[R-G] Cigdem Cidamli: Turkish Elections and After

[Yoshie Furuhashi]

Excellent, level-headed analysis from a Turkish friend of MR! -- Yoshie

<http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/cidamli020807.html>
Turkish Elections and After
by Cigdem Cidamli

The July 2007 elections ended with results beyond the expectations of
most observers.  We will watch for possible coming earthquakes.

To explain the AKP's election victory, in addition to the AKP's own
tactics and policies, exogenous factors should be taken into
consideration.  These include the large vacuum at the centre right and
center left of Turkish politics resulting from the basic disabilities
of the dominant Turkish political structure.  The AKP's success is
substantially due to this vacuum created at the center of Turkish
politics and the inabilities of the party's rivals, which means that
such a level of election support may not be sustained in a different
conjuncture.

Aside from receiving unquestionable and efficient support from
international capital, the US administration, the EU, and media
monopolies, as well as benefiting from the aforementioned political
vacuum, what has the AKP actually accomplished?  Above all, the AKP
succeeded in responding to the "fears of disorder and economic and
political instability which might arise from internal tensions and
conflicts" of the mass of the people, who never feel themselves secure
and are always in fear of further deterioration of their material
social conditions: i.e. the poor, a large section of the middle
classes, shopkeepers, and the majority of Kurdish people.

AKP, at the beginning of this year, actually achieved a representative
position in terms of society's political common sense just after the
assassination of Hrant Dink, mainly because of the political weakness
of the Turkish left.  The army's declaration (the so-called e-coup
d'etat) in April, thanks to its preferred tactic of tension about the
presidential elections, helped AKP, which was just then beginning to
lose this position as representative of the general common sense.
During this process, Erdogan managed to re-grasp that representative
position and started his attack against the other party: i.e. the
nationalists' front headed by the army.

Erdogan has shown a certain skill in managing stagnant political
conditions thanks to his "powerful" advisors, though he always makes
mistakes in chaotic and agitated conditions.  Therefore, it is a bit
strange that the nationalist wing, which had carried on a severe
tactic of tension sending masses into the streets, did not choose to
make any big noise during the last month of the election campaign.
Some of the reasons for this might be the narrow-mindedness of
nationalist politics itself: their elitist orientation in terms of
real problems of the vast majority of the people; their single-minded,
semi-paranoiac attitudes; strict sectarianism of the leader (Deniz
Baykal) of the so-called social democratic party (Republican People's
Party) which has been for some time the main channel for the official
"secularist-nationalist" reactions of the upper middle classes;
Baykal's great effort to distance his party from the left along with
his tactics of opening up to the right; etc.  All these might explain
the change in political position of the nationalist wing from
agitation to stagnation.

However, in addition to these reasons, perhaps we should also look at
the two-and-a half-hours-long unpublicized meeting between Prime
Minister Erdogan and General Yasar Buyukanit, Chief of the General
Staff, in Dolmabahce just before the elections.  It is understood that
during that meeting a consensus was reached between the two about a
series of issues directly related to the elections.  It seems that
there was agreement on a framework in which their differences could be
expressed within "reasonable limits" about the position of Turkey in
regard to Northern Iraq; that the presidential elections system and
the anticipated referenda for it will not be put under too much
pressure; that no open operations will be organized against the secret
nationalist junta organizations within and outside the army, about
which the Chief of the General Staff too has certain concerns.  After
this meeting, the Turkish General Staff did not take any further steps
beyond engaging in some polemics about Northern Iraq and agitating the
Kurdish question a little with the help of its appeals for massive
participation in the "demonstrations against terror" (which followed
the nationalist rallies, on a much smaller scale).  This last was
obviously aimed to help the MHP (the fascist, racist Nationalist
Movement Party) reach the minimum ten percent of the votes needed to
enter the parliament.  However this second series of demonstrations,
while bolstering the MHP and agitating the Kurdish question, seems
only to have contributed to the dissolution of the tense atmosphere
that was created by the April nationalist mass demonstrations while
pushing a large part of the Kurdish masses behind the AKP.  In short,
in this process, the army as the main engine of nationalism was unable
to maintain a united and consistent position.  The General Staff
entered into some partial compromises and indeed at some point froze
the tactic of tension that it had previously accelerated.

