[R-G] USAF issues manual on 'irregular warfare'

[Anthony Fenton]

smallwarsjournal.com/documents/afdd2-3.pdf


  Jane's Defence Weekly  - August 29, 2007

USAF issues manual on 'irregular warfare'

Nathan Hodge Staff Reporter
    Washington, DC

Prompted by continuing emphasis within the US military on counter- 
insurgency operations, the US Air Force ( USAF) has issued a new  
doctrinal manual devoted to irregular warfare.

The new document, AFDD 2-3, Irregular Warfare, focuses on the role of  
airpower in counterinsurgency operations, including intelligence,  
surveillance and reconnaissance, air mobility, precision strike and  
other missions.

The manual also emphasises the importance of 'non-kinetic' missions  
such as advising and training, psychological warfare and public affairs.

In 2006, the US Army and US Marine Corps (USMC) issued a new counter- 
insurgency manual, enshrining a broader cultural shift within the US  
land services toward preparing for and fighting in asymmetric conflicts.

While the army/USMC document notes the role of airpower - and  
describes air forces as a 'tremendous force enhancer' - it also  
relegates the subject to an appendix. A draft of that manual also  
stated: "Insurgencies cannot be defeated from the air."

Major General Allen Peck, commander of the USAF Doctrine Development  
and Education Center, at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, told Jane's  
the new document is supposed to address a 'hole' in USAF doctrine.  
Previous doctrine classed counter-insurgency within 'operations other  
than war'.

"As we faced the new world reality that we need to codify what we  
bring to the fight in irregular warfare," he said. "Transnational  
threats and counter-insurgencies and unconventional warfare are here  
now and are going to be with us for a while - that's what drove us to  
develop the doctrine."

The new document comes ahead of a broader push within the US joint  
community to develop a joint counter-insurgency document. That effort  
is beginning this month, with a joint publication to be ready for  
approval in early 2009.

Gen Peck said the new document draws on counter-insurgency 'best  
practices' in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as from historical study.  
The USAF accelerated the development of the manual in order to  
publish it prior to the joint community beginning its work.

Much of the writing on counter-insurgency warfare stresses the  
importance of cultural knowledge and personal skills, and de- 
emphasises the US military's traditional focus on high-end,  
technology intensive warfare. Gen Peck said the USAF saw greater  
value in high technology.

"The fact is, we are using technology to great advantage, and it is  
an asymmetric capability: the bad guys don't have the capabilities  
that we bring to the fight," he said.

As an example, Gen Peck pointed to the use of aircraft targeting pods  
for surveillance and intelligence.

"Targeting pods were developed so that we could put a laser spot on a  
target and deliver a laser-guided weapon," he said. "And we  
discovered as technology improved that we could use optics to  
magnify, to see at night and see through low visibility conditions.  
And we could precisely geo-locate targets and we could put it on a  
datalink. All these technologies weren't developed for irregular  
warfare, yet they are being used every day."

While Gen Peck played down disagreement between the ground forces and  
the USAF over the general thrust of counter-insurgency doctrine - and  
emphasised that the USAF manual was not intended as a counterpoint to  
the US Army/US Marine Corps (USMC) manual - there has clearly been  
some friction.

"Our preference would be that you weave air power capabilities  
throughout the whole [Army/USMC] document," Gen Peck said. "So if  
ground commanders are reading this doctrine, it's not just something  
you have to turn to an appendix to read about what airpower brings.

"We view airpower not just as fires," he continued. "This is not just  
a matter of building your plan on the ground, and if you need air  
support, you call the air force. We feel that the best joint plan is  
built jointly and if you treat airpower as a manoeuvre force, air  
power can be used for ISR [intelligence, surveillance and  
reconnaissance, we can channel enemy forces, we can kill enemy forces  
and allow us to focus your ground forces in a more effective manner."