articles. The referendum followed  
automatically 30 days later.

The reform's main provisions can be grouped under six headings:

Popular power: Creation of a new level of government consisting of  
communal and other councils that would receive at least 5% of the  
national budget and would take decisions not through elected  
representatives but through assemblies of all members.

Non-capitalist economic development: Provisions for new forms of  
collective, social, and public property alongside private ownership;  
subjection of the central bank to government direction; stronger  
measures for land reform and against capitalist speculation.

Deepening social inclusion: A variety of measures to counter  
discrimination, democratize higher education, and move towards a 36- 
hour work week.

New territorial divisions: New presidential powers to channel  
resources to designated regions with special needs.

A stronger presidency. Removal of the two-term limit on a president's  
time in office; provision for suspension of freedom of information  
during a state of emergency (a response to the capitalist media's  
role in organizing the unsuccessful 2002 military coup); and other  
measures.

Socialism as the goal. The amendments proclaimed a socialist society  
as Venezuela's goal, without specifying what that would mean in  
practice.

(For a fuller outline, see Greg Wilpert's discussion in  
Venezuelanalysis.)

The view from the streets

When we arrived in Caracas, 12 days before the vote, the streets in  
downtown and working-class areas were lined with banners, posters,  
and graffiti calling for a "yes" vote ("Sí con Chávez"). The "no"  
campaign conceded the streets, relying instead on its vise-grip on  
the media—the strongest instrument of political control.

We saw little evidence of public discussion. Efforts were being made  
to circulate the text of the reforms, which filled several dozen  
pages of legalistic prose. But at first, we saw these distributions  
only close by the National Assembly. Not until the last few days did  
we see "red points"—with tables, banners, and music—carrying out the  
distributions across the city. In the last week, a "dual-column"  
version was also distributed. We spent time pouring over it, trying  
to grasp the changes, but it was slow going.

Only in the final few days before the vote did we see flyers that  
attempted to summarize the changes. Just back from a lengthy trip  
abroad, Chávez spoke stirringly during the final week in defense of  
the reform.

Nonetheless, on the whole, we did not see any concerted effort to  
explain why the changes were necessary.

A loaded debate

Most of criticisms we heard from "no" supporters were based on  
obvious distortions of the reform, including claims that the changes  
would abolish private property, end free bargaining for employment  
contracts, make Chávez president for life, abolish elections, and end  
free speech.

Other charges were even more fanciful: the government was arming  
criminal gangs and promoting incursions of Colombian paramilitaries,  
planning to take children from their parents, and preparing to  
convert Venezuela into a "totalitarian" state like Cuba or North Korea.

Such accusations were usually delivered in a scattergun style that  
made reasoned response difficult.

The whole debate was loaded against the Chávez supporters — to vote  
"yes," you had to support a wide range of proposals which were  
individually and collectively difficult to understand. But to vote  
"no" or abstain, you only needed to object to a single proposal, or  
just feel uneasy or uncertain. The capitalist media made certain that  
everyone heard plenty of reasons for unease and uncertainty.

The `yes' campaign

During our two-week stay, we talked to many hundreds of "yes"  
supporters. In the two mass demonstrations we attended, we carried a  
banner reading, in Spanish, "Canadians in support of the Bolivarian  
revolution." Marchers crowded round to greet us, talk to us, and  
express their internationalist convictions.

Given the complexity of the issues, it was striking how well and  
thoroughly these "yes" supporters understood the reform. Whenever we  
asked, "Which change is the most important?" we got specific and  
thoughtful responses, often quoting the constitutional paragraph  
number, and often taking up complex topics remote from the speaker's  
immediate experience.

Partisans of the "yes" often overestimated our knowledge of the  
changes. On a voting lineup in the "23 de Enero" district of western  
Caracas, a "yes" supporter, asked which change was the most  
important, replied, "Well, I'd say article 115, but also articles…"  
and he reeled off a series of article numbers, far too quickly for us  
to jot down.

We took part in a pro-reform student demonstration of more than  
60,000 – the largest such action so far – and a campaign windup that  
mobilized some 750,000 in downtown Caracas. Both actions were far  
larger than anything the "no" forces managed. At both events the mood  
was confident, joyous, and militant.

And as Chávez points out, the vote of 4.3 million for reforms that  
endorsed a course toward socialism is a historic achievement.