Putting these developments together, let us recall the provocative
discussions concerning Turkey carried out at the Hudson Institute some
two months ago and revealed by some sources close to the US
administration.  Is it not unreasonable to see a connection with the
consensus between Erdogan and Buyukanit, reached during the peak of
tension just after the operations against the nationalist junta
organizations and the US administration's intervention, and the
ensuing total stagnation of the nationalist offensive?

The historical lesson that should be drawn from this by those pro-army
"nationalists" on the left is that, as was already seen in all Turkish
coup d'états and especially just after the 12 March 1971 coup famous
for its various leftist-rightist inter-junta games, it is never
possible to produce patriotic politics based on relations with, and
expectations for, such an Americanized institution.  This is
especially so today given the realities of our age and the global
stakes at issue in the Middle East.  The nationalist force today is
one part ravings of the disintegrating middle classes and the other
the reactions of ordinary people against religious fundamentalism, but
it is now in large part ideologically merged with reactionary-racist
concerns about the "internal conflicts and divisions."  Such a
political position cannot be led and transformed towards progressive
results.  Rather the inevitable point that such a political position
will reach is to take a place in a wing of the nationalist forces, to
adopt a racist position, and to be a dish on the bargaining table of
the ruling forces.

When the election results are evaluated together with the tensions in
the Middle East which are accelerating along with US pressures, there
are two alternatives left for the army in the middle run: the first is
to take a defensive position for a while and wait for a new big chance
to come; and the second is to accept a real change of course (which
can also be seen as accepting an internal liquidation) as a result of
US pressures and of the owner-of-the-state pragmatism of the army.
Until now the general tactic of the Turkish General Staff has been to
merge these two and to choose a route according to the strength of US
pressures.  The only development that can change this would be a real
shift in the axis of US politics.

***

Looking at the comprehensive picture that the elections put in front
of us, we have to emphasize two critical points for the near future.
First, as MHP has now become the rising center of nationalism, the
so-called social democratic party will lose ground and the merger of
nationalism with right-wing racism will accelerate.

Second, neo-liberalism, which was the rising hegemonic ideology during
the 1980-90s but which largely lost its ideological power worldwide
after 1999 (and in our country especially after the 2001 crises), was
able to partially repair itself during the July 2007 elections with
the help of "identity politics" and once more consolidated a strong
position. The main representative of the neo-liberal ideology and
program in Turkey, AKP, grasped a representative commonsense position
in-between the Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms, managing this by
creating a feeling that reasonable identity recognition would be
granted to Kurds and by giving hope to the Kurdish bourgeoisie that it
could enjoy a rent-sharing position if it is articulated with US
policies.  Together with its Islamist identity against secularism, it
convinced the Islamist masses that a moderate neo-liberal Islamist
process can weaken and change the official secularist regime.  And it
could even convince permanently depressed left identities that only
the AKP would give them a chance to survive.  Thus, community
formations at all social levels and in all social spheres were
encouraged, and communities were given a chance to survive as a way of
extending its own (and indeed the World Bank's) brutal neo-liberal
politics in the name of "social policy."  As the sum total of all
these, AKP now plays the role of a "freedom-lover" and even
"equality-lover" party against the authoritarian ideological-political
character of its nationalist rival, and it can hide the vacuums
created by neo-liberalism with its peculiar identity politics.

These developments imply an important result for the left: with the
defeat of the so-called social democratic nationalism, liberalism,
once more and this time in a new neo-liberal framework, will act to
repair its hegemony among some sections of the left, social democrats,
and Kurdish people.

***

When we evaluate the election results from the viewpoint of the
Kurdish movement, first, it must be said that Kurds succeeded in
entering parliament in a number sufficient to enable them to have an
official political group.  This opportunity, if wisely used, can
enable a new center of initiative to be created in Kurdish politics.
A Turkish-Kurdish movement can gain some strength in the Middle East
and in the international arena.

