[R-G] AAI: Washington Watch: The Peace Process on Life Support

[james m nordlund]

Washington Watch: The Peace Process on Life Support, By James Zogby
December 3, 2007

http://www.aaiusa.org/

The Annapolis Conference turned out to be much less than the "historic 
breakthrough" hyped by official briefers and dutifully (or naively) echoed

in mainstream media.

In fact, Annapolis was only historic if one ignores the Madrid Conference
of 
1992.  Or if one discounts the significance of the Israeli-Palestinian 
Accords signed in Oslo, Cairo, Paris, Washington, and Wye. Or the major 
post-Oslo economic summits in Casablanca and Amman. Or even George Bush's 
own multi-nation gathering at Sharm el-Sheikh. In other words, Annapolis
was 
only historic if one either disregards history or discounts its
importance.

Seen in this larger context, Annapolis, at best, represented a rather sad 
and pale reminder of what was, what might have been, what was lost, and 
several steps back from where the peace process was seven years ago.

One wants to be hopeful and supportive of every effort to end this
horrible 
conflict, securing for Palestinians their long-denied rights. Given what 
transpired in the lead-up to Annapolis and at the Conference itself, 
however, it's hard to be optimistic.

In the six months since the Bush Administration announced the Conference, 
too little preparation left the meeting, its agenda and goals, in limbo 
until the final day.  And despite U.S. assurances to Arab participants
that 
Israel would make significant confidence building gestures toward the 
Palestinians before the Conference, these did not occur.

Scrutinizing the joint statement issued by the parties at Annapolis, and 
examining in close detail statements issued by President Bush and Israeli 
Prime Minister Olmert, there was little indication of any real movement 
toward a positive outcome. The goals set in the joint statement were too 
vague and limited, and the rhetoric used by the two leaders reflected old 
and failed hard-line policies that have brought stalemate for the last
seven 
years.

The joint Israeli-Palestinian statement reflected, in itself, the 
fundamental dilemma plaguing this entire process. Both parties are 
politically weak. The Israelis, however, are by far the dominant force,
able 
to dictate terms to their liking. Under these circumstances, the best 
Palestinians can do is say "no." In this situation, for real substantive 
negotiations to take place, a third party (presumably the U.S.) must be 
willing and able to offer support to strengthen both the Israeli and 
Palestinian leaders, and to balance the scale between them by protecting
the 
interests of the less powerful Palestinian negotiators. With the refusal
of 
the U.S. to play this role, the result is an ambiguous statement like the 
one that was issued at Annapolis. In it, the best to which the Israelis
and 
Palestinians could agree was to negotiate "core issues" (which they could 
not agree to define except to indicate that "core issues" referred to
those 
"specified in prior agreements" - which they also could not agree to 
define); and to "make every effort to conclude an agreement before the end

of 2008." In other words, they could not agree to implement, but only to
try 
to agree.

For his part, Bush in his opening statement continued to espouse the same 
neoconservative vision that has infected his entire approach to the Middle

East since 2002. In Bush's view, democracy, like a magical elixir, trumps 
justice, and therefore makes all things right. Given this, Palestinians,
he 
argued, should focus less on their borders and more on the character of 
their state. In Bush's view, then, the challenges facing Palestinians are 
not to secure their rights and gain sovereignty, but to root out terror, 
establish a working democracy, operate with transparency, and form the 
institutions of a free society - all this before having a state of their 
own!

Bush added requirements for the Israelis in this process, but they were 
limited and far less onerous than even those he previously outlined. All
the 
Israelis were asked to do is to remove unauthorized outposts, end
settlement 
expansion, and "find other ways for the Palestinian Authority to exercise 
its responsibilities without compromising Israeli security" - whatever
that 
means.

Israel's Prime Minister, aside from some statements indicating his support

for a Palestinian state and his commitment to make "painful compromises"
to 
attain that goal, said little that would commit his government to steps
that 
would put at risk his already fragile government coalition. For example,
in 
one stroke, he defined away the refugee issue, proposing only to assist 
Palestinian refugees to find their place in a future Palestinian state. In

another passage, Olmert describes his insistence that "previous
agreements" 
would serve as the "point of departure" for future negotiations. One of
the 
agreements he cited was President Bush's letter to Ariel Sharon in June of

2004. This, of course, was no agreement at all, but a unilateral give-away

by the U.S. President to the Israeli Prime Minister.

In that letter, Bush commits to Israel:

*        support for actions Israel takes to defend itself against
terrorism 
(presumably including extrajudicial assassinations, the construction of a 
separation wall and acts of collective punishment, etc.);

*        that in any future Israeli withdrawal, the U.S. understands that 
"existing arrangements regarding control of airspace, territorial waters
and 
land passages.... will continue;"

*        that the refugee issue will be resolved by the settling of 
Palestinian refugees in a future Palestinians state and not in Israel; and

finally

*        that "in light of new realities on the ground, including already 
existing major Israeli population centers, it is unrealistic to expect
that 
the outcome of final status negotiations" will result in Israel
surrendering 
these population centers, which include primarily the settlements ringing 
Jerusalem.

Given all of this, it is hard to see a breakthrough, or be optimistic. The

Conference is over, the delegates have gone home, preparing to meet "to
make 
every effort" to complete an agreement. In a few days, major international

donors will gather in Paris to provide needed financial support to the 
Palestinian Authority. That is a good thing.

The process is not dead; but absent a significant change in the U.S. 
approach, it's barely on life support.

Washington Watch is a weekly column written by AAI President James Zogby. 
The views expressed within this column do not necessarily reflect those of

the Arab American Institute.

We invite you to share your views on the topics addressed within Dr.
Zogby's 
weekly Washington Watch by emailing jzogby at aaiusa.org.

Arab American Institute
1600 K Street, NW Suite 601
Washington, DC 20006
www.aaiusa.org 


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