[R-G] Kolko / The Predicted Financial Storm Has Arrived / Aug 29
Anthony Fenton
fentona at shaw.ca
Wed Aug 29 19:55:15 MDT 2007
ZNet Commentary
The Predicted Financial Storm Has Arrived August 29, 2007
By Gabriel Kolko
Contradictions now wrack the world's financial system, and a growing
consensus exists between those who endorse it and those who argue the
status quo is both crisis-prone as well as immoral. If we are to
believe the institutions and personalities who have been in the
forefront of the defense of capitalism, we are on the verge of a
serious crisis-if not now, then in the near future.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bank for International
Settlements, the British Financial Services Authority, the Financial
Times, and innumerable mainstream commentators were increasingly
worried and publicly warned against many of the financial innovations
that have now imploded. Warren Buffett, whom Forbes ranks the second
richest man in the world, last year called credit derivatives-only
one of the many new banking inventions-"financial weapons of mass
destruction." Very conservative institutions and people predicted
the upheaval in global finances we are today experiencing.
The IMF has taken the lead in criticizing the new international
financial structure, and over the past three years it has published
numerous detailed reasons why it has become so dangerous to the
world's economic stability. Events have confirmed its
prognostication that complexity and lack of transparency, the
obscurity of risks and universal uncertainty, especially regarding
collateralized debt and loan obligations, will cause a flight to
security that will dry up much of the liquidity of banking. "
Financial innovation itself," as a Financial Times columnist put it,
"is the problem". The ultra-creative system is seizing up because no
one understands where risks are located or how it works. It began to
do so this summer and fixing it is not very likely.
It is impossible to measure the extent of the losses. The final
results of this deluge have yet to be calculated. Even many of the
players who have stakes in the countless arcane investment
instruments are utterly ignorant. The sums are enormous.
Only a few of the many measures give us a rough estimate:
The present crisis began-it has scarcely ended there--with subprime
mortgage loans in the U.S., which were valued at over $1.3 trillion
at the beginning of 2007 but are, for practical purposes, worth far,
far less today. We can ignore the impact of this crisis on U.S.
housing prices, but some projections are of a 10 percent decline-
another trillion or so. Indirectly, of course, the mortgage crisis
has also brought many millions of people into the larger financial
world and they will get badly hurt.
What the subprime market did was unleash a far greater maelstrom
involving banks in Germany, France, Asia, and throughout the world,
calling into question much of the world financial system as it has
developed over the past decade.
Investment banks hold about $300 billion in private equity debts they
planned to place-mainly in leveraged buy-outs. They will be forced to
sell them at discounts or keep them on their balance sheets-either
way they will lose.
The near-failure of the German Sachsen LB bank, which had to be saved
from bankruptcy with 17.3 billion euros in credit, revealed that
European banks hold over half-trillion dollars in so-called asset
backed commercial paper, much of it in the U. S. and subprime
mortgages. A failure in America caused Europe too to face a crisis.
The problem is scarcely isolated.
The leading victim of this upheaval are the hedge funds. What are
hedge funds? There are about 10,000 and, all told, they do
everything. Some hedge funds, however, provided companies with
capital and successfully competed with commercial banks because they
took much greater risks. A substantial proportion is simple
gamblers; some even bet on the weather--hunches. Many look to their
computers and mathematics for models to guide their investments, and
these have lost the most money, but funds based on other strategies
also lost during August. The spectacular Long-term Capital
Management 1998 failure was also due to its reliance on ingenious
mathematical propositions, yet no one learned any lessons from it,
proving that appeals to reason as well as experience fall on deaf
ears if there is money to be made.
Some gained during the August crisis but more lost, and in the
aggregate the hedge funds lost a great deal-their allure of rapid
riches gone. There have been some spectacular bankruptcies and
bailouts, including some of the biggest investment firms. Investors
who got cold feet found that withdrawing money from hedge funds was
nigh on impossible. The real worth of their holdings is hotly
contested, and valuations vary wildly. In reality, there is no way
to appraise them realistically-they all depend largely on what people
want to believe and will take, or the market.
We are at an end of an era, living through the worst financial panic
in many decades. Now begins global financial instability. It is
impossible to speculate how long today's turmoil will last-but there
now exists an uncertainty and lack of confidence that has been
unparalleled since the 1930s-and this ignorance and fear is itself a
crucial factor. The moment of reckoning for bankers and bosses has
arrived. What is very clear is that losses are massive and the entire
developed world is now experiencing the worst economic crisis since
1945, one in which troubles in one nation compound those in others.
All central banks are wracked by dilemmas. They have neither the
resources nor the knowledge, including legal powers, to remedy the
present maelstrom. Although there is clamor from financiers and
assorted operators to bail them out, the Federal Reserve must also
weigh the consequences of its moves, above all for inflation. Then
there is the question of "moral hazards." Is the Federal Reserve's
responsibility to save financial adventurers from their own follies?
Throughout August the American and European central banks plunged
about a half-trillion dollars into the banking system in an attempt
to unfreeze blocked credit and loans that followed the subprime
crisis-an event which triggered a "flight to safety" which greatly
reduced banks' willingness to loan. In effect, the Federal Reserve
relied on banks to restore confidence in the financial system,
subsidizing their efforts.
Central banks' efforts succeeded only very partially but, in the
aggregate, they failed: banks and investors now seek security rather
than risk, and they will sit on their money. The Federal Reserve
privately acknowledges its inability to cope with an inordinately
complex financial structure. European central bankers are in exactly
the same dilemma: they simply don't know what to do.
But this scarcely touches the real problem, which is structural and
impinges wholly on the way the world financial structure has evolved
over the past two decades. As in the past, there is a critical split
in the banking and finance world and each has political leverage
along with clashing interests. More important, central banks were not
designed to cope with today's realities and have neither the legal
powers nor knowledge to control them.
In this context, central banks will have increasing problems and the
solutions they propose, as in the past, will be utterly inadequate,
not because their intentions are wrong but because it is impossible
to regulate such a vast, complex economy-even less today than in the
past because there is no international mechanism to do so.
Internationalization of finance has meant less regulation than ever,
and regulation was scarcely very effective even at the national level.
Not only leftists are naïve but so too are those conservatives who
think they can speak truth to power and change the course of events.
Greed's only bounds are what makes money. Existing international
institutions-of which the IMF is the most important--or well-
intentioned advice will not change this reality.
More information about the Rad-Green
mailing list