Of course it should not be forgotten that votes for independent
Kurdish candidates largely decreased in the Kurdish provinces of the
East and densely Kurdish populated provinces of West Anatolia, and AKP
undoubtedly became the only party taking the majority of Kurdish
votes.  The rise of AKP among Kurds will bring this party to a
position where it no longer can avoid the Kurdish question.  To be
sure, Erdogan should not be expected to take steps for any "solution"
in this area, unless he receives the strongest of guarantees from the
US.

On the other hand, a crossroad will be reached where either the
disintegration of PKK and the legal Kurdish movement would accelerate
or a more positive direction would develop.  The decisive factor will
be how the Kurdish legal party, in terms of its relationship with the
left opposition, takes a position against the neoliberal policies of
AKP.  It is possible that PKK would initiate a ceasefire because of
the new conditions (unless, of course, Turkey were to enter into
Northern Iraq).  But it should always be remembered that the US, at a
critical threshold in Iraq and in the entire Middle East, will be a
very influential factor over the development of the Kurdish question
in Turkey.  In the coming months, the most critical element will be
the US-Turkey-Iraq negotiations around the Kirkuk referendum and
Northern Iraq.  AKP politics about the Kurdish issue should be
expected to take its shape accordingly.

***

Meanwhile it is now evident that the so-called social democratic party
leadership will not resign after its election defeat and there will be
a long and deep fight between the different left-right fractions
within both this party and the nationalist movement.

Left explorations and initiatives for alternative projects will
accelerate in this atmosphere and various centers will try to gain
strength and position, including the new "social democratic" centers
supported by the fractions of monopoly capital and media monopolies
against the traditional sectarian leadership.  A prominent "social
democratic" figure who last year was the colonialist
administrator-governor of Afghanistan (Hikmet Cetin) on behalf of NATO
is included in this game now, with a heavy pro-liberal, pro-US
emphasis.  It seems that the ruling classes aim to have a social
democratic alternative as a hedge against any possibility of AKP's
weakening or going out of control.

Left liberalism, which during the election process was represented by
left independent candidates and which even considered the working
class as a part of its own identity politics, of course will try to be
part of these initiatives, including the only non-Kurdish left
candidate who won a seat in the parliament.  How the Kurdish deputies
will merge nationalism with left liberalism, which positions they will
take against AKP's neoliberal policies and US Middle East policies,
and how they will merge this with a Kurdish nationalist-liberal
framework all remain to be seen.

There is no strong possibility that in the coming few months the
presidential elections will again turn into a major crisis.  However,
in a period when economy will be under much more pressure, AKP will
start implementing a new course of neo-liberal assaults more
recklessly and this time introduce much delayed privatizations in
energy production and distribution and the remaining parts of the
health, social security, and public system "reforms."  These will
accelerate social problems, and at least partially weaken identity
politics patches over neo-liberal destruction, and create stronger
pressure to fill the giant vacuum in the sphere of social left
opposition.

The need for an independent and revolutionary left will become a much
more burning issue in the coming days.  At this point, in order to
overcome the hopelessness and confusion among the left, ideological
clarity as well as practical militancy will be more important than
ever.  In order to prevent the left from being taken entirely under
the influence of a new neo-liberal wave, just as happened during the
1990s, a vivid line of ideological, political, and social struggle
should be taken.

Under our concrete political and social conditions, the path of a real
left renovation can be built only by organizing, uniting, and
politicizing the mass struggles related to poor and working people's
basic social rights against neo-liberalism with a revolutionary
perspective.  This is not mere agitation but a realistic political
judgment and commitment that can determine the future of a left in
search of various alternatives.  One of the important problems for
this line is to concretely shape this political perspective along the
realities of AKP's assault program and to make it achieve political
and organizational richness.  Thus it is time for ideological and
political clarification in order to overcome the confusion among the
left by militant practice, step by step.

Cigdem Cidamli is editor and chief translator of the Turkish edition
of Monthly Review.

--
Yoshie