The impact of our discussions with "yes" supporters was overwhelming  
and is hard to convey to those who have not witnessed revolution.  
Here we have a revolutionary vanguard of hundreds of thousands,  
perhaps millions—experienced in struggle, wise, passionate, and  
determined—that has several times rallied a decisive majority to beat  
down attacks of the imperialist foe.

Defections from the Bolivarian camp

Yet again and again, "yes" activists told us that support for the  
reform in their milieus was noticeably less than support for Chávez  
in the presidential elections last year. This uncertainty in the  
progressive camp was reinforced by a series of much publicized  
defections, including the Podemos party (which scored 8% in last  
year's vote) and former defense minister and army chief Raúl Baduel.  
Many Bolivarian activists told us that the reform faced possible defeat.

In this context, it seemed to us that the revolutionary forces  
urgently needed to organize an intensive dialogue with those in  
Bolivarian rank-and-file who were uncertain about the reform. We  
expected to see efforts to canvass working-class areas similar to  
what took place earlier this year, when five million signed up to  
support the project of a new unified socialist party (the PSUV). But  
we saw no such initiative.

A PSUV meeting we attended in the Catia district of Caracas, a week  
before the vote, concerned itself with the organizing of scrutineers  
at polling places – a crucial and complex task – rather than with  
organizing discussions with voters in its region and getting out the  
"yes" vote. For the newly formed party branch we visited, just  
getting the scrutineers in place and provided with logistical backup  
was a major challenge. The party shows great promise, but did not  
play a strong visible role in the campaign. (See "The Battle for the  
United Socialist Party of Venezuela," by Kiraz Janicke.)

Hammer of counterrevolution

The opposition campaign proceeded along two parallel tracks. On one  
hand, "no" spokespersons – with Baduel and Podemos in the lead –  
cloaked themselves in the mantle of the 1999 constitution, an early  
Bolivarian achievement, claiming they merely wanted to defend the  
movement's original goals (although in fact, the opposition at that  
time had bitterly opposed that progressive document).

At the same time, the opposition readied its "Plan B." Opposition  
groups engaged in repeated violent provocations against "yes"  
supporters, including three wanton killings of Chávez supporters.  
Elements of the right-wing student movement that is strong in the  
country's traditional upper-class universities were prominent in the  
disorders. There was talk of insurrection if "yes" forces won.

Opposition leaders did little to disavow and prevent such actions.  
During the campaign they did not pledge to accept a "yes" victory.  
All this reinforced fears about voting.

In the aftermath of the vote, some opposition leaders made  
conciliatory gestures, clearly seeking to build a bridge to more  
conservative forces within the government. Yet the entire course of  
the opposition since Chávez's election in 1999 has aimed not just at  
halting the Bolivarian process but at forcibly destroying the  
revolution root and branch and fully restoring U.S. domination and  
oligarchic rule. In view of Venezuela's oil wealth and world  
political influence, the opposition's masters in Washington can  
settle for nothing less.

If the opposition can preserve its control of Venezuela's most  
powerful social institutions, starting with the private economy and  
the media, it has good reason to hope that over time they can divide,  
grind down, and crush the revolution.

This fact was a central motivation for the constitutional reform  
proposals. The Bolivarian movement's socialist course is not a change  
from its original goals, which included national sovereignty, a break  
from neo-liberalism, endogenous development, popular democracy,  
equality, and the well-being of the working masses. Rather, as Chávez  
has stated, these goals can be achieved only through a fundamental re- 
organization of society along socialist lines.

However, many supporters of the Bolivarian cause preferred to stand  
pat on the social achievements of their movement, rather than risking  
an uncertain advance toward socialism. The dynamics of elections  
under capitalism, which isolate working people from each other while  
maximizing the impact of hostile media, reinforce such conservative  
impulses.

Yet the revolutionary process has as yet been able only to slightly  
alleviate the grinding poverty of the Venezuelan masses. Society has  
only begun to recover from the devastation of neo-liberalism. A still- 
dominant capitalist class conspires to heighten instability, while  
seizing on it to discredit the government.

The revolution cannot stand pat. It must advance – or ultimately lose  
all.

That choice will be made not in parliament but in the arena of mass  
social struggles, where the multi-millioned Bolivarian vanguard, if  
successfully deployed, has decisive political weight.

The referendum's outcome is a serious setback. But the resolute  
response of President Chávez, plus the vigor and determination of the  
Bolivarian ranks, provide good reason to believe that the revolution  
will resume its forward march.






SOCIALIST VOICE
Editors: Roger Annis, John Riddell
Managing Editor: Ian Angus
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